The question as to whether or not Iraq actually used chemical weapon-loaded Scud missiles during the 1991 Gulf War is still an open one. Further to this, there still remain outstanding questions about the claims that Iraq possessed illegally-retained Scud Missiles in the period prior to the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. There is no complete record to draw upon and no one organisation has ever been seen to have compiled an exhaustive and comprehensive analysis.

- A review by a former member of the Dhahran Scud Watchers Club


This page contains assorted US Department of Defense documents as collected by SCUDWATCH from various sources. As located, they appear in simple text format. SCUDWATCH has re-edited them for slightly for readability, but has not changed the content. As our collection increases in size we will attempt to group them into either subject or further chronological order for inclusion into the main body of this website. As can be see, most if not all are redacted, some heavily. Documents without dates are posted towards the bottom of this page. Highlighting by SCUDWATCH.


1- Iraq's Ballistic Missile Binary Warhead Capabilities - 8 NOV 90

2- Talking Paper for RADM Fox, DDIN, JS - 24 November 1990

3- Effect of Patriot Interception on SCUD Warhead Dissemination - 23 JAN 91

4- IRAQ SRBM WARNING REPORT - 24 JAN 1991

5- Request for Info Iraqi SCUDS - 27 JAN 91

6- Iraqi Chemical Threat Reassessment - 17 FEB 1991

7- Iraq's Chemical and Biological Warfare Capability:
Surviving Assets and Non-Use During the War - 15 MAR 91

8- Iraqi Nerve Agents - UNDATED

9- IZ CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARHEAD THREAT - UNDATED

10- RII-1488, MATING CHEM WARHEADS TO FROGS/SILKWORMS - UNDATED





1/. Iraq's Ballistic Missile Binary Warhead Capabilities

Filename:0502br.90

TASKER 2142 [ (b)(2) ]

[ (b)(2) ] SUSPENSE: 8 NOV 90 0200

SUBJECT: Iraq's Ballistic Missile Binary Warhead Capabilities

DISCUSSION:

DIA believes that Iraq has limited numbers of binary warheads for its ballistic missiles. These warheads are probably filled with precursor chemicals which when mixed in flight will produce the G-series nerve agent (GB or GF) or binary components to form the nerve agent VX.

[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]

Iraqi missiles are derived from Soviet SCUD-B short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) that can deliver an 800 kg warhead to a range of up to 300 km. SCUD accuracy is 850 meters circular error (CEP) at a nominal range of 200 km. In addition to the basic SCUD, Baghdad has two longer range systems which it achieved by reducing payload and sacrificing accuracy. According to computer modeling, the Al Husayn carries less than a 100 kg warhead to a range of 600 km, but with a CEP in excess of 2,000 meters. In April 1988, Iraq claimed the Al Abbas was test flown to a range of 900 km. Computer modeling suggests that the maximum range for the Al Abbas is about 725 km with little or no warhead mass. This missile will have a larger CEP than the Al Husayn, at least 3,000 meters, at a 600 km range. Iraq displayed both the Al Husayn and the Al Abbas at an October 1988 military exposition.

DIA believes that Iraq could have a few binary CW-equipped SRBMs aimed at coalition facilities in Saudi Arabia. However, due to poor accuracy, the most lucrative targets would be urban areas, as was the case with conventional warhead missile targeting in the Iran-Iraq War. Iraq probably has neither the number of warheads, firing crews, nor launchers to salvo-launch a series of CW- equipped missiles at coalition military installations (i.e. airfields) to compensate for poor accuracy. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)( ]

Saddam may believe that even inaccurate missiles could serve psychological purposes. Large concentrations of troops (without early warning and protective equipment) could be targeted but such a strike would require responsive targeting and good tactical reconnaissance, which the Iraqis are unlikely to have in Saudi Arabia.

[ (b)(6) ][ (b)(2) ]





2/. Talking Paper for RADM Fox, DDIN, JS

Filename:010bk.90d

[ (b)(2) ] 24 November 1990

Subject: Talking Paper for RADM Fox, DDIN, JS

1. Purpose: To address Iraq's chemical and biological warfare (CBW) capability and indicators to use CBW.

2. Talking Points:

a. Chemical Warfare:

Iraq has developed the most complete and sophisticated chemical warfare program in the Third World. Iraq has made nerve agents tabun (GA), sarin (GB), GF, and VX, as well as liquid and dusty mustard.

