Missing Missile Warheads...
Missile Unit 223...
Richard Butler's report...
UNMOVIC under Hans Blix...
The Cluster Document...
UNSCOM Technical Evaluation Meeting Report: Warheads numbers.
Letter dated 19 February 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), addressed to the President of the Security Council
I have the honour to refer to the letter which I addressed to the President of the Security Council on 17 December 1997 (S/1997/987) setting out the results of the visit I made to Baghdad from 12 to 16 December 1997.
I invite attention, in particular, to paragraph 38 of that report (S/1997/987, annex) setting out the modalities for the conduct of technical evaluation meetings agreed to by the Commission and by Iraq as follows:
"(a) The Executive Chairman would invite qualified objective international experts to take part and participate in the Commission's team. They would he chosen from the countries having the necessary expertise;
"(b) The Commission would prepare a dossier for the team containing all the relevant information. The dossier would be made available to the Iraqi side to enable it to respond to relevant questions at the technical evaluation meeting;
"(c) The discussions at the meetings would be conducted in an open and continuous manner in order to enable joint evaluation of technical issues;
"(d) The Commission's team would advise the Executive Chairman on its findings as a result of the meetings. The Executive Chairman would them incorporate these findings in appropriate reports to the Security Council and the Government of Iraq."
The commission had agreed to these meetings in view of Iraq's claims that it had destroyed and/or no longer had any weapons of mass destruction and, where there was disagreement between the Commission and Iraq on these issues of substance, those disagreements should be settled in technical "seminars" with the participation of both international and Iraqi experts.
I wish to inform the Council that the first two technical evaluation meetings have now been concluded. The first of these meetings, related to the accounting for Iraq's special warheads for biological and chemical weapons, was held in Baghdad from 1 to 6 February 1998. The second meeting, related to Iraq's activities in connection with the chemical agent VX, also took place in Baghdad from 2 to 6 February 1998. The results of both these meetings have now been transmitted to me. As will be seen from the paragraph in my letter of 17 December 1997 quoted above, I undertook to incorporate the findings in appropriate reports to the Security Council and the Government of Iraq.
I am now submitting herewith the body of the two reports, together with the conclusions in full (see enclosures I and II, respectively).
There are two annexes attached to each report, one containing the list of participants and the second the remarks made by Iraq in the context of the outline of the conclusions which was conveyed to the Iraqi participants by the Commission's expert teams prior to their final formulation. I am also transmitting a copy of this letter with the same attachments today to the Government of Iraq.
(Signed) Richard Butler
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION'S TEAM TO THE TECHNICAL EVALUATION MEETING ON PROSCRIBED MISSILE WARHEADS
(BAGHDAD, 1-6 FEBRUARY 1998)
1. The Executive Chairman of the Special Commission and the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq agreed, in December 1997, to conduct, as part of the verification of specific issues, technical evaluation meetings (TEM). It was accepted that among the first two such meetings, one would deal specifically with the issue of proscribed missile warheads, including warheads for biological and chemical weapons. It was arranged that the warhead TEM would be held in Baghdad at the beginning of February 1998.
2. The Executive Chairman asked a number of Governments to nominate qualified and objective experts to take pad and participate in the Commission's team to be sent to the warhead TEM. Based on responses received, the Executive Chairman formed the Commission's team composed of experts from China, France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom and United States in addition to experts from the staff of the Office of the Special Commission. A list of the team members is in Annex 1.
3. The missile warhead technical evaluation meeting was held in Baghdad from 1 to 6 February 1998. It was originally planned to last five days but was extended by one day in order to allow more time for discussions of the main issues involved.
4. The Commission's team assembled in Bahrain on 22 January and spent eight days in preparation for the meeting. The team was provided with a full set of all of Iraq's relevant declarations and documentation, the Commission's inspection reports and analytical papers, and access to all relevant information in possession of the Commission. The team also received the "Missile Dossier" prepared by Iraq for the warhead TEM. The team prepared the missile warhead dossier with all relevant information for the TEM as background material for the meetings, and sent it to Iraq. The preparation work resulted in two commentary notes that outlined major issues for discussion and evaluation during the TEM. One commentary note dealt with general warhead issues and the second was devoted more specifically to biological and chemical warheads (special warheads). The commentary notes served as an annotated agenda for the TEM.
5. The warhead TEM was opened on 1 February 1998 in Baghdad. The delegation of Iraq headed by Lt. General Amer M. Rashid, Minister of Oil, included Iraq's officials and experts who were involved in various activities that were subject to discussions during the TEM. A list of Iraq's delegation is in Annex 1.
6. From 1 to 6 February, eleven plenary sessions were held in addition to working group meetings and field visits. During the first two sessions on 1 February, the Iraqi side made its presentations on the overall warhead material balance and on its accounting of special warheads. During these sessions, the Commission's team provided to the Iraqi counterparts its commentary notes. The TEM schedule of plenary sessions is provide below:
1 February -- Iraq's and team's presentations.
2 February -- Examination of issues related to warhead material balance and accounting.
3 February -- Examination of issues related to warhead designs and testing.
4 February -- Examination of issues related to special warheads and issues related to warhead material balance and accounting.
5 February -- Examination of issues related to warhead material balance and accounting.
6 February -- Examination of issues related to warhead material balance and accounting, and issues related to warhead production. Concluding session.
7. The purpose of the TEM was to conduct, through open discussions with Iraqi counterparts, examination and evaluation of issues related to proscribed missile warheads in order to enable joint evaluation of technical issues. The TEM examined Iraq's declarations and data relevant to the subject. The Iraq delegation participated in all discussions during the TEM and provided its comments to the team's outline of conclusions that were presented to the Iraqi side at the concluding session of the TEM on 6 February (Annex 2).
