Collection 11


The September 24th 2002 Dossier...

The 2002 N.I.E...

Dr. David Kelly and the BBC...

2004 Iraq Survey Group Scud account...

Saddam's intent...



The September 24th 2002 Dossier...




FROM: IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION - THE ASSESSMENT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

(Extracts)

Executive Summary

6. As a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has:

illegally retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles, with a range of 650km, capable of carrying chemical or biological warheads;

PART 1

IRAQ'S CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMMES

CHAPTER 1: THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

1. Since UN inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq in 1998, there has been little overt information on Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. Much of the publicly available information about Iraqi capabilities and intentions is dated. But we also have available a range of secret intelligence about these programmes and Saddam Hussein's intentions. This comes principally from the United Kingdom's intelligence and analysis agencies - the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the Security Service, and the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). We also have access to intelligence from close allies.

CHAPTER 2

IRAQ'S PROGRAMMES: 1971-1998

SCUD missiles

The short-range mobile SCUD ballistic missile was developed by the Soviet Union in the 1950s, drawing on the technology of the German V-2 developed in World War II.

For many years it was the mainstay of Soviet and Warsaw Pact tactical missile forces and it was also widely exported. Recipients of Soviet-manufactured SCUDs included Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and Libya, although not all were sold directly by the Soviet Union.

7. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had a well-developed ballistic missile industry. Many of the missiles fired in the Gulf War were an Iraqi modified version of the SCUD missile, the al-Hussein, with an extended range of 650km. Iraq had about 250 imported SCUD-type missiles prior to the Gulf War plus an unknown number of indigenously produced engines and components. Iraq was working on other stretched SCUD variants, such as the al-Abbas, which had a range of 900km. Iraq was also seeking to reverse-engineer the SCUD engine with a view to producing new missiles. Recent intelligence indicates that they may have succeeded at that time. In particular, Iraq had plans for a new SCUD-derived missile with a range of 1200km. Iraq also conducted a partial flight test of a multi-stage satellite launch vehicle based on SCUD technology, known as the al-Abid. Also during this period, Iraq was developing the Badr-2000, a 700-1000km range two-stage solid propellant missile (based on the Iraqi part of the 1980s CONDOR-2 programme run in co-operation with Argentina and Egypt). There were plans for 1200-1500km range solid propellant follow-on systems.

10. From Iraqi declarations to the UN after the Gulf War we know that by 1991 Iraq had produced a variety of delivery means for chemical and biological agents including over 16,000 free-fall bombs and over 110,000 artillery rockets and shells. Iraq also admitted to the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) that it had 50 chemical and 25 biological warheads available for its ballistic missiles.

The use of ballistic missiles

11. Iraq fired over 500 SCUD-type missiles at Iran during the Iran-Iraq War at both civilian and military targets, and 93 SCUD-type missiles during the Gulf War. The latter were targeted at Israel and Coalition forces stationed in the Gulf region.

12. At the end of the Gulf War the international community was determined that Iraq's arsenal of chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles should be dismantled. The method chosen to achieve this was the establishment of UNSCOM to carry out intrusive inspections within Iraq and to eliminate its chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles with a range of over 150km. The IAEA was charged with the abolition of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. Between 1991 and 1998 UNSCOM succeeded in identifying and destroying very large quantities of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles as well as associated production facilities. The IAEA also destroyed the infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons programme and removed key nuclear materials. This was achieved despite a continuous and sophisticated programme of harassment, obstruction, deception and denial (see Part 2). Because of this UNSCOM concluded by 1998 that it was unable to fulfil its mandate. The inspectors were withdrawn in December 1998.

CHAPTER 3

THE CURRENT POSITION: 1998-2002

1. This chapter sets out what we know of Saddam Hussein's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, drawing on all the available evidence. While it takes account of the results from UN inspections and other publicly available information, it also draws heavily on the latest intelligence about Iraqi efforts to develop their programmes and capabilities since 1998. The main conclusions are that:

• Saddam continues to attach great importance to the possession of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles which he regards as being the basis for Iraq's regional power. He is determined to retain these capabilities;

• Iraq can deliver chemical and biological agents using an extensive range of artillery shells, free-fall bombs, sprayers and ballistic missiles;

Iraq possesses extended-range versions of the SCUD ballistic missile in breach of UNSCR 687 which are capable of reaching Cyprus, Eastern Turkey, Tehran and Israel. It is also developing longer-range ballistic missiles;

Chemical and biological agents: delivery means

14. Iraq has a variety of delivery means available for both chemical and biological agents. These include:

• al-Hussein ballistic missiles (range 650km): Iraq told UNSCOM that it filled 25 warheads with anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin. Iraq also developed chemical agent warheads for al-Hussein. Iraq admitted to producing 50 chemical warheads for al-Hussein which were intended for the delivery of a mixture of sarin and cyclosarin. However, technical analysis of warhead remnants has shown traces of VX degradation product which indicate that some additional warheads were made and filled with VX;

BALLISTIC MISSILES

Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessment: 1999-2002

24. In mid-2001 the JIC drew attention to what it described as a "step-change" in progress on the Iraqi missile programme over the previous two years. It was clear from intelligence that the range of Iraqi missiles which was permitted by the UN and supposedly limited to 150kms was being extended and that work was under way on larger engines for longer-range missiles.