Iraq is continuing to develop its extensive CW capability. New agents and weapons systems for CW use are being investigated.

Iraq is expanding its chemical production capabilities to allow production of all presursor chemicals required for nerve and blister agent production without relying on foreign suppliers.

The world's largest chemical agent production complex is located at samarra, near Baghdad. Monthly production capacities have been estimated at 150 tons for mustard, 5 to 10 tons for tabun, and 20 tons for sarin. Production capacity for GF my be similar to that for sarin.

Chemical warfare agents are stored at eight major airfields in S-shaped bunkers and at other depots dispersed throughout Iraq. The total quantity of CW stocks is unknown but probably contains approximately 1000 tons of mustard and possibly hundreds of tons of nerve agents. The quantity of VX is judged to be 10 to 20 tons. It is unlikely that chemical munitions are located in Kuwait.

Iraq has a range of artillery ammunition 130mm, 152mm with binary and/or unitary fills, and 155mm their preferred system for chemical delivery, 122mm multiple rocket launchers with binary and/or unitary fills and with 2 or 3 canisters or bottles containing CW agent, 82 mm and 120 mm mortars, 250kg and 500kg bombs, and munitions for 90mm air-to-surface rockets fo ruse by helicopters. A limited number of chemical missile warheads is available for SCUDs and for extended range SCUD-type warhead missiles.

Iraq has prepared its forces for offensive and defensive chemical warfare operations. It has learned from its past errors in the Iran Iraq war in using chemicals. It has become the country with the greatest battlefield experience in using CW and is the only country to have used nerve agent weapons in war. Currently, its forces are in an essentially defensive posture.

Iraq has made preparations to launch CW attacks using fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. Although some activity has been noted near SCUD launch sites, the locations of CW warheads for the SCUDs are not known. Most likely targets for therse warheads include airfield, logisitic bases, and troop concentrations in the rear.

Iraq is likely to use CW as an integral part of tactical operations to protect key political, military, or economic strategic areas. One such area is the Northern portion of the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO). Iraq would be highly likely to use in any offensive into Saudi Arabia.

Iraq used CW in the Iran-Iraq War to deter or reverse a decisive and strong ground offensive by the enemy. Iraq would use CW in a premptive or integral operation. It would certainly use CW in any defensive situation to prevent its forces from being defeated or pushed back in Kuwait or Iraq.

b. Biological Warfare

Iraq has established a biological warfare (BW) program which is supported at the highest level of the iRAQI Government. The current capability proably consists of at least hundreds of kilograms of anthrax and tens of kiolograms of botulinum toxin.

More than fifteen Iraqi facilities possess the technical capability to support a BW program. The Salman Pak complex is the leading BW research and development facility.

BW has more of a stratefic role than does CW. BW would most probably be used prior to the initiation of hostilities against large concentrations of personnel, such as troop areas in the rear and cities. Both BW and CW can be used in a terrorist situation. Iraq has indicated that it would use both as terrorist weapons systems in major cities throughout the world, especially against countries which oppose its policy regarding Kuwait and have taken a stand against it or have seized its assets.

Prepared by: [ (b)(6) ]

[ (b)(2) ]





3/. Effect of Patriot Interception on SCUD Warhead Dissemination

Filename:092pgv.91p [ (b)(2) ]

RESPOND TO ITF TASKERS 3657 AND TASKERS 3547
PASS TO ITF OPS OFFICER
23 JAN 91, 1115 HRS, SENT BY: [ (b)(6) ]

23 January 1991

Subject: Effect of Patriot Interception on SCUD Warhead Dissemination

Reference: OICC Task 3647, What if a Patriot hits a SCUD with 1)Mustard 2) Most Persistent Nerve Agent 3) Anthrax-Range of Options, Hit High/Low/Mid Altitude Range, due 01/23/91-0500; OICC Task 3657, Biological Warfare (BW) Employment, due 01/23/91-1200.

Iraqi Chemical Delivery By Missile

Iraq is assessed to have a limited number of SCUD warheads with chemical fills. The most likely chemical agents for these warheads are the persistent blister agent mustard and the semipersistent nerve agent GF. Both binary and unitary fill architecture may be available. The most likely warhead configuration for these munitions is a bulk fill, but it is possible that Iraq has successfully incorporated submunitions similar to those in cluster bombs into their SCUD chemical warheads. The use of submunitions could further improve dissemination efficiency.