8. The Commission's team conducted the meetings in an open and transparent manner. Information and data that pointed to unresolved issues or raised concerns were shared openly with the Iraqi counterparts. Iraq was requested to provide its statements on unresolved issues. The team noted Iraq's efforts to provide answers to issues raised by the team. In most cases Iraq did not respond with official declarations or factual statements. Instead the Iraqi representatives offered mostly explanations that, in their view, described with various degree of probabilities and possibilities, events that could have resulted in the issues discussed during the TEM. The team was straightforward and forthcoming in presenting the facts on the subjects under discussion and its preliminary analysis of issues that resulted from explanations that were offered by the Iraqi counterparts. On several occasions, the Iraqi side vehemently objected to the introduction of all relevant facts and information for the team's consideration at the meetings. In many cases, the Iraqi side would withdraw or change its explanations if they were not satisfactory to the team. In a few cases, the Iraqi side promised to conduct further investigations and provide new or revised declarations, official statements or clarifications. Iraq has not provided the supporting documents to the team that the Commission had requested as a pad of the preparation for the warhead TEM. This request was reiterated by the Executive Chairman during his visit to Iraq in January 1998, immediately prior to the warhead TEM. During the TEM, the Iraqi side reconfirmed its position that it had provided to the Commission all available documents regarding the warhead issue, no other documents were available in Iraq and if any were found, Iraq would provide it to the Commission. One document related to warhead production, that had been found by an Iraqi expert, was provided to the team on the last day of the TEM.
9. After its departure from Iraq on 6 February, the Commission's team proceeded to write the present report concluding on 13 February.
Technical discussions of main specific issues.
10. The issues that were discussed during the TEM might be summarized in three main categories: warhead material balance and accounting of different types of warheads; indigenous warhead production in Iraq; and warhead designs and testing activities.
11. The issue of the material balance of warheads received priority attention. A serious attempt was initiated to establish, in an objective and technical manner, the accounting of proscribed missile warheads using warheads remnants that could still be found in Iraq. The TEM benefited from the extensive excavation work done by Iraq, under UNSCOM supervision, to collect remnants of warheads that had been destroyed after April 1991. This re-excavation effort began in August1997. Over 2,000 different items have already been re-excavated and catalogued. Prior to the TEM, three UNSCOM teams conducted expert analysis and assessments of the remnants retrieved. During the TEM, the Commission's team and the Iraqi side jointly reviewed results and findings of the re-excavation activities to establish the degree to which the excavated materials supported Iraq's declarations and what further efforts, if any, were required.
12. Through a joint effort, objective and reliable methods for identification of types of warheads and for the accounting for destroyed warheads were established. Based on the agreed methodologies, both sides came to practically identical figures (subject to minor variations) as to the numbers of warheads that could be identified among the remnants. This enabled them to synchronize factual findings to a great degree. Each side then made its own assessment of the degree of completeness of the warhead accounting that was achieved through the analysis of remnants retrieved from the destruction and burial sites. In its assessments, the Iraqi side used the total quantity of material re-excavated including both remnants of warheads destroyed under UNSCOM supervision and remnants of warheads that Iraq destroyed unilaterally in 1991. The Commission has focused on the unilateral destruction, as the destruction of other warheads had been carried out under UNSCOM supervision and thus, had already been verified. As in other areas of the material balance for proscribed items, the main problems in the warhead area relate to the unilateral destruction by Iraq of missile related items in the second half of 1991. Iraq carried out this destruction without inviting the Commission to supervise as required by the Security Council resolution 687 (1991).
13. During the meetings, main categories of warheads were determined for the purpose of establishing the overall material balance of proscribed warheads. This includes: (1) special warheads (both modified from imported and indigenously produced); (2) imported combat warheads (conventional warheads and modified for special warheads); (3) imported combat warheads (conventional warheads only); (4) indigenously produced warheads (conventional and special). It was agreed that accounting of destroyed warheads under the first three categories was to be done by the identification of warhead nose cones among the remnants of destroyed warheads. Under the forth category of indigenously produced warheads, the accounting was to be based on identification of a key structural ring for this type of warhead.
14. Based on available findings and Iraq's current official declarations, the Commission's team has come to the following assessments in the accounting of Iraq's unilateral destruction of warheads:
(a) Under the category of special warheads, both modified from imported and indigenously produced, as declared by Iraq to have been unilaterally destroyed: The total number of special warheads found is 39-40. At this time 31-32 of them could be counted against the 51 that need to be identified through the examination of remnants i.e. 61%. The remaining 8 warheads were recovered from a destruction pit not previously identified as a site of the unilateral destruction of special warheads. Issues related to these warheads and their recovery site are discussed in paras. 16-18 below. The team and the Iraqi side could not reach a joint conclusion on how many indigenously manufactured special warheads needed to be accounted for using the established methods of accounting. Iraq considered that 14 nose cones needed to be identified; the team's opinion was 16. Iraq's assessment was presented in its delegation's concluding comments (see Annex 3). In a comparable category, the Iraqi estimate is at a level of 88% (70 warheads found out of 79 declared) based on accounting of the total quantity of material re-excavated including both remnants of warheads destroyed under UNSCOM supervision and remnants of warheads that Iraq destroyed unilaterally in 1991.