25. In early 2002 the JIC concluded that Iraq had begun to develop missiles with a range of over 1,000kms. The JIC assessed that if sanctions remained effective the Iraqis would not be able to produce such a missile before 2007. Sanctions and the earlier work of the inspectors had caused significant problems for Iraqi missile development. In the previous six months Iraqi foreign procurement efforts for the missile programme had been bolder. The JIC also assessed that Iraq retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles from before the Gulf War.

The Iraqi ballistic missile programme since 1998

27. According to intelligence, Iraq has retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles (Figure 5), in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687. These missiles were either hidden from the UN as complete systems, or re-assembled using illegally retained engines and other components. We judge that the engineering expertise available would allow these missiles to be maintained effectively, although the fact that at least some require re-assembly makes it difficult to judge exactly how many could be available for use. They could be used with conventional, chemical or biological warheads and, with a range of up to 650km, are capable of reaching a number of countries in the region including Cyprus, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel.

© 2002 H.M. Government




The 2002 N.I.E...




From the CIA's October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate: Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs Key Judgments - October 2002

Iraq maintains a small missile force and several development programs, including for a UAV that most analysts believe probably is intended to deliver biological warfare agents.

Gaps in Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM suggest that Saddam retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant SRBMs with ranges of 650 to 900 km.

• Iraq is deploying its new al-Samoud and Ababil-100 SRBMs, which are capable of flying beyond the UN-authorized 150-km range limit.

• Baghdad's UAVs-especially if used for delivery of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents-could threaten Iraq's neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United States if brought close to, or into, the US Homeland.

• Iraq is developing medium- range ballistic missile capabilities, largely through foreign assistance in building specialized facilities.

Discussion

• UNSCOM inspection activities and Coalition military strikes destroyed most of its prohibited ballistic missiles and some Gulf war-era chemical and biological munitions, but Iraq still has a small force of extended-range Scud- variant missiles, chemical precursors, biological seed stock, and thousands of munitions suitable for chemical and biological agents.

Ballistic Missile Program

Iraq has developed a ballistic missile capability that exceeds the 150km range limitation established under UNSCR 687. During the 1980s, Iraq purchased 819 Scud B missiles from the USSR. Hundreds of these 300km range missiles were used to attack Iranian cities during the Iran-Iraq War. Beginning in 1987, Iraq converted many of these Soviet Scuds into extended-range variants, some of which were fired at Tehran; some were launched during the Gulf war, and others remained in Iraq's inventory at war's end. Iraq admitted filling at least 75 of its Scud warheads with chemical or biological agents and deployed these weapons for use against Coalition forces and regional opponents, including Israel in 1991.

Most of the approximately 90 Scud-type missiles Saddam fired at Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain during the Gulf war were al-Husayn variants that the Iraqis modified by lengthening the airframe and increasing fuel capacity, extending the range to 650 km.

Baghdad was developing other longer-range missiles based on Scud technology, including the 900km al-Abbas. Iraq was designing follow-on multi-stage and clustered medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) concepts with intended ranges up to 3,000 km. Iraq also had a program to develop a two-stage missile, called the Badr-2000, using solid-propellants with an estimated range of 750 to 1,000 km.

Iraq never fully accounted for its existing missile programs. Discrepancies in Baghdad's declarations suggest that Iraq retains a small force of extended-range Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of launchers and warheads. Further, Iraq never explained the disposition of advanced missile components, such as guidance and control systems, that it could not produce on its own and that would be critical to developmental programs.

© 2002 CIA




Dr. David Kelly and the BBC...




INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF DR DAVID KELLY

CONDUCTED BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD HUTTON

Terms of Reference:

"...urgently to conduct an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr Kelly."

(Selected Q and A extracts from the Hearing Transcripts of the Hutton Inquiry)

Day 2. Tuesday, 12th August 2003 (10.30 am)

MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, Mr Gilligan please.