Chemical Dissemination by SCUD Missile

Normal warhead function for a SCUD carrying chemicals is to airburst at some altitude. The burst spreads the chemical agent over a wide area. The Army Chemical Research Development and Engineering Center (CRDEC) estimates a bulk filled SCUD can cover an area of about 688 hectares to a contamination of 1.0 mg- min/m3 when filled with mustard; a GF fill could reach the same contamination level over 733 hectares. Both estimates are highly dependent on weather conditions in the target area, and could vary significantly.

It is important to note that the missiles which have reached Tel Aviv and Riyadh contain significantly less payload than the figures assumed to make these estimates of contamination. The fill of the mustard-filled SCUD was 1311 pounds, while the fill weight for GF was 1166 pounds. The extended range SCUDs could carry only 100 to 400 pounds of agent. This will significantly reduce the area of contamination.

The inclusion of submunitions could alter the probable area of contamination. Submunitions can be disseminated over a very wide area. The relatively hard submunitions can be forcefully ejected from the warhead by a blast. Once released, they are aerodynamically designed to land upright and dispense agent upon impact. This can be a very good way to disseminate biological agents as well.

There is no evidence to conclude that Iraq has a warhead with chemical submunitions. No information on testing has been obtained, and experimentation with bursts at relatively high release points has not been seen. Nonetheless, Iraq does have submunition technology and chemical agents and missiles. They have the potential to make such a weapon, and could have done so without our knowledge.

Biological Warheads

Iraq is assessed to have some type of biological delivery capability. No details of the systems which Iraq would use to deliver BW agents are known. Some of the possibilities for BW delivery include cluster bombs, missile warheads and spray systems. Based on available information, none of these systems can be confirmed as containing BW agents.

Dissemination of BW agents from missiles could be an effective way to deliver toxic agent. The missile would ideally be detonated at a relatively high altitude, perhaps greater than 10 kilometers, releasing submunitions loaded with agent. Due to the extreme virulence of the BW agents, these submunitions would be spread over a very wide area, perhaps as large as hundreds of square miles.

The technology of BW dissemination using a missile warhead with submunitions is sophisticated, but within the capability of Iraq. Therefore, use of BW through this dissemination system cannot be ruled out. As noted above, Iraq has the agents, the missiles and the submunition production technology to produce these BW weapons. Their ability to effectively use them is suspect.

Estimated Effects of Patriot Intercept

The result of a Patriot intercept on a chemical warhead would be a much different event than an explosive detonation of a warhead. Rather than being explosively ejected at the ideal height, the agent will just drain out of the warhead. This will reduce the area of contamination significantly. Also, since the intercept will occur at an altitude in excess of the desired burst height, the losses of agent to the atmosphere will increase and further reduce the area of contamination. The impact of the Patriot could also act to aerosolize some of the agent. (This assumes the weapon would be set to burst lower than probable Patriot intercept.) In no case would Patriot intercept be expected to increase dissemination of agent.

The destruction of the agent by the Patriot system would not mean the loss of agent toxicity. The Patriot would not destroy the chemical or biological agent, just make it more difficult to reach the ground. Therefore, the Patriot will not completely eliminate the potential of the Iraqi missiles to deliver chemicals, but can greatly reduce their effect.

The effect of intercept altitude makes prediction of expected contamination very difficult. If intercepted high enough, the missile payload would be completely diluted by the atmosphere without producing any contaminated area. Lower level intercepts will result in a much smaller area of contamination than the missile, but possibly with higher levels of contamination.

POC is [ (b)(6) ]





4/. IRAQ SRBM WARNING REPORT (U)

Filename:627rpt.91j

DATE: 24 JAN 1991
TO:
SUBJ: IRAQ SRBM WARNING REPORT (U)
THIS IS THE FOURTH REPORT IN THE SERIES WHICH RELATES
TO THE SUBJECT WARNING PROBLEM. THIS INFORMATION IS BEING
DISSEMINATED TO PROVIDE WARNING TO U.S. DEFENSE

[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[ b.2. ]
- AUTHORITIES REGARDING THE DEVELOPMENT AND STATUS OF A SITUATION WHICH MAY THREATEN U.S. INTERESTS.