(b) Under the category of imported combat warheads (conventional warheads and those modified for special warheads) as declared by Iraq to have been unilaterally destroyed: 79 warheads were found out of the 118 that needed to be identified through the examination of remnants i.e. 67%. In addition to the 8 special warheads mentioned in subparagraph (a) above, remnants of 8 imported warheads were also found among remnants but they were not listed in Iraq's documents of the unilateral destruction. Issues related to these imported warheads are discussed in para. 19 below. Iraq's assessment was presented in its delegation's concluding comments (see Annex 3). In a comparable category, the Iraqi estimate is at a level of 85% (134 warheads found out of 157 declared) based on accounting of the total quantity of material re-excavated including both remnants of warheads destroyed under UNSCOM supervision and remnants of warheads that Iraq destroyed unilaterally in 1991.
(c) Under the category of imported combat warheads (conventional warheads only) as declared by Iraq to have been unilaterally destroyed: 58 warheads were found out of the 83 that needed to be identified through the examination of remnants i.e. 70%. As mentioned in the subparagraph (b) above, remnants of 8 imported warheads were also found among the remnants. Iraq did not present its assessment under this category in its delegation's concluding comments. During the meetings, there was no disagreement on the relevant figures except on the assessment of how to account for these 8 imported warheads.
(d) Under the category of indigenously produced warheads (conventional and special) as declared by Iraq to have been unilaterally destroyed: some 68 warheads were found out of the 96 that needed to be identified through the examination of remnants i.e. 71%. Iraq's assessment was presented in its delegation's concluding comments (see Annex 3). In a comparable category, the Iraqi estimate is at a level of 75% (78 warheads found out of 104 declared) based on accounting of the total quantity of material re-excavated including both remnants of warheads destroyed under UNSCOM supervision and remnants of warheads that Iraq destroyed unilaterally in 1991.
15. The work achieved prior to and during the TEM on the analysis of warhead remnants led to important progress in the accounting for different types of warheads. Based on its assessments, the team considers that the current scope and level of findings from re-excavated materials has not yet allowed for a satisfactory verification of Iraq's declarations on the material balance in the warhead area. Further work is required. The team conveyed, to the Executive Chairman, Iraq's proposal that the Commission bring into Iraq, very quickly, advanced survey equipment to find if there is any more buried material, to resolve the issue of the material balance of what had been destroyed.
16. In its commentary note of 1 February, the team identified a major problem with Iraq's declaration of the unilateral destruction of special warheads. Prior to the TEM, Iraq declared that special warheads had been unilaterally destroyed only in two pits in Nibai (termed the P1 and P6 sites). A considerable amount of remnants of special warheads have recently been recovered from another area (termed the P3 site), approximately 1 kilometre away from the P1/P6 area. Prior to the TEM, Iraq offered an explanation that this had been a result of activities of a farmer who had excavated warhead remnants in the P1/P6 area, transferred and then buried them in the P3 area. The team came to the conclusion that the amount of remnants excavated in the P3 area, their composition and locations of their recovery, were more consistent with this being a separate destruction activity area. If this were the case, it would indicate that more special warheads had been produced and destroyed than were declared by Iraq.
17. At the TEM, the Commission's team presented its findings to the Iraqi side. The team stated that based on available data it could be concluded that, at least 8 special warheads, most probably biological weapons, had been destroyed at P3. In response, the Iraqi side offered a new explanation of a preliminary nature. It stated that there was a possibility that a significant amount of chemical warheads (up to 13) had been destroyed at P3 on 11 July 1991. Iraq promised to conduct an investigation of this issue. This preliminary explanation was offered without officially withdrawing the previous one. In the team's assessment, the new explanation could not explain already known findings at the P3 area and is not consistent with Iraq's other explanations related to the designs, production and destruction of chemical and biological warheads. Other available evidence still remains unexplained including the types of warheads destroyed, method of destruction, etc.
18. It should be noted that Iraq's official declaration on the unilateral destruction in Nibai had previously been corroborated by interviews with all Iraqi personnel who were involved in the destruction activities in Nibai. All of them unanimously supported the statement that all destruction of special warheads had taken place in the P1/P6 area. During the TEM, the Iraqi side did not provide any new individuals who could corroborate the new explanation of destruction activities at P3. The team also noted an obvious contradiction between the new explanation and Iraq's official statements until recently that an UNSCOM inspection team had actually verified the destruction of 45 special warheads in April 1992, shortly after Iraq declared their unilateral destruction in 1991. In 1992, Iraq presented to this UNSCOM team 43 missile warhead nose cones in the P1/P6 area as evidence of destruction of the 45 special warheads there. At the TEM, the Iraqi side stated that "there had been, with good possibility, due to a reason which is not clear now, a movement of conventional warhead remnants from a nearby destruction pit to where the special warheads were destroyed". No definite statement was made by the Iraqi delegation whether this "movement" of nose cones had been intended to tamper with evidence of destruction. No factual information has been provided on the related events. Based on available data and Iraq's explanations, the team could not come to a conclusion whether the special warhead nose cones that had recently been found at P3 were in addition to the 45 special warheads verified by the UNSCOM team in 1992 or were from the same 45 special warheads that Iraq had declared as unilaterally destroyed between 9 and 11 July 1991. Iraq made a statement to the team that the newly recovered special nose cones from P3 were from the 45 declared special warheads. The team believes that until all issues related to the destruction activities at the P3 site are fully investigated, clarified and resolved, a material balance of special warheads can not be established. This remains a major issue in the verification of Iraq's declaration of the unilateral destruction of special warheads.