MR ANDREW GILLIGAN (called)

Examined by MR DINGEMANS

Q. Can you tell his Lordship your full name.

A. Yes, it is Andrew Paul Gilligan.

Q. What is your occupation?

A. I am a journalist.

Q. And who do you work for?

A. The BBC.

Q. In what capacity?

A. I am the defence and diplomatic correspondent of the Today Programme on Radio 4.

Q. Can I then turn to the meeting on 22nd May. You say you had been in Iraq covering the war and you had returned in April?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was responsible for the meeting on 22nd May? Did you contact him or did he contact you?

A. No, I contacted him.

LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you something, Mr Gilligan? Where did you contact Dr Kelly? Did you telephone him?

A. Yes.

Q. So the meeting was intended as a general discussion about Iraq?

A. Yes. I mean, I wanted to hear from him why he thought no weapons of mass destruction had been found. You know it was quite a salient issue by then. He was actually -- he sounded anyway, maybe he was just being polite -- quite keen to hear from me what my experience had been. Obviously Iraq had been his profession speciality. He had not been able to go there himself for four or five years. You know he was always interested in seeing people who had come from Iraq to, you know, to get their impressions.

Q. The notes you made on 22nd May 2003, were those made with a pen and pencil or with some other means?

A. They were made on my personal organiser.

Q. Can we turn to BBC/7/57? This is the printout from your personal organiser?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you manage to make all the notes on one page?

A. No, I started a continuation file. I think either I just saved it and that takes you out of it and I decided to start a new file, or else this particular one file was full so I started a continuation file.

Q. Can we look at BBC/7/58? Is that the continuation file?

A. Yes, it is. Yes.

Q. Can we go back, then, to BBC/7/57?

LORD HUTTON: I wonder, Mr Dingemans, would it be helpful if you were to ask Mr Gilligan to read out the note in full so that everyone is aware of its contents because it is in a sort of shorthand. It certainly I think would help me and no doubt others. Just do it at your own time when you think it appropriate.

MR DINGEMANS: Mr Gilligan, whilst we are looking at the note, would you mind reading that out to everyone, but obviously where it has "wk" putting in "week".

A. Do you want me to include my questions as well?

Q. No, just the note at the moment.

LORD HUTTON: I think if you just read the note exactly as it is without putting in any additions or insertions.

MR DINGEMANS: Then I will come back to you and ask you about your questions.

A. The whole thing?

Q. Yes, just reading the note through, if that is all right.

A. "Transformed week before publication to make it sexier. The classic was the 45 minutes. Most things in dossier were double source but that was single source. One source said it took 4 [that should be 45] minutes to set up a missile assembly, that was misinterpreted. "Most people in intelligence weren't happy with it because it didn't reflect the considered view they were putting forward. "Campbell: real information but unreliable, included against our wishes. Not in original draft -- dull, he asked if anything else could go in. "Uranium from Africa -- not nuclear expert but was very suspect, documents certainly forged or forgeries. "10 to 15 years ago there was a lot of information. With the concealment and deception operation there was far less information. "It was small ...", this is the programme, I think. "It was small because you could not conceal a large programme."

LORD HUTTON: Is it "you could not" or "you do not"?

A. "You could not". "... you could not conceal a large programme and because it was actually quite hard to import things. The sanctions were effective. They did limit the programme. No usable weapons. "In one of the Jan", that is a reference to one of the Blix reports by Hans Blix to the UN, it said there were some "chemical reactors which had not been destroyed by UNSCOM. Glass lined chambers to promote chemical reactions. These were being used again by the Iraqis. They were recovered, they were taken to [that should be] Al-Munthanna [another plant] not properly destroyed by the UN, recovered by the Iraqis, taken to Fallujah and used for non-banned purposes." This is him discussing another thing that Blix overlooked. "The 18 chemical missiles", these were missiles with the potential for chemical tipped warheads although I do not think they actually obtained chemicals, "were reported by Blix but they were downplayed. Blix thought they were leftovers." I cannot read it, the type is a bit faint

LORD HUTTON: It looks like "thin". Is it "I think"?

A. "I think it is 30 per cent likely that Iraq had an active chemical warfare programme in the six months to a year and likelier that there was a biological warfare programme."

Q. You wanted to read into that your questions. Was there any question that had provoked the first note on BBC/7/57?

A. Yes. We started by talking about other things and then we got on to the dossier; and I said: What happened to it? When we last met you were saying it was not very exciting. He said: Yes, that is right, until the last week it was just as I told you. It was transformed in the week before publication. I said: To make it sexier? And he said: Yes, to make it sexier. Then I said: What do you mean? Can you give me some examples? And he said the classic -- he did not use the word example, he said the classic was the 45 minutes, the statement that WMD could be ready in 45 minutes, and most things in the dossier were single source. There is a bit more in there. These are notes. They do not --

LORD HUTTON: Most things in the dossier were double sourced, were they not?