1. SUMMARY [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] INDICATE IRAQ INTENDS TO LAUNCH TWO SCUD MISSILES ARMED WITH CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WARHEADS AGAINST ISRAEL DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS ON 21 JANUARY 91. ONE SOURCE INDICATED TARGETS WERE HAIFA AND TEL AVIV. SOURCE INDICATED THE LAUNCHES WOULD OCCUR FROM 3608N 04132E IN NORTHWEST IRAQ. THE SAME SOURCE INDICATED A SECOND LAUNCH IS TO OCCUR FROM SOUTHWEST IRAQ VICINITY 3206N 04228E NEAR MUDAYSIS. MISSILE TO BE NUCLEAR ARMED AND TARGETED AT US/SAUDI BASE. ALSO DURING EARLY MORNING 21 JAN 91. THE LOCATIONS OF THE SCUD MISSILE LAUNCHERS ARE WITHIN RANGE OF INDICATED TARTETS IN ISRAEL, AS ARE US/SAUDI BASES IN NORTHERN SAUDI ARABIA AS FAR SOUTH AS 2545N LATITUDE.

2. BACKGROUND. THE POSSIBILITY OF SCUD LAUNCHES AGAINST ISRAEL FROM NORTHWESTERN IRAQ WAS REPORTED BY [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] DURING SEP/OCT 90 WHICH INDICATED THE DEPLOYMENT OF UP TO TWELVE MOBILE LAUNCHERS TO THE GENERAL AREA OF MOSUL, IRAQ.

NO OTHER DEFINITIVE INTELLIGENCE HAS CONFIRMED SCUD PRESENCE IN THIS AREA. IN THE AREA NEAR MUDAYSIS IN SOUTHWEST IRAQ, A SCUD MISSILE BEEN PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED AS SCUD DEPLOYMENT AREA.

3. ASSESSMENT. THERE IS NO OTHER INFORMATION TO SUPPORT ABOVE [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] REPORTING. THE INFORMATION WILL CONTINUE TO BE EVALUATED WITH FOLLOW-UP AS REQUIRED. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] POC FOR IRAOI SRBM TARGETING [ (b)(6) ] SUPPORT IS THE JIC TARGET SUPPORT CELL (TSC) POC IS [ (b)(6) ]

[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]

NNNN





5/. Request for Info Iraqi SCUDS

Filename:0pgv080.91p

27 JAN 91/2335 HOURS/SENT BY: [ (b)(6) ]

PASS TO DI-6B FOR COORDINATION.

SUBJECT: Request for Info Iraqi SCUDS

1. [ (b)(2) ] has long believed that Iraq possessed the technological capability to develop a chemical warhead for its SCUD and modified SCUD missiles. [ (b)(2) ] identified possible SCUD warhead crates at Samara CW production facility in late December 1990, and CW warhead testing is believed to have been conducted in the spring of 1990.

2. [ (b)(2) ] assesses that VX is a possible agent in Iraq's inventory; however, [ (b)(2) ] does not know if or how it is weaponized.

3. [ (b)(2) ] does not know if Iraq possesses altitude fuses.

4. [ (b)(2) ] assesses but cannot confirm that Iraq can use mustard with the SCUDS.

5. [ (b)(2) ] believes that Iraqi production efforts with SOMAN were unsuccessful; however, limited quantities of this agent could be in the Iraqi inventory. Iraq is trying to produce another semi-persistent nerve agent GF which is easier than SOMAN to manufacture.

POC: [ (b)(6) ]





6/. Iraqi Chemical Threat Reassessment

Filename:0407pgf.91
[ (b)(2) ]

17 FEB 1991 0830 SENT BY: [ (b)(6) ]
PREPARED BY: [ (b)(6) ]

FM: DIA/OICC
TO: ARCENT
INFO: CENTCOM

Subject: [ (b)(2) ], Iraqi Chemical Threat Reassessment

1. Iraq still retains a credible capability to employ chemical weapons against ARCENT. While Iraq's capabilIty to deliver chemical munitions by aircraft has been severely degraded, SCUD-B and artillery delivery have not been significantly impacted.

2. DIA continues to assess Iraq to possess a limited number of CW warheads for their SCUDs to include extended range SCUDs. There is no indication that the capability of Iraq to use these SRBMs to deliver chemical munitions has been significantly degraded. Coalition air superiority, however, has likely limited Iraq's overall SRBM employment by restricting firing times. The previous assessment remains that Iraq's intention is to withhold SCUD-B's employment until the ground war starts.