19. Iraq's declarations and opening presentations to the TEM included the accounting for the consumption and destruction of all 819 imported warheads. According to this account, there should have been no imported warheads remaining at Project 14412, Iraq's warhead production establishment, after the war in 1991. Contrary to this, materials re-excavated in areas associated with Project 14412 contained remnants of some ten imported warheads. None of them appear to be recorded in the unilateral destruction documents. Remnants of other excavated warheads have revealed that a number of warheads that Iraq had declared and accounted for as imported ones turned out to be Iraqi produced. These findings were presented to the Iraqi side at the TEM. Following an Iraqi request, the TEM participants made a field visit to assess the remnants of undeclared imported warheads. Using agreed methodologies for warhead identification, it was confirmed that the team's findings had been correct. As a result, the Iraqi side stated that some 6-8 warheads might have been destroyed unilaterally without this being recorded in consumption diaries of the destruction. Iraq offered an explanation that some of these warheads might be included in available documents concerning the destruction of Project 144/2 items without specifically mentioning them. According to this explanation, others might have been listed in documents that could not be found. Iraq also answered that two warheads that had been declared as modified from imported warheads were, in fact, Iraqi made warheads. The Iraqi side then stated that all these findings would in no way affect the final material balance of destroyed imported conventional warheads. In the team's view, as the new findings are not reflected in the current official declarations, the declared material balance of proscribed warheads, especially in the area of the unilateral destruction, needs to be changed. The team believes that the resolution of these issues is required to establish a definite material balance. The team expects the Iraqi side to provide an official statement on these issues.
20. The key Iraqi documents that were offered in support of the material balance of imported warheads, recorded the consumption of a number of imported warheads twice. At this stage some 25 cases have been identified. Of a particular concern to the team was that this duplicate accounting affected special warheads disproportionately. Iraq's explanation was that this duplicate listing might have been the result of Iraqi made warheads being placed inside warhead shipping containers from which original imported warheads had already been consumed. This explanation was found by the team to be inconsistent with Iraq's other declarations on warhead consumption and destruction.
21. At the TEM, Iraq offered, as explanations, several suggestions of varying degree of probability. They were based on an assumption by Iraq's delegation that warhead serial numbers which appeared on imported shipping containers, when they were re-used with chemical warheads, had not been blackened out contrary to what had been previously stated. Iraq explained that common painting of all special warheads, both modified from imported and indigenously produced, might have led to mistakes by the Army in recording Iraqi produced chemical warheads. Iraq stated that these mistakes might have affected only 2-5 chemical warheads out of a dozen cases that were recorded as duplicate listings in the consumption diary of the unilateral destruction. No explanation was given as to how this number had been derived and why the recording of other warheads had not been affected by similar mistakes. It remains unexplained why serial numbers on shipping containers with Iraqi manufactured biological warheads had been blackened out and a common painting of biological warheads, both modified from imported and indigenously produced, had not led to the similar mistakes by the Army. The new explanations also did not correlate with inventory procedures as described by military officers who had been directly involved in the maintenance and inventory control of warheads until their destruction. According to them, under the procedures in force at that time, the inventory of warheads had been done and updated regularly based on documents accompanying the warheads and not through the visual checking of the exterior of warheads in shipping containers. Inventory documents that accompanied imported and indigenously Iraqi produced warheads were very different, thus, excluding the possibility of misidentification of the warheads during the inventory control.
22. Iraq pointed out that some of the shipping containers at Dujail, where chemical warheads had been presented to an UNSCOM team in 1991, held imported warheads with mismatched serial numbers. The implication of this could not be properly assessed until further investigation of other irregularities with chemical warheads at Dujail could be carried out and completed. This includes Iraq's change in the explanation of agent codes on warheads and shipping containers, mismatches between agent codes on warheads and on their shipping containers.
23. The team did not find Iraq's explanations of the duplicate listing of serial numbers to be consistent or capable of providing an explanation for all known cases. The team recommends further investigation to establish the real causes for the duplicate listings of imported warheads. In the team's view, the current status of this issue adversely affects the accounting of imported warheads and the overall warhead material balance.
24. As the results of the discussions during the TEM, the Iraqi side has indicated that it might change its current declaration of the warhead material balance to increase the number of imported warheads that were destroyed unilaterally and to redistribute the allocation of special warheads between categories of imported and indigenously produced warheads. Iraq did not submit an official declaration during the TEM.
25. Analysis of re-excavated remnants and of inspection records have revealed evidence that is not consistent with Iraq's declarations and explanations with respect to the markings on warheads. This includes, in particular, special warheads and H3 warheads. During the TEM, the team sought a clear understanding of Iraq's system of markings on warheads in order obtain additional supporting information for verification of Iraq's declarations and for establishing a reliable accounting for warheads. Iraq provided a number of explanations mainly from the recollection of its experts and military personnel. In one particular case, Iraqi counterparts admitted that its previous statements on the marking of chemical warhead agent fill had been completely erroneous. In the team's view, it is difficult to understand how such mistakes could have happened with dangerous weapons of mass destruction that indeed would absolutely require unambiguous and distinct markings to prevent mishandling and misuse. Iraq's explanations of evidence related to the production serial numbers on special warheads conflicted with Iraq's declared production schedule, filling and deployment of warheads. Concerning H3 warhead markings, Iraq offered explanations that differed from the previous ones and need to be further assessed. Iraq's explanations on the timing of markings of biological warheads have introduced new information relevant to a schedule of production, filling and deployment of biological weapons. These issues will be examined at the forthcoming technical evaluation meeting on Iraq's biological weapon programme.
26. The team considers it important to obtain a full understanding of Iraq's warhead markings, in particular, of special warheads, in order to ascertain types and quantities of special warheads produced and destroyed. The team believes that continued investigation of warhead markings is warranted as part of the efforts to achieve a definite and verifiable material balance in the warhead area.