A. Sorry, yes, most things in the dossier were double sourced but that was single source. These are notes. They do not note everything that was said. They are not a verbatim transcript of the conversation. They are only highlights. Some words are abbreviated, some sentences are abbreviated. There are quite large portions of the conversation which I have not noted at all.

LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you, Mr Gilligan, looking at the first paragraph, you put the question: Was it to make it sexier? And Dr Kelly replied: Yes, to make it sexier?

A. Yes, to make it sexier, yes, so he adopted my words.

Q. -- you were saying that your research was suggesting there was no intelligence. Someone was writing in The Times in August: nothing new. Indeed that is what you said Dr Kelly had said. In your textual analysis, recent intelligence, when you chased it through, did not actually say this. Dr Kelly is telling you here it is real information. Did you understand him to be talking about real intelligence?

A. Yes, I mean

Q. But his comment on it was that it was "unreliable and included against our wishes".

A. Yes, I mean to say there was nothing new to put in it, obviously there is new intelligence coming through all the time, but in order to make it into a dossier, it is or should have to be assessed as reliable. So I think that was perhaps the import of the comment in The Times that there was nothing that had been assessed as sufficiently reliable to put in a dossier. Obviously there was, they do get information in all the time; but, you know, not all of it is particularly reliable. I mean, Dr Kelly was in no doubt that there was -- and he said this and it was one of the things he asked me to say in the report -- that there was a WMD programme of some sort but he did not believe the level of the threat to the West was as great as the dossier had said.

MR DINGEMANS: That was the research. Was there any other research that you carried out before you prepared the piece for broadcast?

A. I did -- again, I mean, I did look to find other contexts and I saw a speech by Robin Cook, Robin Cook's resignation speech in March 2003. He said something like: Iraq probably has no weapons of mass destruction in the commonly understood use of the term. And he would have been --

Q. And how did he define the commonly understood use of the term?

A. A strategic device capable of hitting a -- a device capable of hitting a strategic sitting target, something like that. He would have been privy, certainly until he left the job of Foreign Secretary in May 2001 he would have been privy to the intelligence on that. That sort of coincided with Dr Kelly's view that any weapons that there were were very small and very crude.

(Short Break)

MR DINGEMANS: Mr Gilligan, I think you had concluded telling us about the research you carried out for this broadcast. Can I then take you to BBC/4/205? This is a typewritten version of some manuscript notes prepared by Miranda Holt. First of all, who is Miranda Holt?

A. She is one of the assistant editors of the Today Programme. She was the day editor who was on duty that day. Each edition of the programme is produced by two different teams of people, a day team and night team. They change over at 8 o'clock in the evening, overlap for an hour between 8 and 9. She was the editor of the day team on the Wednesday preparing for the Thursday programme on which this was broadcast.

Q. And do the first four lines of that note refer to what you discussed with her? Perhaps you can read them out.

A. "WMD -- weapons of mass destruction. Gary Samore. "AG meeting ..."

Q. AG is you, is it not, Andrew Gilligan?

A. Yes: "Chief British weapons inspector. 24/9 dossier 45 minutes. "Until the week before -- nothing significant in the dossier. "'Sexed up' 45 minutes -- added at Campbell's behest. "MI6 -- defector. 'To set up missile'."

Q. That did not refer to anything you were dealing with, did it?

A. No. Well "to set up missile" did, he said that.

Q. "We also discussed the failure of Iraq to use WMD and the inability to find them. I offered my usual and standard explanations (conditions early in the war not favourable to CB use and lack of command and control late in the war; that the small arsenal of weapons (or its destroyed remnants) compared to 1991 would be difficult to find without human information)." I think we have already heard from you that that was discussed and we can see that in your note; is that right?

A. Yes, and I mean -- I am not quite sure what he said about the human information part but everything else I certainly remember saying to him.

Q. Then he says this: "The issue of 45 minutes arose in terms of the threat (aerial versus land launch) and I stated that I did not know what it refers to (which I do not)." Is that accurate?

A. No, I think -- the conversation is as I described to you. The part of the conversation that related to 45 minutes is as I have described to you.

Q. "He asked why it should be in the dossier and I replied probably for impact." Do you recall him using those words?

A. No, again he raised -- he brought up the 45 minutes, it was not me who brought it up. He gave it as the classic example of the way in which the dossier had been transformed.

Q. Then: "In the course of the latter, as recorded in his letter, Gilligan had raised the reference in the September dossier to the possibility of weapons being deployed in 45 minutes. Kelly had commented that this did not correspond with any weapon system that he knew". I think you have already told us that did not form part of the conversation; is that right?

