1991 Iraqi Scud Summary...
1991 Scud False Alarms...
The British position on CW exposure...
The Thirty Year Rule...
An Open Question...
Early Scud Summary updated by Scudwatch.
(Original sources unknown)
• eventually it was mentioned that there were 15 Iraqi SCUD Brigades with 15 launchers each, both mobile and fixed, totalling of 225. Estimates of replacement rockets, however, have exceeded 800.
• Software mod to Patriot computers that was supposed to help its sort and track of SCUD type targets arrives in Dhahran, one day after a tragic accident that might have been saved by the used of the software
- software had inaccurate tracking calculation that became worse over time
- unit in question had battery operating over 100 hours
- resultant errors were serious, needed to re-boot computers every day
• The modified Al Hussein SCUD that was fired at Dhahran was missed by the Patriot System due to a "once in a million" technical glitch, according to US Army investigators. The impact of the SCUD caused the death of 28 Americans. Col Bruce Garnett was quoted in Defense News (6 May91, pg20) saying that the system did not detect the missile. The US compound was guarded by two Patriot batteries, one of which was on a maintenance stand-down. The on duty battery failed to see the incoming missile due to strange combination of incoming geometry and other classified factors. The Colonel also said that of all the SCUD's fired, this one may have been the one that never broke-up in flight prior to hitting the ground.
• It was first thought that Iraq had only 30-40 SCUD missiles, then around 60-70, then as the war went on the estimates eventually went as high as several hundred. Now it is being said that Iraq has several hundred more SCUD's
• Present Patriot Missile batteries have a second generation software that will allow them to track SCUD's that break-up in the air (26 Feb Mod placed during War)
• 86 (102?) x SCUD's were fired between 17 Jan and 28 Feb 1991
- 05 x missiles never reached full launch height
- all were considered Al Abbas or Al Hussein Rockets
- 03 x missiles fired at Israel were Al Hijara missiles
- 43 (+?) x fired against Desert STORM facilities in Saudi & Bahrain
- 38 x fired against other targets, mostly in the direction of Israel
- 39 x fired against Israel
- 3 (?) x fired against other targets
- 29 x were considered "intercepted" by Patriot Missiles
- 07 x impacted targets with fragments
- 11 x came down harmlessly outside of populated areas
• 01 x SCUD observed exploding on ground during launch sequence
• 02 x F-15E's destroy three SCUD launchers, no proof that missiles were on them
• Observed/sensed : 35 attacks during 1st week
18 attacks during 2nd week
4 attacks during 3rd week
5 attacks during 4th week
• Patriot Software Version 34 (correction against false target firings) arrived in Israel and Saudi on 4 Feb91. Israel had 6 x Batteries on her soil, four of them commanded by US officers. 120 x new PAC-2 missiles were sent to Israel first by the USG much to CENTCOM's irritation.
• None of the 21 x Patriot Batteries in Saudi Arabia had "embedded data recorders" as did the Batteries in Israel which tracked all SCUD fragments and strongly suggested that the Pentagon assessment of 100% kill ratio was wrong.
© Copyright 1997-2003 Fighter Tactics Academy
The eight false alarms given on Log A (83 + 8 false alarms = 91 launches?) are recorded as occurring at:
January 21st 1991 - 01:30 A.M.
January 21st 1991 - 02:00 A.M.
January 21st 1991 - 03:30 A.M.
January 22nd 1991 - 21:00 P.M.
January 26th 1991 - 05:10 A.M.
January 26th 1991 - 11:45 A.M.
January 27th 1991 - 20:30 P.M.
February 23rd 1991 - 04:00 A.M.
Two of these events (January 21st 1991 - 02:00 A.M. and 03:30 A.M.) correspond approximately with events shown on the available second format NBC log sheet for January 21st 1991 as occurring at 02:13 and 03:24.
Further alerts on January 21st 1991 are seen to be called at 07:21, 11:45 and 21:25. These three events are not shown on the Log A account, which shows only three false alarms occurring on January 21st, these taking place at 01:30, 02:00 and 03:30.
'Evaluation of U.S. Army Assessment of Patriot Antitactical Missile Effectiveness in the War Against Iraq, by Steven A. Hildreth, Specialist in National Defence, Foreign Affairs and National Defence Division, Congessional Research Service, prepared for the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security', dated April 7th 1992.