27. The Commission's team selected for discussion and evaluation at the TEM the following issues related to indigenous warhead production in Iraq: warhead production process and key technological operations; warhead production orders and their implementation; impact of warhead designs and technological features on production; and the accounting of imported warhead key components.
28. Iraq's declaration of the total amount of warheads produced indigenously is derived by summing the declared quantities of warheads destroyed and other warheads that Iraq claimed had been expended. Except for one case, there are no documents made available that contain independent data on actual production or acquisition of indigenous warheads. The available Iraqi document mentioned that the warhead production workshop (shed 12 of Project 144/2) had 40 Al Hussein warheads on 16 January 1991. This figure did not correlate with other Iraqi declarations and clarifications. Iraq's explanation of this figure that was offered during the TEM, was not consistent with other data contained in the same document.
29. Due to the absence of practically any supporting documentation to confirm the declared figure of actual production of indigenous warheads, the team attempted, based on discussions with Iraqi experts, to conduct technical evaluation of Iraq's pre-war industrial warhead production capabilities and limitations. The team believes that additional discussions with Iraqi experts on the production capabilities and the provision by Iraq of supporting documents are necessary to pass a sound technical evaluation and verify Iraq's declarations and clarifications.
30. By raising issues related to production orders and their implementation, the team sought to obtain an understanding of the production planning for warheads, in particular special warheads. The team's analysis is mainly based on Iraq's explanations which are constructed from the recollection of Iraqi experts. In the team's opinion, the declared figure of the total production of 121 indigenous warheads is credible on the assumption of a twelve month production period. Iraq's explanations were not clear enough regarding the actual time frame of the production of those warheads, when production of various types of warhead started and ended. Open questions remain as to the schedule of the production of special warheads both for chemical and biological weapons.
31. To resolve outstanding issues the team believes that additional efforts should be made to obtain Iraq's warhead production records. During the TEM, Iraqi experts were requested to fill a production planning chart. Unless the chart is completed and supported with documents (such as acceptance documents for produced or modified warheads and completed work orders), no solid evidence can be obtained to prepare an objective technical evaluation. Without such evidence, experts will be unable to verify the declared warhead production rate, including the total number of warheads produced indigenously.
32. By addressing the technical issue of designs of warheads under production, the team sought an understanding of Iraq's need for specific key components which depended on different warhead configurations. Clear technical definitions and descriptions were to serve as a basis for the assessment of the Iraqi presentation on the warhead material balance with respect to indigenously produced warheads and their accounting. The explanations received during the TEM concerning designs of warheads under production showed consistency and were supported by the analysis of warhead remnants excavated. The explanations allowed the team to clarify inconsistencies in Iraq's FFCD dated July 1996. The Iraqi side should be requested to provide written statements to confirm its explanations.
33.The team agrees that a full understanding of the acquisition and production of key warhead components is a useful way to ascertain the maximum number of warheads that could have been produced in Iraq. During the TEM, the team studied Iraq's presentation of the declared material balance of warhead key parts, in particular two types of warhead structural rings. Clarifications of the acquisition, consumption and destruction of these rings were sought. 121 imported rings of one type (out of 196 declared as imported) were found in the warhead remnants. Analysis of information provided by the Iraqi experts during the TEM led the team to conclude that the declared consumption of imported rings seems credible. It should be noted that change in the declared balance of imported warheads vs. indigenously manufactured warheads would consequently change the current figure of consumed imported rings. The team recommends that the recovery and analysis of rings that serve as a unit in the accounting of indigenously produced warheads continue.
34. Iraq stated that it had been unable to produce one of the key warhead rings either from imported un-machined rings or from its own raw materials. On the other hand, Iraq stated that it had the capability and had actually produced other rings. The team's assessment is that since the production processes used by Iraq were similar, Iraq should have been able to overcome the declared difficulties in the production of the key rings. The team recommends that in order to establish a reliable foundation for the accounting for indigenously produced warheads, Iraq should attempt to account for all imported key rings, both finished and un-machined. It is also suggested that an effort be applied to locate the unused imported rings.
35. In the team's assessment, verification work in the area of the production of indigenous warheads needs to continue, especially to ascertain the total number of indigenously produced warheads and to settle relevant warhead production issues raised by the team.
36. The re-excavated remnants and other materials, such as documents, drawings and video tapes obtained by the Commission at the Haidar farm, contained important evidence of warhead designs and testing activities that, in the team's opinion, needed to be examined with Iraqi experts. In most cases, there were indications of undeclared activities by Iraq. The team presented a list of specific cases to the Iraqi side for explanation. During the TEM, the team showed all drawings and video tapes depicting events or items to be discussed. The team accommodated Iraq's request for a preview of these materials ahead of the experts' discussion. Due to a shortage of time it was not possible to conduct in-depth expert examination of the warhead design and testing issues. A few cases involving activities with separating warheads were discussed. A final assessment of explanations offered by Iraq will have to be made in light of explanations on other issues still to be provided by Iraq.
37. The team recommends that a specialized inspection team be scheduled to address all issues of warhead design and testing with Iraq's experts. The team also suggested that a letter to be sent to Iraq asking for written explanations, to be provided prior to this inspection, on all design and testing issues raised during the TEM. In the team's opinion, the issues for clarification raised by the team relevant to warhead design and testing are important to obtain a full technical understanding of Iraq's achievements in warhead related activities.