A. Well, as I say it was David Kelly that raised the issue of 45 minutes. He described it as a classic example of how the dossier had been transformed. I mean the second sentence in that: "Kelly had commented that this did not correspond with any weapon system that he knew". If you read the notes I sent to Miranda Holt, he is talking about there being conventional weapons in that time but not weapons of mass destruction, so that could be -- you know, there is something in that sentence of what we said certainly.

Q. Right.

A. But again I must stress it was he who brought up the 45 minutes.

Q. "Gilligan had asked why he thought the claim had been included in the dossier. Kelly had said that he had assumed that it was for impact. Although he did not know what the claim was based on, it emphasised the immediacy of the threat." Does that accord with your recollection?

A. No, I do not remember hearing the word "impact". Clearly, I mean part of that is the sort of import of what he said, if he said it was merely included for impact rather than because it was true, but I mean again that is not really an accurate reflection of the conversation we had.

Q. Right. After lunch I will take you through what he said about your conversation to the FAC.

LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much. We will rise now and sit again at 2 o'clock.

(The short adjournment)

Q. Turning to the bottom of that page, Mr Arbuthnot asked: "May I asked, the allegation that Andrew Gilligan made that someone had said that the 45 minutes, that the issue of 45 minutes was over-hyped in the document. That is not something that you recognised as having come from you?" Dr Kelly responded: "No, I think I may well have said that the 45 minutes mention was there for impact, yes, because it came out of a conversation, not about the dossier, but about Iraq, 'why weapons had not been used and why they had not been found subsequently' and then the question was 'well, if you have something that is available in 45 minutes surely it would have been used' and then, I cannot identify such a system that you could use within 45 minutes and then the question was 'why would it be included' and I cannot give an answer as to why it would be included." Was that evidence accurate?

A. No, I think -- I mean, this is not the context in which the 45 minutes came up. It came up in the context of my asking for examples of the transformation of the dossier and he said the classic was the 45 minutes.

Q. Dr Kelly, at the bottom of the page, having been asked if that was a statement that was there for impact, "was it a statement you think should not have been made", said: "I think I would like to quote Hans Blix who at the weekend said he thought it was unwise to have it there, I think that is probably the correct statement to make. I can't, I really can't say that I thought it should not be there because I am actually no (sic) aware of the intelligence behind it." Did Dr Kelly make you aware of any of those matters?

A. Well, he certainly conveyed his view that he did not believe that the 45 minutes claim was correct and he seems to have repeated that to the ISC or at least that it was unwise to have it in there. He clearly was, however, aware of the intelligence behind it. I mean, if -- because he knew that it was a single source and he went into it in slightly more detail. He said he thought it was -- let me get my notes. (Pause). He said they -- let us have a look ... (Pause). He said he believed the source was wrong. He said it took 45 minutes to construct a missile assembly and that was misinterpreted to mean that WMD could be deployed in 45 minutes. That is what he said to me. So he may not have been aware of the exact identity of the source, but he certainly was aware of some of the broad issues behind the intelligence.

Q. "... that they had such weapons and my whole background working for both the Ministry of Defence and the United Nations really supports the position of the dossier, and one of the comments I made yesterday to the Foreign Affairs Committee was that in essence you take a report produced in 1999 by Richard Butler, which was a status of verification achieved by UNSCOM and put that alongside the dossier, they match quite well and the two together essentially comprise quite a reasonable definition of the problem, the threat presented by Iraq, and I also hasten to add that it was not of course the UN's job to do a threat assessment, it was very much a status of verification, but you can read that in another way, assess it as a threat." Did you pick up those as being his views?

A. Well, I certainly recognised that his view was that Iraq did have the weapons programme. In fact, that was one of the points he asked me to make in my report, and I did so. And on the question of weapons themselves, he was not sure but he thought any weapons they did have were few in number and crude, and obviously the dossier is not -- is firmer than that. On the question of the UNSCOM reports, that did not really arise in this context. I mean, actually if you can -- if you look at the UNSCOM and the UNMOVIC reports, I mentioned this earlier, they do not say that Iraq has weapons; they say that it had them and that some parts -- and that many of them have been destroyed, but the verification of the destruction of some of the rest cannot be established. So the term they use is things like "growth medium" and things like that for biological weapons was unaccounted for. That does not mean they have necessarily got them, it just meant they are unaccounted for.

Q. And this is the Government dossier. Can you just share with us your conclusion about the Government dossier as it then was?

