The question as to whether or not Iraq actually used chemical weapon-loaded Scud missiles during the 1991 Gulf War is still an open one. Further to this, there still remain outstanding questions about the claims that Iraq possessed illegally-retained Scud Missiles in the period prior to the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. There is no complete record to draw upon and no one organisation has ever been seen to have compiled an exhaustive and comprehensive analysis.
- A review by a former member of the Dhahran Scud Watchers Club
of the UN-supplied Iraqi December 7th 2002 CAFCD...
December 15th 2008
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has informed SCUDWATCH that they will not release details from Iraq's last 'Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Disclosure' on the following grounds:
Freedom of Information Request Reference: 0866-08
I refer to your request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 ("the Act") for
"Which parts of Iraq's ballistic missile declaration which formed section IV of the December 7th 2002 CAFCD are contained in the redacted version of the documentation which was sent to London for analysis following my earlier FOIA request?"
I can confirm that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has now completed its assessment of the information which you requested on 12 October and must inform you that the information you requested is exempt from release under sections 27(1)(a) and 27(2) of the Freedom of Information Act.
Section 27 of the Act requires the application of a public interest test. In reaching this decision I have considered both the factors in favour of release balanced against the factors in favour of withholding the information.
Releasing the information would demonstrate our openness and accountability as it would increase public knowledge of the issues we deal with and help to inform debate. However, balanced against this, we have judged that the factors in favour of withholding the information outweigh the factors in favour of disclosure. In respect of section 27(1)(a), the effective conduct of international relations depends upon maintaining trust and confidence between Governments. If the United Kingdom does not maintain this trust and confidence, its ability to protect and promote UK interests through international relations will be hampered. In respect of section 27(2), the information requested is confidential information obtained from a State other than the United Kingdom or from an international organisation or international court.
Only the 10 elected Security Council members received the redacted version of the CAFCD. We can confirm that the redacted version is also held within UNMOVIC archives and has been declared as confidential.
We are therefore satisfied that the redacted version contains confidential information provided by other States which would have been given to the 10 elected Security Council members in confidence.
The UN Security Council's view is that information provided in confidence by UN member States, should be kept under strict control. Access to confidential information held within the UNMOVIC archives is restricted for an initial period of 30 years. For reference please see the following links below:
Link to S/2007/680: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Iraq%20S2007%20680.pdf
Link to SG's final report: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/UNMOVIC%20S%202008%20372.pdf
In view of this, the confidential information contained in the redacted CAFCD should not be disseminated more widely. This was upheld in UN resolution 1762 dated 29 June 2007, to which the UK has agreed.
The effective conduct of international relations depends upon the UK maintaining the trust and confidence of other States, which allows for the free and frank exchange of information on the understanding that it will be treated in confidence. If the contents of the redacted CAFCD were to be released now, the other Permanent Members and 10 elected members of the UN Security Council may be more reluctant to share sensitive information with the UK in future. Furthermore, they may also be less likely to respect the confidentiality of information supplied by the UK to them, to the detriment of UK interests. This in turn would be likely to harm our relations with those Members, hampering our ability to protect and promote UK interests through international relations. For these reasons, we consider that the public interest in maintaining this exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the contents of the redacted version CAFCD.
For further details please see the SCUDWATCH FOI 8 page.
in relation to the request for details from the unredacted version
of the UN-supplied Iraqi December 7th 2002 CAFCD...
October 9th 2008
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has reiterated to SCUDWATCH that they will not release details from Iraq's last 'Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Disclosure' following a request for an Internal Review subsequent to their prior refusal to release information from the document:
FOI Request 0529-08: Iraq Declaration: Internal Review
You have requested an internal review of the decision, conveyed to you in XX-XXXX XXXXXXX's email of 20 August, not to disclose the entirety of Chapter 6 of Part IV of the December 7th 2002 "Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Declaration" (CAFCD) made by Iraq. Your request was made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. I have conducted a full examination of the case, and have concluded the following.
Search for information and consultation
I have reviewed the information sources used in making this assessment, and the breadth of consultation undergone. I have concluded that there was a broad trawl for relevant information, and am content that a reasonable search was carried out in relation to your request. I also conclude that all appropriate stakeholders (including those outside the Foreign and Commonwealth Office) have been consulted.
I note that the request was subject to two extensions and that, on both occasions, you were made aware of such. While it is desirable to reply to such requests within the 20 day deadline, I consider the use of extensions to have been appropriate given the complexity of the issues concerned, the breadth of consultation undergone, and the use of a Public Interest Test.