From: Appendix 2: Official Statements on performance of Patriot ATM During Desert Storm:
Q: Have there been any Scud attacks into Saudi Arabia that have not provoked an alarm? Because I was told yesterday there was one in Dhahran and there were eyewitnesses to it, but no alarm went off.
A: There is not any confirmed Scud attack last night.
Scudwatch note: Being as the reporter had heard of this event "yesterday" this event must have occurred on the previous night and not, as the briefer suggests, "last night".
© 1992 Stephen A. Hildreth
British context re: GWS/I Chemical exposure, from December 1993.
Obtained from DoD GulfLINK:
File: 950719_68360155_94d.txt Page: 94d Total Pages: 1
IIR 6 836 0155 94/BRITISH POSITION ON CHEMICAL [sic]
CDSN = LGX637 MCN = 93343/21085 TOR = 933431430
RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS8530 3431430---RUEALGX.
R 091430Z DEC 93
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RHFPAAA/UTAIS RAMSTEIN AB GE//IN-CMO//
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N2/N22//
RHFUMHE/BRFINK MHE BOERFINK GE
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUQYSDG/FOSIF ROTA SP
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RULKQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUDMONI/ONI SUITLAND MD
RULKNIS/DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV WASHINGTON DC//NAVATAC/22//
R 091409Z DEC 93
FM [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
INFO RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5//
RUFGAID/USCINCEUR INTEL VAIHINGEN GE
RUFTAKA/UCIRF AUGSBURG GE
RUFTAKC/UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEHPG/USDAO PRAGUE CZ
[ (b)(2) ] SECTION 01 OF 03 [ (b)(2) ]
[ (b)(2) ]
SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 836 0155 94.
/*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/
COUNTRY: (U) UNITED KINGDOM (UK); CZECH REPUBLIC (CZ).
SUBJ: IIR 6 836 0155 94/BRITISH POSITION ON CHEMICAL
AGENTS IN THE GULF WAR AND ON THE GULF WAR DISEASE (U)
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTEL. [ (b)(2) ]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DOI: (U) 931202.
REQS: (U) [ (b)(2) ]
SOURCE: (U) [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
SUMMARY: [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] TEXT:
1. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] No Text here. Redacted.
Note: Section two seems to be missing.
3. (U) BRITISH DETECT NOTHING -- THE BRITISH OFFICIALS
STATED THAT THERE WERE NO POSITIVE CHEMICAL DETECTION
INCIDENTS FROM ANY BRITISH UNIT. BRITISH MONITORING
EQUIPMENT WAS LOCATED DOWN TO THE PLATOON LEVEL. THE
MONITORS GAVE SOME ALARMS WHICH RESULTED IN THE USE OF
MORE CAPABLE DETECTORS. ALL OF THE MONITOR ALARMS WERE
RULED TO BE FALSE ALARMS AS THE DETECTORS NEVER PRODUCED A
4.[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] No Text here. Redacted
5. (U) BRITISH REJECT THE IDEA OF A NEW DISEASE --
BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER THE GULF WAR, BRITISH MEDICAL
PERSONNEL MONITORED THE HEALTH OF BRITISH MILITARY
PERSONNEL USING NORMAL REPORTING PROTOCOLS. THE DATA
SHOWED THAT, IN SOME REPORTABLE AREAS, THE MILITARY
ACTUALLY EXPERIENCED FEWER HEALTH PROBLEMS DURING THE GULF
WAR THAN BEFORE OR AFTER THE WAR. MUCH OF THIS IS
ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE REDUCED CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL. NONE
OF THE REPORTED INDICATORS SHOWED ANY INCREASE. FROM THIS
DATA, WHICH COVERS ALL SERVICE MEMBERS, NOT JUST THOSE IN
THE GULF, THE BRITISH MEDICAL AUTHORITIES CONCLUDED THAT
IT WOULD NOT BE USEFUL TO INVESTIGATE MORE DEEPLY. WHEN
REPORTS BEGAN TO COME FROM THE U.S. OF A NEW "GULF WAR
DISEASE", BRITISH AUTHORITIES LAUNCHED A NATIONAL APPEAL
FOR ANYONE WHO MIGHT HAVE SUCH A DISEASE TO COME FORWARD.
THERE WERE THIRTY RESPONSES TO THE APPEAL, BUT SOME
RESPONSES WERE REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.