3. We have begun to consider with increased concern the possibility of SCUD-B (300 km variety) launches from south central Iraq into massed troop concentrations along the border. These missiles would be more accurate and carry more agent (approx 550 kg) and therefore may have limited success against military point targets. We reiterate the point that we assess Iraq to have limited CW warheads and thus could not sustain Cw attacks with SCUD missiles.

4. We assess that by 31 March most Iraqi unitary nerve agent will have degraded beyond usefulness. Blister agents will degrade but at a rate which will not affect there usefulness in the near term. The known production capability has been degraded by 75%.

5. We assess the Iraqis to have weaponized binary Cw nerve agents but that the majority of their agent remains unitary. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] assesses that the majority of agent is binary. Both [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] and DIA agree that neither assessment can be defended conclusively.

6. Coalition air strikes against the LOCs have not degraded the transportation system enough to affect the movement of Iraqi chemical munitions assets.

7. The majority of bunkers at airfields associated with chemical munitions have been either destroyed or severely damaged. The listing below is the bomb damage assessment regarding these airfield facilities as of 16 Feb 91:

TARGET NAME / BE NO. TARGET DESCRIPTION STATUS

Tallil Afld [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Destroyed-I5 Feb 91 [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]

Al Jarrah Afld [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Both Bunkers Destroyed [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]

H-2 Afld 3 Storage Bunkers 1 Destroyed, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] 1 severely damaged, 1 undamaged 14 Feb 91

H-3 Afld [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Destroyed- 9 [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Feb 91

K-2 Afld [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Severe [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Damage-10 Feb 91

Al Taqqadum Afld [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Moderate [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Damage- 4 Feb 91

Mosul Afld [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Destroyed- 28 [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Jan 91

Kirkuk Afld [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Destroyed- 15 [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Feb 91

8. Most of the airfields in southern and southeastern Iraq, including airfields in Kuwait, have suffered significant damage to runways and operational support facilities. Although the Iraqis have demonstrated energetic rapid runway repair efforts, the overall effect of the MCF airstrikes has largely constrained Iraq's capability to stage and sustain sortie generation against Coalition Forces.

9. Coalition destruction of aircraft, Iraqi aircraft in Iran, and the wide dispersal of remaining aircraft will significantly degrade Iraq's capability to conduct chemical warfare. The concentration of bombing on aircraft shelters near the FEBA has probably destroyed a great number of the ground attack aircraft capable of employing CW munitions noted deployed to southern Iraq and Kuwait before the outbreak of hostilities. Therefore, if CW munitions are to be used, the remaining aircraft will have to come from more distant bases This will increase the probability of their detection and destruction by coalition aircraft well before they reach the battlefront.

10. It is currently believed that Iraqi aircraft now in Iran will probably not be launched from Iranian airbases (though the possibility cannot be discounted). This further degrades Iraqi air force CW capabilities. The dispersal of Iraqi aircraft, given the current degradation of Iraqi C3 capabilities, will difficult for the IZAF to employ CW munitions in a coherent or coordinated manner. However, the current state of the IZAF does not preclude the possibility of a successful "leak through' of aircraft should the Iraqis attempt to conduct an attack using air defense saturation techniques.

11. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]

12. Initial release authority for all chemical weapons (illegible)ably remains with Saddam Husayn, at least in the sense that Saddam has determined and approved the situations in which chemical munitions may be used. Sadam probably does retain greater control over aircraft and SSM weapons with chemical delivery capability, not so much because these have a particular importance in chemical warfare, but because these delivery systems are by their nature be better controlled from the center than can fast changing ground operations.

13. We assess that chemical release authority for aircraft remains with Saddam Husayn, and that he is still capable of communicating his orders to use chemicals to his commanders. Unlike ground forces at the front, to which chemical use authority devolves to below-corps levels, a chemical-laden air force must be tightly controlled to ensure they never have the opportunity to bomb Saddam.

14. Even though chemical munitions in the past have been kept at the corps level and delivered under close supervision to the firing units for a particular firing mission, there are several defector reports that chemical munitions have already been delivered to divisional artillery units. This would make sense given the differences in the present situation from that which existed during the Iran-Iraq War. In all likelihood, chemical munitions have already been delivered to those firing units assigned chemical firing missions. These units will probably be given two different contingencies under which they can fire chemical munitions. In a prepared fire, units will fire only those types of rounds which the corps fire plan requires. However, if the division is under threat of being overrun, the division commander has probably been given authority to use any means, including chemical munitions to defend his unit. Despite coalition emphasis on degrading Iraqi artillery, there are still more than enough artillery tubes and MRLs available to all divisions and Corps to fire a high priority chemical delivery mission.