38. In addition to the team's assessments and recommendations contained here above, the team puts on record the following main conclusions and comments:
a. Through the TEM and other inspection activities, important progress has been achieved in the overall accounting of proscribed missile warheads. Findings from the re-excavation of warheads remnants have provided valuable data for analysis and evaluation. The team has not found the level of verification achieved so far to be satisfactory. Further work is required.
b. Less progress has been achieved in the accounting of Iraq's declared special warheads for chemical and biological weapons.
c. Issues that were raised by the team related to the warhead material balance and accounting such as duplicate counting, warhead destruction activities and warhead markings, need to be fully resolved to enable the establishment of a solid and verifiable material balance in the warhead area.
d. The Commission still needs to obtain a full picture of Iraq's warhead production. The team believes that Iraq's warhead production and acquisition records are the best way to ascertain relevant facts.
e. Issues for clarification raised by the team relevant to warhead design and testing are important to obtain a full technical understanding of Iraq's achievements in warhead related activities.
f. The team's experts consider that they would have benefited more in their evaluation work, if factual answers had been provided by the Iraqi side rather than explanations of various degree of probabilities that were difficult to assess in a scientific and objective manner.
g. The TEM in general proceeded in a professional manner.
39. The Governmental expert members of the Commission's team would like to place on record their appreciation for the assistance that they received from their colleagues from the UNSCOM staff. The UNSCOM staff members are highly qualified experts with in-depth knowledge and technical understanding of issues in their respective areas of responsibility. Their contribution to the team's work, by briefings, information sharing, analysis and evaluation, was always done in a professional and objective manner.
40. The team is grateful to the Government of Iraq for its hospitality.
41. The present report has been jointly prepared by all team members, unanimously approved and adopted on 13 February 1998.
Lists of Iraq's delegation and the Commission's team at the Technical Evaluation Meeting on proscribed missile warheads
(Baghdad, 1-6 February 1998)
Lt General Amer M. Rasheed, Minister of Oil, Former Deputy of MIC Director
Major General Ra'ad Asma'el Jameel, Former Director of Project 144/2
Major General Hussam M. Amin, Director of the National Monitoring Directorate, Former Senior Officer in Project 144
Brigadier Engineer Kamal Abed Mohammed, Former Senior Officer in Project 144/2
Brigadier Engineer Azhar Abed Al-Khadil Jawad, Former Senior Officer in Project 144/2
Brigadier Husham Mohammed Asma'el, Former Staff Officer at the Missile Force
Brigadier Asma'el Sa'eed Ahmed, Former Commander of the Technical Battalion, Brigade 224
Brigadier Mahmoud Feraj Bilal, Former Senior Officer at MSE
Brigadier Ala'a Mahdee Al-Sa'aed, Former Senior Officer at MSE
Lieutenant Colonel Sinan Abed Al-Hasan Mohyee, Former Officer at Al-Hakam Factory
Lieutenant Colonel Asma'el Ahmed Salih, Former Officer at Al-Hakam Factory
Colonel Mar'ee Hussain Audhaib, Former Commander of the First Maintenance Unit S.S. Missile Force
Colonel Hameed Mohmoud Al-Mashhadani, Former Battalion Commander in Brigade 223
Colonel Abed Al-Rassak Tarish Zboun, Former Senior Officer Project 144
Colonel Karim Mouhsin Alwan, Former Senior Officer Project 144
Lieutenant Colonel Laith Abed Al-Khadir Hameed, Former Officer in Project 144
Lieutenant Colonel Talib Hamza Awad, Former Officer in the First Maintenance Unit
Colonel Mesheb Kashim Hamad, Former Senior Officer in Project 144
Lieutenant Colonel Raad Manhel Ali, Former Officer in MSE
Chemist Muneer Abed Taih, Former Chemist in MSE
Brigadier Ala Rasheed Al-Ja'afaree, Former Senior Officer in Ababil Project
Dr. Assam Jasim Khadim, Former Engineer in Project 144
The Commission's team
Nikita Smidovich (UNSCOM staff/Russian Federation)
Ilya Adyasov (Russian Federation)
Fouad El Khatib (UNSCOM Staff/Republic of France)
Frederic Fricot (Republic of France)
Curtis Gentry (United States of America)
Christian Hoherz (Federal Republic of Germany) Jean Jano (UNSCOM Staff/Federal Republic of Germany)
Chen Jianfeng (People's Republic of China)
Hamish Killip (United Kingdom)
John Larrabee (UNSCOM Staff/United States of America)
Boris Looshin (Russian Federation)
Andrew McGill (United Kingdom)
Igor Mitrokhin (UNSCOM Staff/Russian Federation)
Norbert Reinecke (Federal Republic of Germany)
Gail Shepherd (United States of America)
Oleg Skabara (Russian Federation)
Dick Spertzel (UNSCOM Staff/United States of America)
Jerry Threatt (United States of America)
Xin Wanqing (People's Republic of China)
Comments and remarks made by Lt. General Amer M. Rasheed, Head of Iraq's delegation, at the concluding session of the missile warhead TEM on 6 February 1998.
Regarding the material balance, (I have several points):(1)
1. Both teams discussed the material balance in an objective and constructive (manner) and agreed on a methodology for this, based on the nose cones for the Soviet warheads and for the Iraqi and Soviet special warheads as the key element. Also, the U-ring and the connecting ring were used as the key element for the accounting for the Iraqi warheads.
2. The material balance for the special warheads, total, shows that 70 were destroyed, including both by UNSCOM and unilaterally, out of the declared 79 warheads. This is 88%.
3. Soviet combat warheads material balance shows verified destruction of 134 out of 157 declared by Iraq, if you add all Soviet warheads, conventional and special. This is 85%.