A. Well, I cannot see the whole thing here, so I mean essentially my belief was that this was, as somebody who had studied the area and knew quite a lot about it, from a lay perspective obviously, was that there was not very much that was new in it but there were a couple of points, two or three points. That was how I expressed it. I singled out, particularly, the 45 minute point. I singled out the claim that missiles could reach Cyprus, which I described as not in fact new. It was not in fact, it was a sort of extrapolation from the range of a scud missile and the distance between Baghdad and Cyprus, but it had never been expressed that way before; and I singled out as well the uranium from Africa claim.

Q. Can I take you to BBC/4/82, which I think shows you what you said at that time. First of all, the first line of that report. We have all phrases that we use, but you say: "A couple of sexy lines designed to make headlines"~--

A. Yes.

Q. -- which rather suggests that you are the person who uses "sexier" rather than Dr Kelly.

A. That is perfectly true. As I said, it was I who suggested it.

Q. "... and for the tabloids like the fact that he can deploy within 45 minutes if the weapons were ready and that he could reach the British bases on Cyprus, both of which we actually knew." Which is rather downplaying the effect of the dossier because now, as I understand it, the great complaint is that no-one knew about the 45 minutes.

A. Well, I was wrong about the 45 minutes on this occasion. It was a new point. This is one of the perils of live broadcasting, you have a pretty limited time to get to grips with a dossier on a subject. You do not have time to go and look up all the claims. You are speaking, you know, ex tempore. I was wrong about that. 45 minutes did make a very considerable impact indeed on that day; and on the day that followed, as I say, it was a headline in most of the papers.

Q. Did you, when you reported what Dr Kelly had said to you, exaggerate and embellish what he reported to you?

A. No.

MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, I have nothing further.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr Gilligan.

A. Thank you.

MR DINGEMANS: Ms Watts.

MS SUSAN JANET WATTS (called)

Examined by MR DINGEMANS

Q. Can you tell his Lordship your full name?

A. Yes. My full name is Susan Janet Watts and I am a BBC reporter.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.

MR DINGEMANS: What programme do you work with?

A. I work with BBC Newsnight.

Q. And how long have you been a journalist?

A. Well, I have been a journalist since 1984 and I worked on Newsnight since 1995.

Q. What is your role on Newsnight?

A. I am the science editor.

Q. So biological and chemical warfare was something you covered?

A. Yes.

Q. When Dr Kelly discussed with you the 45 minutes claim, did he discuss any weapons that might have been used to launch chemical and biological weapons?

A. Yes. We talked a bit about why such a precise timing might be used, 45 minutes rather than 43 or 40. He said that he was -- he made clear that he, in his word, was guessing; but he said that in 1991 the Iraqis were, and I quote, "playing around with multibarrel launches and that these take 45 minutes to fill". So that was his best guess, if you like, as to where that figure had come from.

Q. He did not know what weapons system might be able to deliver it?

A. In that short time, no.

Q. He was speculating that it might be multibarreled launchers?

A. Yes, and that might be the origin of that figure.

Q. Was he then suggesting that the 45 minutes claim was false?

A. He was not suggesting it was necessarily false. But I think he was suggesting to me it might not necessarily only have one interpretation.

Q. You were interviewing with him or talking to him because you were going to help preparation for an interview with Robin Cook. Did you discuss that at all?

A. Only briefly towards the end of the conversation. This was for an item I was putting together, a 4 minute item. I asked him what he would like to ask Robin Cook.

Q. What would he have liked to ask Robin Cook?

A. He just suggested that he should be asked why he was adamant in his position, Robin Cook's position.

Q. So adamant about his political position?

A. Yes, that there were no weapons to be found.

© 2003 The Hutton Inquiry




2004 Iraq Survey Group Scud account...




Iraq Survey Group Final Report (October 06 2004)

Key Findings Delivery Systems

• The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) has uncovered no evidence Iraq retained Scud-variant missiles, and debriefings of Iraqi officials in addition to some documentation suggest that Iraq did not retain such missiles after 1991.

© CIA/2004 ISG




Saddam's intent...




From the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD - September 30th 2004 - AKA The Iraq Survey Group Final Report:

Regime Strategic Intent

Annex D

Saddam's Personal Involvement in WMD Planning

The Iraq Survey Group recovered this recording of Saddam and senior officials discussing the use of WMD. This discussion was part of a more general meeting which would appear from the content to have taken place during the second week of January, 1991. This is of particular interest as it provides a compelling demonstration of Saddam's personal interest and involvement in WMD planning and preparation.

Saddam: I was talking to 'Abd and I told him there is no need to make a big fuss about these suits because we are going to use them in this special occasion, even if it is a Chinese design the collar, the neck line should be lower than this.

Speaker 2: The suit, Sir, will have a neck line like the Dishdasha (Traditional dress of Arabia), so we can use normal white shirt with it.