15. [ (b)(2) ]





7. Iraq's Chemical and Biological Warfare Capability:
Surviving Assets and Non-Use During the War

Filename:0902pgv.91
[ (b)(2) ]
15 MAR 91/1202 HOURS/SENT BY: [ (b)(6) ]

[ (b)(2) ]

Iraq's Chemical and Biological Warfare Capability:
Surviving Assets and Non-Use During the War

KEY JUDGMENTS

Iraq's biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW) production capability has been severely degraded, but not eliminated. To completely reconstitute the BW system to pre-war levels would require a minis of 5-8 years, although a very minimal capability could be established much quicker. Reconstitution of the CW system to prewar levels would require a minimum of 3-5 years, although some agent production may be possible once the electrical power system is operational.

Chemical weapons were not made available to Iraqi units to use against coalition forces. While a full accounting of the plans of Iraq's military and political leadership is not known, they made fundamental miscalculations about how the coalition would prosecute the war, and how effectively their own forces would be able to respond. These miscalculations, together with the fear of coalition unconventional retaliation likely influenced the non-use of chemical weapons.

Background

Coalition air forces struck biological weapons research, development and storage facilities, as well as chemical weapons research and development, production, filling and storage facilities. The bombing campaign against these targets progressed generally in three stages, although with a great overlap between the stages. The first stage targeted both BW and CW R&D/production and CW filling capability. The second stage targeted BW storage, followed by CW storage. During the second stage, much of the R&D/production capability that survived the first stage was restruck and destroyed. The third stage targeted delivery systems in the field and targets not destroyed in the first two stages were also restruck.

Biological Warfare Research and Development, Production and Storage

Initially, four BW R&D/Production facilities--the Abu Ghurayb Suspect BW Production facility, the Abu Ghurayb Clostridium Vaccine Plant, the Taji Suspect BW Production facility, and the Salman Pak R&D/Suspect Production and Support facility--were identified and targeted by coalition forces. A fifth facility, the Latifiyah BW Production facility, was added in February 1991. As a result of coalition bombing, 11 of the 13 buildings associated with BW R&D/production at these facilities were destroyed and two were severely damaged. All five facilities are assessed to be unable to support BW R&D and/or production.

BW storage initially included 19 12-frame refrigerated bunkers at 11 locations. During February 1991 two additional 12-frame refrigerated bunkers were identified, bringing the total to 21 such bunkers. Of these targets, the original 19 refrigerated bunkers were all destroyed. The final two refrigerated bunkers were discovered too late in the campaign to be attacked.

Chemical Warfare Research and Development, Production, Filling and Storage

CW production included the Samarra Chemical Weapons Research, Production and Storage Facility, and three separate precursor production facilities at Habbaniyah. Production at Samarra occurred in 10 buildings, five of which were destroyed. Of the five surviving production buildings the most significant is P-6, which is capable of producing 50-70 MT of sarin per month. About 70% of Samarra's total production capacity was destroyed. The three Habbaniyah facilities were destroyed.

Three buildings at Samarra were dedicated to CW munitions filling and all three buildings were destroyed. At least one of these buildings may have been empty at the time of its destruction raising the possibility that Iraq has retained at least part of its chemical munitions filling capability and possibly other chemical related equipment.

CW storage capability was in the form of 8 cruciform bunkers at Samarra and 22 "S"-shaped bunkers at 14 locations. Of the 8 cruciform bunkers one was destroyed and the remaining 7 sustained only superficial damage. Of the 22 "S"-shaped bunkers 16 were destroyed and 6 suffered serious damage. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(2) ] architecture is not relevant to its ability to store agent or weapons, and Iraq [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]

[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]

[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]

Factors Deterring Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons

Iraq's failure to use its chemical weapons cannot be completely understood without a full accounting of the plans made by the Iraqi military and political leadership in preparation for the war, and the execution of those plans. Intelligence information on this subject remains limited and analysis of the reasons for deterrence is still preliminary. However, the following is an estimate of the influence of several factors which may have contributed to a decision not to use chemical weapons.