4. For Iraqi warheads, conventional and special, 78 were verified destroyed out of 104, which is 75%. So we preview it, so we got it right. I am saying here briefly on material balance, we have agreed on the methodology of verifying the destruction. When we apply this (to) the special (warheads) Soviet plus Iraqi, we have 88%. When we applied this to all Soviet, we have 85%. When applied to all Iraqi, we have 75%.
5. This is a very significant progress of achievement compared with the situation in July 1997 when UNSCOM said only 30% of Soviet warheads were verified, not verified, were accounted. Even though this is a very significant progress, the Iraqi side requested UNSCOM many times during the TEM, to bring advanced survey equipment to find if there are any more buried material, especially near P3, very, very quickly, to resolve this issue of material balance of what has been destroyed. Our suggested time scale is to start this next week, for on one week, and then it might take us another two weeks for excavation and bringing out the remains and analysing them. So that, we have, hopefully, a final resolution by the end of February, before Mr. Butler's arrival in Baghdad on 2 March. Just to help you, this is not for note taking. Mr. Butler last night, in the Security Council, said: "What is the situation in Iraq regarding this Special Commission work, on VX, Anthrax and warheads, so I am talking (about) the warheads,... how much has been destroyed compared to Iraqi declaration." This is what he said. So it is so important to concentrate on the material balance of what has been destroyed. This is the major significant issue and let us not exaggerate minor detailed issues. This is the central focus of this issue. I would like, please, Mr. Nikita, later on, let the experts say if they disagree on this being the most significant issue. We should focus on this material. If there are different people offering their views, I would like to discuss this.
6. Iraq has agreed with UNSCOM, through joint work, to try its best to differentiate between biological and chemical warheads which are excavated.
7. Last point on material balance. Iraq assured UNSCOM and the team's experts that it had made all documents available to it regarding the warhead issue. But most important of all, regarding the production of these warheads, I mean the quantity of 50 chemical warheads plus 25 biological special warheads. Until now, we have not seen any criticism of these documents, but only had incidents which, from the UNSCOM's point of view, find it difficult to confirm these documents by the Iraqi declaration. Iraq has provided possible explanations to apparent discrepancies or even apparent contradictions. But most important of all, the fact that what has been produced is 50 CW and 25 BW, is supported fully by documents. If UNSCOM has any information contrary to this, Iraq is always ready to cooperate to find possible explanations. So, this is on the main issue of why we were here. Now we come to what I call; answers on concerns raised during TEM.
1. In April 1992, UNSCOM 35 verified initially that there were 43 special warheads, depending only on the nose cone, and not on the lead mass in them, as is the case now in 1997 and 1998. It is not possible (to say) how many were special and how many conventional. Iraq thinks that there has been, with a good possibility, due to a reason which is not clear now, a movement of conventional warhead remnants from a nearby destruction pit to where the special warheads were destroyed, before the arrival of UNSCOM 35. And since it is impossible to correlate verification (one of them not scientific, because no lead mass taken into account) with what happened between two events with a six year difference. There is no possibility to correlate.
2. Regarding P3. The site at Nebai is well known to UNSCOM being without landmarks, a large site, not populated at all. Since the Iraqi side did not have any maps at the time or now, of the site, or the area, it would be rather difficult to remember site -- let us not call it site, let us call it a pit location of destruction. It is meaningless to make a conclusion, sorry, findings, on why Iraq has not declared location P3, when it is only a recollection by memory which was used. We even think there might be a another pit near P3 or possibly in the whole area. That is why Iraq is requesting earnestly to bring advanced equipment by UNSCOM to ascertain this issue.
3. Iraq stated to the team that it is now certain that the numbers on CW warhead shipping containers were not covered by paint. In addition, Iraq said to the team that, both Iraqi and Soviet special warheads were painted similarly so that their external appearances are the same. As a conclusion on this point, this has caused that Iraqi special warheads were designated as Soviet warheads due to the number on the shipping container. There is a high probability, that the number on Soviet warhead which had been painted, will not correlate at all with the number on the container. This is a very solid explanation to the major concern of UNSCOM. Due to the common painting of Soviet and Iraqi warheads (and even Project 144 did not pay attention to special warheads, which one are Iraqi and which one are Soviet), this led the missile force not to think that there are Iraqi special warheads. So they did not know they were Iraqi warheads, they took for granted that these Iraqi special warheads are Soviet warheads. And they only discovered this at the time of the CDG destruction at Muthanna. Also Project 144 cannot ascertain precisely how many Iraqi special CW warheads were produced. They think it might be 10 to 13 warheads, as a possibility. This led Iraq to state that what was quoted as Soviet special warheads in consumption diary number 10, if I am not mistaken, are not all Soviet warheads. But there might be 2 to 5 Iraqi warheads with Soviet numbers being those of the containers in which they are positioned. As a solid proof of the above, we find that even with the Soviet warheads destroyed by UNSCOM, there are 5 warhead numbers which do not correlate with the numbers on the containers. Four of them are the same, and four of them correlate with conventional warheads fired against Iran, and one destroyed unilaterally by Iraq (diary number 10.) Last point on this. As an answer to why this doubling occurred predominately on the special warheads and little on the conventional warheads, is because of painting, which we have explained above, of the Soviet and Iraqi warheads. There could be no checking of the serial number of the warhead even if the container was opened. Also because special warheads were manufactured in Project 144 at a later date when there were many empty containers, consumed containers, sent to Project 144. Not like for H-2 warheads when there were few conventional, the number could be easily checked by opening of the container. Another subject, 7 (#1) Soviet conventional warheads in Project 144 after the cease fire. Based on UNSCOM ascertaining that remnants of these warheads are from P7, the explanation which we could give to this is the following:
1) 3 of them which are cut into halves, are part of 77 halves in the Project 144 destruction diary. There is no definition of the 77 warheads as Iraqi or Soviet. It is written in the diary 77 halves of warheads. It does not say Soviet or Iraqi.