A TOTAL OF THIRTEEN PEOPLE WHO HAD SERVED IN THE GULF PUT
THEIR CASES FORWARD. THE CIVILIAN DOCTORS HANDLING TWO OF
THE CASES ELECTED NOT TO FORWARD THE CASES TO THE MOD FOR
EVALUATION. SIX OF THE CASES WERE PATIENTS SUFFERING FROM
ACUTE ANXIETY. TWO OF THE CASES WERE FROM PATIENTS WHOSE
SYMPTOMS WERE RELATED TO IDENTIFIABLE ILLNESSES. ONE OF
THE CASES HAS NOT YET BEEN EVALUATED. THAT LEAVES TWO
CASES WHICH REPRESENT PATIENTS WHO HAVE COMPLAINTS FOR
WHICH A CAUSE HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED. WHEN ONE LOOKS AT
THE GENERAL POPULATION, ONE DISCOVERS THAT THERE ARE
ALWAYS A NUMBER OF PATIENTS WHO HAVE COMPLAINTS WHICH
CANNOT BE DIAGNOSED. THE BRITISH FIND IT MORE LOGICAL TO
OPERATE UNDER THE ASSUMPTION THAT VETERANS WITH
UNDIAGNOSABLE COMPLAINTS FALL INTO THE "NORMAL" CATEGORY
OF UNDIAGNOSABLE RATHER THAN TO POSTULATE THE EXISTENCE OF
SOME NEW DISEASE OR SYNDROME.
COMMENTS: (U) [ b.2. ] - THE BRITISH NOTED THAT
THEIR NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM PROVIDES MEDICAL CARE TO ALL
BRITISH CITIZENS. THEREFORE, THERE IS NO NEED FOR A
VETERAN TO PROVE THAT A MEDICAL PROBLEM IS SERVICE RELATED
BEFORE HE IS ELIGIBLE FOR GOVERNMENT HEALTH CARE.
//IPSP: (U) PG 2520//.
//COMSOBJ: (U) [ (b)(2) ]
COLL: (U) [ (b)(2) ]
INSTR: (U) [ (b)(2) ]
PREP: (U) [ (b)(2) ]
ACQ: (U) [ (b)(2) ]
DISSEM: (U) FIELD: [ (b)(2) ]
WARNING: [ (b)(2) ]
ZONE NOT IN MSG: SCCODEWD
© 1993 DoD
From the Freedom of Information White Paper - Your Right to Know - The Government's proposals for a Freedom of Information Act:
Presented to Parliament by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster by Command of Her Majesty December 1997
6.1 A Freedom of Information Act will have a considerable impact on our public records system. Government records of historical value are selected for permanent preservation and, when they are 30 years old, they are made available to the public in the Public Record Office.  "Records" includes not just written ones but records in any form (for example e-mail).
A unified Act
6.2 The Government wants the two systems - Freedom of Information for current records and Public Records for historical records - to complement each other to give a unified approach to openness. We therefore propose that the FOI Act should cover access to both current and historical material. This will provide a comprehensive right of access to all records, regardless of their age.
6.3 At present there are both statutory and non-statutory rules governing access to historical material:
• the Public Records Act 1958 sets out the responsibilities of the Lord Chancellor as the Minister responsible for public records, the powers and duties of the Keeper of Public Records and the general rules governing the access to and selection, preservation and destruction of, public records;
• the Public Records Act 1967 sets the statutory closure period after which records must be made available for public inspection as 30 years, except for certain defined reasons;
• the 1993 White Paper on Open Government contains more specific guidance on the criteria for extended closure of public records and the retention of documents in Departments.
6.4 We propose that those rules relating to access rights to historical records be incorporated into the FOI Act (other aspects, such as the role and responsibilities of the Public Record Office, will continue to be covered by a separate Public Records Act). This does not mean that exactly the same access provisions for current records will apply to historical records. Those for historical records will reflect the fact that their sensitivity has decreased due to the passage of time. In moving toward a unified Act, we want to take the opportunity to improve the public's right of access to historical records.
The 30 year rule
6.5 At present, historical records must be made available to the public - in the Public Record Office - after 30 years. We have examined carefully the case for change and concluded that on balance it is preferable to retain the 30 year rule which is in line with international practice. In particular, we do not think that meeting the considerable costs of reducing the 30 year rule for all historical records would constitute the best use of scarce public resources.