Major Factors

The reason chemical weapons were not used during the war was that they were not made available to the Iraqi troops. To date, we have no evidence that chemical weapons were deployed to the KTO. Iraqi leadership made fundamental miscalculations about how the coalition would prosecute the war, and how effectively they would respond. Possibly expecting the coalition forces to fight like the Iranians, i.e. attacking first with infantry followed by mobile armor, it appears the Iraqis felt they would have days or even weeks to move chemical weapons into the KTO once the war began. Given the above, it is likely the Iraqis misjudged coalition speed of advance, the degree to which their air force and artillery assets would be attrited, and the degree to which their ability to resupply would be degraded.

It is equally likely Iraq believed that both Israel and the coalition had chemical and nuclear weapons, and would use them if provoked. They quickly realized that these weapons could be delivered anywhere in Iraq. This impression was reinforced by public statements of allied and Israeli leaders, and probably led Iraq to conclude the consequences of any chemical attack would be too severe to justify their use and may have led to an early decision not to use them.

The speed and violence of the coalition advance which reached its objectives deep inside Iraq in only four days was probably the most significant tactical factor in precluding chemical use. Iraqi forces were constantly off balance, and coalition air supremacy made effective concentration of artillery for use against coalition ground forces virtually impossible.

With minor exception, Iraq did not take the military initiative during the DESERT STORM operation, and was constantly on the defensive. Coalition forces deterred Iraq from repeating the success it had enjoyed with CW during the Iran-Iraq war.

Iraq's C3 system was heavily damaged by coalition bombing. In addition, Iraqi commanders could not control their forces in part because of a complete failure of their intelligence system to evaluate the developing situation. The immediate establishment of allied air superiority denied Iraq information on the disposition of coalition forces, making fire planning extremely difficult. The limited information available may have resulted in a decision not to disperse chemicals within theater until the ground battle began and coalition force dispositions became better defined.

Destruction of Iraqi CW production likely had a significant effect on a decision not to use chemicals. The chemicals made earlier by Iraq may have deteriorated in storage, or Iraq may have miscalculated that their defenses would allow them time to produce and deploy chemicals later in the conflict. The loss of their production facilities would have prevented Iraq from making agent as needed, which was its practice during the Iran-Iraq war.

It is also likely that Saddam Husayn retained personal control of CW during the war, in order to allow a more complete evaluation of the military situation. However, the speed of the ground offensive, together with C3 problems, may have made this retention a significant factor, since release of chemicals would then have been more complicated and slower. It could-be that mistrust of any units but Republican Guard forces was a factor in this high level retention.

Other Factors

Iraq lost their air ability to deliver chemicals on the first day of the war, one method of chemical delivery preferred during the Iran-Iraq war. Artillery and MRLs then became the only sustainable means of delivering chemicals. Iraq also had a limited number of SCUD and SCUD-type missile warheads available that could have been used to deliver chemical agents. However, artillery, MRLs and SCUDs were attrited heavily during the allied air campaign.

Iraq was not able to fully supply its ground forces in the KTO during the war. Deployment of chemical ammunition would have had to compete for scarce transportation resources with all the other needs of the Iraqi forces. Large transfers of chemical munitions to the KTO may have been evaluated as too risky. The air campaign also destroyed most known and suspect CW storage in Iraq.

The weather conditions during the ground offensive were poor for chemical use. Winds were strong, generally out of the south and there was some rain in the area, which would have made the effects of chemical weapons unpredictable and therefore less desirable.

[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]

[ (b)(6) ]





8/. Iraqi Nerve Agents

Filename:0503wp.00d
Subject: Iraqi Nerve Agents

[ (b)(2) ]

[ (b)(6) ]

In response to your questions the following is submitted:

1A. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]DIA estimates on the number of Iraqi chemical warheads for SCUD missiles: DIA estimates that Iraq has 20-40 chemical warheads for its SCUD-B SSM's. A recent report [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] that Iraq has 20 chemical warheads for its SCUD missiles, enough for five or six salvos employing chemical warheads. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]

1B. What is the basis for DIA's assessment that Iraqi nerve agents will be militarily ineffective after 31 March? Iraq is not able to make good-quality chemical agents. Technical failures have reduced their agent purity and caused problems in storage and handling. This is a particular problem for the sarin-type nerve agents (GB and GF). Lower purity causes internal decomposition of the agent, significantly limits shelf life and reduces toxic effects when the munition is employed. We estimate the shelf life of these nerve agents to be 4-6 weeks. Mustard and binary agents have somewhat longer shelf lives. Mustard is also judged to be of poor quality, but it has less corrosive impurities, thus a longer shelf life. The chemicals used in a binary weapon are not true chemical agents. They must mix while the munition is in flight and result in the toxic binary agent dispersed when the munition is burst. These precursor chemicals have lower toxicity, so they are easier to produce with good quality than unitary agents, and therefore have a longer shelf life.