Use of exemptions
I have reviewed the exemptions used, and concur with Ms XXXXXXX's assessment that the information held by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is exempt from release under sections 27(1)(a) and 27(2) of the Freedom of Information Act. I also conclude that the factors considered during application of the Public Interest Test have been properly recorded and explained.
Factors in favour of release include that it would increase public knowledge of the issues and inform debate. However, as conveyed to you in the email of 20 August, the effective conduct of international relations depends upon the UN maintaining the trust and confidence of other States, which allows for the free and frank exchange of information on the understanding that it will be treated in confidence. If the requested information were to be released, such States may be more reluctant to share sensitive information with the UK Government in future, and may be less likely to respect the confidentiality of the information supplied by the UK Government to them. In both instances, there would be prejudice to relations between the UK and that State, and I therefore conclude that the information was and remains exempt from disclosure under section 27(1)(a).
I also conclude that the information was and remains exempt from disclosure under section 27(2), as it is indeed confidential information gained from "a State other than the United Kingdom or from an international organisation". It is clear from my review that the information requested is covered by the stipulations highlighted in Ms XXXXXXX's email, namely that it should be kept under strict control, and should be restricted for an initial period of 20 years.
Given the reasons above, I do not believe that the public interest favours release over exemption.
Your specific queries
I note the points raised in the third paragraph of your 10 September email in support of why the information should be released. These points were considered as part of my review and I note that they were addressed as part of your original request.
I do find that we have yet to reply to your request of 24 July for clarification of the precise meaning of
"...Chapter 6 of Part IV of the December 7th 2002 CAFCD is not/not contained in the redacted copy of the documentation...".
I can confirm that this is intended to mean that
"...Chapter 6 of Part IV of the December 7th 2002 CAFCD is not contained in the redacted copy of the documentation..."
For further details please see the SCUDWATCH FOI 7 page.
of the UN-supplied Iraqi December 7th 2002 CAFCD...
August 20th 2008
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has informed SCUDWATCH that they will not release details from Iraq's last 'Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Disclosure' on the following grounds:
Freedom of Information Request Reference: FCO 0529-08
I refer to your request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
I can confirm that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has now completed its assessment of the information which you requested on 25 June and must inform you that the information you requested is exempt from release under sections 27(1)(a) and 27(2) of the Freedom of Information Act.
Section 27 of the Act requires the application of a public interest test. In reaching this decision I have considered both the factors in favour of release balanced against the factors in favour of withholding the information.
Releasing the information would demonstrate our openness and accountability as it would increase public knowledge of the issues we deal with and help to inform debate. However, balanced against this, we have judged that the factors in favour of withholding the information outweigh the factors in favour of disclosure. In respect of section 27(1)(a), the effective conduct of international relations depends upon maintaining trust and confidence between Governments. If the United Kingdom does not maintain this trust and confidence, its ability to protect and promote UK interests through international relations will be hampered. In respect of section 27(2), the information requested is confidential information obtained from a State other than the United Kingdom or from an international organisation or international court.
Only the Permanent 5 members of the UN Security Council received the full un-redacted CACFD. It is held within UNMOVIC archives and has been declared as proliferation sensitive. The UN Security Council's view is that proliferation and other sensitive information contained in the CAFCD, which is treated as confidential or strictly confidential and provided in confidence by UN member States, should be kept under strict control. Access to this information in the UNMOVIC archive is restricted for an initial period of 20 years.
The 10 elected Security Council members received the redacted version of the CAFCD because it was deemed that they did not have access to the proliferation-sensitive technologies contained in the full un-redacted version. We are therefore satisfied that the full un-redacted version contains confidential information provided by other States which would have been provided to the Permanent 5 Member States in the strictest confidence. In view of this, the proliferation sensitive information contained in the full un-redacted CAFCD should not be disseminated more widely. The principle of treating proliferation sensitive information provided by Member States in the strictest confidence was upheld in UN resolution 1762 dated 29 June 2007, to which the UK has agreed.
The effective conduct of international relations depends upon the UK maintaining the trust and confidence of other States, which allows for the free and frank exchange of information on the understanding that it will be treated in confidence. The other Permanent Members of the UN Security Council may be more reluctant to share sensitive information with the UK in future (particularly with regard to proliferation) if the full un-redacted CAFCD were to be released now. Furthermore, they may also be less likely to respect the confidentiality of information supplied by the UK to them, to the detriment of UK interests. This in turn would be likely to harm our relations with those Permanent Members, hampering our ability to protect and promote UK interests through international relations. For these reasons, we consider that the public interest in maintaining this exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the entirety of chapter 6 of the CAFCD and list of supporting documents.