Saddam: Why did they bring it to us like this then?

Speaker 2: No, I saw the state minister wearing the suit.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, formally, we are wearing it, but you seem to be cold sir (everyone was laughing).

Saddam: I think the people who designed that suit will not make that mistake: First, because you wear it right on the body, so it will get dirty soon; secondly, out of elegance, the hand shouldn't appear from the suit like this.

Speaker 2: Sir, the design of the suit is with a white shirt and a collar (neck line) like dishdasha.

Saddam: Then my design is right.

Husayn Kamil: Absolutely right, sir.

Saddam: Then work on it and make the corrections to the sizes.

Speaker 2: Sir, we will amend it to be exactly with the neck line.

Saddam: Even if it appears a little bit. Now when some one wears a suit, of course the shirt line will appear a little bit, but here I prefer not to have it obvious.

Speaker 2: Sir, you can see that nobody is wearing it.

Saddam: It's forgotten, but now I will ask Abu Muthanna, because he is the best at remembering [shackling noise]. Since 1958 the Iraqi army has been using these kinds of suits [people commenting and talking in the background].

Saddam: I want to make sure that-close the door please [door slams)]-the germ and chemical warheads, as well as the chemical and germ bombs, are available to the "concerned people," so that in case we ordered an attack, they can do it without missing any of their targets?

Husayn Kamil: Sir, if you'll allow me. Some of the chemicals now are distributed, this is according to the last report from the Minister of Defense, which was submitted to you sir. Chemical warheads are stored and are ready at Air Bases, and they know how and when to deal with, as well as arm these heads. Also, some other artillery machines and rockets (missiles) are available from the army. While some of the empty "stuff" is available for us, our position is very good, and we don't have any operational problems. Moreover, in the past, many substantial items and materials were imported; now, we were able to establish a local project, which was established to comply with daily production. Also, another bigger project will be finalized within a month, as well as a third project in the coming two to three months that will keep us on the safe side, in terms of supply. We, Sir, only deal in common materials like phosphorus, ethyl alcohol and methyl [interrupted].

Saddam: Etc. . . . this is not important to me.

Husayn Kamil: So, Sir, regarding the germs and [he pauses].

Saddam: And the Chemicals.

Husayn Kamil: No, we have some of the chemicals available [interrupted].

Saddam: So, we qualify that the missiles, by tomorrow, will be ready on the 15th.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, we don't have the germs.

Saddam: Then, where are they?

Husayn Kamil: It's with us.

Saddam: what is it doing with you, I need these germs to be fixed on the missiles, and tell him to hit, because starting the 15th, everyone should be ready for the action to happen at anytime, and I consider Riyadh as a target.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, let me explain to you. What we produced now are the rocket heads and the containers, and we distributed them underground in three different locations. We considered these locations the best places we have, and that if we had a chance to scatter and to find more locations, then we would have done it. These locations are far away from Baghdad, this is problematic because of transportation which will take seven days to commute, but we minimized all the transportation procedures in a way. However, when we want to commute it, we cannot do it within one day Sir, and if we want to do it by plane, then, Sir, we have to go for the method [paused].

Saddam: Let's talk about it later [waiters entered the room, sound of plates banging and side talks to the waiters].

Husayn Kamil: (door slams) Sir, we have three types of germ weapons, but we have to decide which one we should use, some types stay capable for many years [interrupted].

Saddam: we want the long term, the many years kind.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, this option is available and all other options are available as well.

Saddam: You mean at which time should we use it and at which moment!

Husayn Kamil: Yes sir. That is why there has to be a decision about which method of attack we use: a missile, a fighter bomb or a fighter plane.

Saddam: With them all, all the methods.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, we have to calculate now [interrupted].

Saddam: Husayn knows about those.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, there are some calculations we have to do, since we have modified fighters. The bombs or the warheads are all available, but the moment for using them at zero hour is something we should indicate sir; we will say that this will be launched (interrupted).

Saddam: At the moment of use (zero hour), you should launch them all against their targets.

Husayn Kamil: All of the methods are available, sir.

Saddam: We don't want to depend on one option. The missiles will be intercepted and the planes, at least one will crash, but whenever the missiles or planes fall down over the enemy land, then I consider the goal is achieved and the mission fulfilled.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, it is available and stored "somewhere," but if you, Sir, order us to transfer it, we are a bit worried it will cause contamination. It has been stored for 45 to 47 years, and yet has not been certified as being safe (uncontaminated). Sir, it had been experimented on only once and some of the employees, Sir, were contaminated.