6.6 Instead, under the new FOI regime which we are introducing, more records should be released before 30 years. Fewer records will be withheld for the full 30 years. This will mean that 30 year old records will generally be of a greater sensitivity than before. We think it right therefore that the threshold date should be set at 30 years, a period long enough to enable the great majority of these historical records then to be released to the public. One of the virtues of this system, in comparison with practice elsewhere, is that there is a set date by which it is known that records are going to be listed and be available for the public to use. This will continue.
Criteria for withholding documents for longer than 30 years
6.7 The overriding presumption is that all records preserved for historical reasons will be made available to the public at 30 years. The 1993 White Paper on Open Government laid down the strictly-defined criteria that must be met if they are to be withheld from the public for longer than 30 years. As part of our general approach to giving access rights a statutory basis, we propose to incorporate these criteria into statute, so that they have the same status as the tests governing access to current information.
6.8 The criteria relate closely to some of the specified interests identified for FOI purposes: defence, international relations and national security; information provided in confidence; and personal information. We will take the opportunity of the FOI Act to reformulate the criteria to reinforce this relationship.
6.9 We also propose to introduce an upper time limit of one hundred years on the withholding of material. Such a ceiling means that no information would be left indefinitely undisclosed either because it is not subject to any statutory disclosure requirement or because it is subject to statutory provisions which bar its release. We fully expect that virtually all of the public records held beyond 30 years because of their continuing sensitivity will cease to need protection after 100 years. However, because of the inherent sensitivity of the records in question we propose to test whether their disclosure could still cause substantial harm to the public interest.
Application of the criteria
6.10 Applications from departments for the extended closure or retention of documents beyond 30 years are put to the Lord Chancellor who is advised by his Advisory Council on Public Records. We propose to give the Advisory Council the statutory support of the Public Record Office so that such applications are checked against the relevant statutory criteria.
Right of appeal
6.11 The present route of appeal against extended closure or retention of records beyond the 30 year period - to the Lord Chancellor's Advisory Council - is unsatisfactory. The Council and its little-known powers are limited to making non-binding recommendations on disclosure. Furthermore the Council is itself involved in the initial decision to close or retain material. We propose to direct appeals on public records to the independent Information Commissioner.
The importance of record-keeping
6.12 An FOI Act can only be as good as the quality of the records which are subject to its provisions. Statutory rights of access are of little use if reliable records are not created in the first place, if they cannot be found when needed, or if the arrangements for their eventual archiving or destruction are inadequate. The fast-growing use of IT will further increase pressure on the records system. We therefore propose to place an obligation on departments to set records management standards which take these changes into account, having regard to best practice guidance drawn up by the Public Record Office.
The vast majority of records have little historical value and are therefore destroyed before they are 30 years old.
© 1997 Crown Copyright
The question as to whether or not Iraq actually used chemical weapons during the 1991 Gulf War is still an open one. This compendium reviews the circumstances surrounding the SCUD missile issue. There is no complete record to draw upon, and no one organisation has ever been seen to seriously attempt to compile a comprehensive report analysing these incidents in a CBW (chemical / biological warfare) threat context. No complete investigation of the Iraqi SCUD missile attacks has ever been made.
An examination of the basic facts show nine Scud missiles remained to be accounted for, two of Soviet origin and seven indigenously produced variants, along with nine 'special' chemical warheads (by Iraqi admission). UNSCOM, by 1999, had accounted for forty-three of these items out of an admitted production of fifty-two.
Given its overarching importance, the fact that this issue has never been properly examined is almost a form of evidence that there has been some kind of a passive cover-up, albeit with a completely benign exterior. Further omnipotent potential is carried by the possibility that some documentation surrounding these events may have been locked away for a period of perhaps thirty (or even one hundred) years by preceding US and UK Governments.
It is unlikely that in the recent (pre-2003 conflict) past Iraq would have freely admitted to a breach of the 1925 Geneva Protocol which outlaws the use of chemical nerve agent (or mustard gas) weapons. United Nations Resolution 687 decided that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of: (a) all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities; and (b) all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts and repair and production facilities. It did not call on Iraq to admit to transgressions of the June 1925 Geneva poison gas Protocol.
The only logical suggestion made here is that Iraq did militarily consume these 'missing' weapons in 1991. Warheads were not marked in any way to distinguish their content, so that individual units would not have been precisely aware of what category of munition they were actually firing. By Iraqi admission chemical weapons were deployed to the field, and then the USA bombed Iraqi communications into oblivion. The rest is fairly un-revised modern history.
© 2005/6 SCUDWATCH