A chemical weapons production run probably was conducted at Samarra from mid-December 1990 through mid-January 1991. The nerve agent recently produced should have already begun to deteriorate, and decomposition should make most of the nerve agent weapons militarily ineffective by the end of March 1991.

POC [ (b)(6) ][ (b)(2) ]





9/. IZ CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARHEAD THREAT

Filename:053pgv.oop
[ (b)(2) ]

SUBJECT: IZ CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARHEAD THREAT

[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Iraq has successfully test launched a surface-to-surface missile carrying a binary chemical warhead. While DIA has long assessed that Iraq has had the capability to produce a chemical warhead, physical evidence such as a test launch [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] of chemical warheads does not exist. Furthermore, the accuracy of Iraq's SCUD and SCUD variant missiles' are so poor at extended ranges and so little agent would be' contained in each missile that upwards of 60 missiles would need to be directed against an airfield to pose a significant military threat. The SCUD missile as the Al Hussayn can carry a chemical warhead of 350-400 kg over a distance of 475-500 kilometerS, with a CEP of 1-2 kilometers. The Al Hussayn missile can take a warhead of less than 100 kg to about 600 kilometers, with a CEP of 2-3 kilometers. The Al Abbas can deliver a 200 kg warhead to a range of 600 km in width a CEP of 3-5 km. AIRBURST. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Iraq only possesses mobile TELs, 29 fixed launchers in Western Iraq, 3 launch sites with 4 positions each in Southern Iraq without missiles, and 6 flat bed trucks modified as TELs. The 29 fixed launchers in Western Iraq are not in range of U.S. forces [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(5) ] The three sites in southern Iraq are within range of U.S. forces if the extended range Al Abbas and Al flussayn are used, but are not a significant military threat to U.S forces. The most significant threat to U.S forces is if Iraq has deployed their SCUDS to Southern Kuwait. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] SCUDs were in Kuwait; however, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] unable to confirm SCUDs at airfields. US forces are within 350 kilometers from the Al Salem airfield in Southern Kuwait, well within range to become a significant military threat. If Iraq has placed mobile launchers at the Al Jaber airfield, US forces are within 300 kilometers.

Iraq has a research and development program for biological weapons and is assessed to produce anthrax and botulinum toxin Iraq is assessed to have a limited number of biological weapons. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(2) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(2) ] to the lethality, persistence, and delayed effects of BW agents, long range delivery systems including aerial bombs and missile warheads would be the preferred delivery means.





10/. RII-1488, MATING CHEM WARHEADS TO FROGS/SILKWORMS (CENTAF RFI# 803)

Filename:033pgv.91d
[ (b)(2) ]
TO: CENTAF

FROM: DIA VP TASK FORCE

SUBJ: RII-1488, MATING CHEM WARHEADS TO FROGS/SILKWORMS (CENTAF RFI# 803)

[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(5)]

3A. DIA ASSESSES THAT IZ LIKELY HAS A CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) warhead for the frog, although we have no direct evidence of such a warhead. DIA assesses that IZ is likely to have a CW warhead for its SILKWORMS. CW warheads would be mated to FROGS in a manner very similar to the way IZ mates CW warheads to its SCUD type missiles. DIA would expect that personnel performing the mating operations of these warheads would be outfitted in protective clothing and that there would be some sort of decontamination vehicle in the immediate vicinity.

3B: CW warheads are probably mated to SCUDs at the SCUD production facility. Mating of the CW warheads to FROGs would most probably take place at the facility which produces the FROG rocket body. DIA has no evidence that any mating of a SCUD missile CW warhead has been done at Samarra, the facility at which the chemical is probably filled into the SCUD CW warhead. If FROG warheads have been filled with CW, it most likely would have been done at Samarra.

[ (b)(6) ]