-Time 07:36-08:20, Saddam: I want as soon as possible, if we are not transferring the weapons, to issue a clear order to the "concerned people" that the weapon should be in their hands ASAP. I might even give them a "non-return access." [Translator Comment: to have access to the weapons; to take them with them and not to return them]. I will give them an order stating that at "one moment," if I'm not there and you don't hear my voice, you will hear somebody else's voice, so you can receive the order from him, and then you can go attack your targets. I want the weapons to be distributed to targets; I want Riyadh and Jeddah, which are the biggest Saudi cities with all the decision makers, and the Saudi rulers live there. This is for the germ and chemical weapons.

Husayn Kamil: In terms of chemical weapons, we have an excellent situation and good grip on them

[Translator Comment: they are in good control of them].

Saddam: Only in case we are obliged and there is a great necessity to put them into action. Also, all the Israeli cities, all of them. Of course you should concentrate on Tel Aviv, since it is their center.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, the best way to transport this weapon and achieve the most harmful effects would come by using planes, like a crop plane; to scatter it. This is, Sir, a thousand times more harmful. This is according to the analyses of the technicians (interrupted).

Saddam: We should consider alternatives Husayn (He called Husayn Kamil, Husayn). Meaning that if the planes don't arrive, then the missile will, and if the missile is intercepted, the plane will arrive.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, it is rare that the missiles are intercepted.

Saddam: Anyways, it is our duty to think of all the bad scenarios of this mission. Then Israel first, and if the Americans attack us with unconventional, harmful types of weapons, or at the moment we see it feasible to attack, but as for now, put Riyadh and Jeddah as targets.

Saddam: Air Force Commander [Muzahim Sa'b Hasan Muhammad Al Nasiri, at the time], you should coordinate with the Minister of Industry to get access to the weapons in the shortest time possible, of course with a lot of consideration for the technical and safety factors. Also, I want to give a written authorization to the "concerned people" that is signed by me, in case something happens to me. You know this is a life and death issue, all the orders about targets are sealed in writing and authenticated. Furthermore, for the officials from the missile (rockets) authority, you should coordinate with them so that they take the missile to locations. They are to inform the chief of staff, or operations commander deputy, to go to Husayn, Minister of Industry and go with the same necessary procedures. Regarding the chemical weapon [interrupted].

Husayn Kamil: We are really in good control of it sir.

Saddam: No, I mean it should be with the "taking action" people.

[Translator Comment: the people who will execute the command; implementers.]

Husayn Kamil: Sir, the chemical is available and our establishment is the one responsible for commuting the weapon and supervising how it is used.

Saddam: Excellent. Do you have anything stocked in the establishment stores?

Husayn Kamil: We have (empty) heads but we also have production all over. Not only in the factories; it is scattered.

Saddam: I want you to keep in mind that by the 15th nothing should be stored in your factories that the "enemy" can have access to.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, the Ministry of defense should pull that "Stuff" out. The Ministry of defense already ordered 25% of that stuff. When and if they ask us for the rest, we will have no problem supplying it. Sir, we are in an excellent & prepared situation regarding the missile warheads and fighter's bombs. They are all modified and ready for launching any time, the chemical and the germ.

No conversation (sound of plates banging).

Saddam: Where are the most American forces and troops gathered and concentrated?

Speaker 2: Sir, it is in Khalid Military city "Madinat Khalid," located 60 kilometers past Hafr Al-Baten in Saudi, where the front General Command and Air Force Command are located. Most of the American army sectors, Sir, are by the coastal side in Al-Dammam, where most of the camp complexes exist.

Saddam: I want these big gatherings and complexes to be allocated properly and given to the Air Force commander to be added to the above targets of the germs weapons. This should be done by an order to Muzahim. This is by a direct order and it has the green light from me, since this mission doesn't fall into daily regular operations. I will issue a letter, signed by me, listing the commands and the alternative plans and probabilities of this mission, which should be followed literally.

Speaker 2: Sir, Economically important targets such as refineries, power plants & water reservoirs, should we include them in the mission?

Saddam: These locations should be put under the regular Air Force operations, and included in attacks not on this particular mission.

Husayn Kamil: Sir, these vital locations must be added to the mission and become priority targets to the biological & chemical weapons, because this will end all sorts of life. People are drinking water from these desalination plants and getting their fuel from refineries, thus ending the mission.

Saddam: Muzahim has already written these locations down and will take care of it, Refineries and [interrupted].

Muzahim: The Refineries and desalination plants, Sir.

Saddam: May God help us do it. Then there was no conversation.

Saddam: We will never lower our heads as long as we are alive, even if we have to destroy everybody.

The recording continues after this for a further 48 minutes, in which the participants discuss other military matters, such as senior command appointments and low-level defensive preparations. There was no further discussion of WMD.

© 2004 CIA