2) The other 2 complete warheads and another 2 (#1) of remnants of warheads were not found in the Project 144 destruction document. Possibly there was a document and we can not find it. For the 2 complete Iraqi warheads, we had a separate document of the project. As a conclusion, we find that this issue is a matter of explanation and clarification. Taking into account the above remarks and knowing that some of Iraqi special warheads destroyed unilaterally have been assumed as Soviet, in addition to the swapping of two warheads between Soviet and Iraqi as Al Hijaras, this, in absolutely no way, will affect the final material balance of destroyed Soviet conventional warheads. (Al-Hijaara al Sijjil - see collection 1.)
Another point. UNSCOM has clarified to the Iraqi side that what it has destroyed in 1991 of Al Hijara warheads, is not three Soviet plus one Iraqi but three Iraqi and one Soviet. This is another proof that there is no correlation between the number on the warhead and the container. It shows that the Iraqi missile forces have taken for granted the Soviet number on containers which contain two Iraqi warheads.
Another point. UNSCOM raised a question of two Iraqi empty warheads which were near the Technical Battalion in July 1991 during UNSCOM 3. We think, Iraq thinks this will not change the Iraqi declaration. This could be either conventional or Al Hijaras and need to be jointly thoroughly investigated.
Another issue. UNSCOM raised a concern on production documents of shed number 12. This was an answer to a request by the director of Project 144 on 8 June 1991. The request says: "Give me production status." It doesn't say, have you produced? It is a pity this has not been given to UNSCOM. So as this is production status, to the best of our understanding, the numbers 40 of Hussein warheads is what was in the shed before 16 January 1991. What has been mentioned about the repairs of 7 special warheads, has been done before 17 January on the special warheads.
Another point. UNSCOM has provided to Iraq a solid proof during the meeting that marking "A" on chemical warheads corresponds to Iraqi binary, and "A+B" to Sarin. This was a major confusion for the last few years. But still a question remains to be settled, of minor importance: has Muthanna put such letters on shipping containers. Was this done or not?
Another point and the last one. Iraq was presented with a document of only two lines of a list of many lines where there is an indication of the designation of 3, 4, 5 to special warheads on 13 September 1990. Iraq requested that the complete list be given to provide a reasonable explanation. However, till this is done, Iraqi specialists do not recollect any reasonable information to explain this date. However, this date shows that there has been preliminary planning for designation of biological agents filling of warheads. At that time, mid-September, especially Al Hakam site was, at that time, designated for filling. If this is true, it in no way affects the statements in the FFCD regarding the actual filling of warheads in January of 1991, and in no way affects the material balance.
(What happened to the special warheads designated 1 and 2?)
TEM Proceedings and General Conclusions.
1. Iraq valued very much the importance of such TEM meetings and consider it a good modality for working jointly and in a transparent fashion and in cooperation
2. However, we note that it is much more useful and important to concentrate on issues of significance and importance to the material balance and the significant understanding of the Iraqi programmes and not on minor issues, especially technical details, and not to try to exaggerate their importance and influence of these points on the overall file.
3. It is very important when we make the overall assessment to pay the same attention to what has been achieved, not to talk about what is not filled in a glass of water, from this file. It is very important because the Security Council or the multinational community, will not go back to the previous minutes of meeting, and to previous reports. They want conclusions. So when you tell them there are remaining this issue, this issue, this issue, you give wrong perception. And this leads to suspicions and misunderstanding. So in this respect, I ask you, please, revise what Mr. Smidovich calls main points where minor issues give conclusion to significant points unnecessarily and could easily give wrong perception of what all of us have achieved.
Last major issue on TEM. We ask you officially, in about two to three weeks time from now, to convene the same meeting to review, analyse and evaluate what all of us will do, especially using advanced equipment of UNSCOM on excavations we will conduct jointly, and also to reflect by your side and our side on the issues which have been raised. Possibly we did not give (them) enough time, all of us, both sides, for examination, for serious and in-depth examination.
And at the end, I would like to thank you for what has been provided to us to remove your concerns in terms of some video, some drawings, and "farm" documents which we are sure have helped UNSCOM to build up of better understanding. And we hope that this mode of work will be even strengthened and widened further to resolve this file. This is on the technical report.
I have two more points.
One of them, even Nikita will say this is political statement, but in the end we are discussing a problem of the agony of the Iraqi people, (this is) without saying who is to blame or not to blame for it. Definitely there is a genocide in Iraq, children, women, elderly people, normal people, extreme human suffering. This can be removed if you as experts contribute to the closing of the file. I am sure that it is contrary to the conscience of any human being to let suffering of Iraqi people continue because of a minor technical issue, or a minor technical detail which (need) to be resolved. Result is significant if Iraq has weapons. We respect concern if it is significant to the mandate. So please concentrate on the main issue, that is, has Iraq destroyed all its weapons, not on details. While we could always answer you, but to give priority on this issue. And it will be unwise, and I would not be only an Iraqi but also a human being not to tell you this.
An issue I have asked Mr. Smidovich, if possible, I want responses from experts who joined us for the first time in such meetings with UNSCOM, to see their reflection on what I have just said as Iraqi conclusions. Especially the Chinese experts, Russian, French experts, German expert as the new experts who were not with us. We know you came under the UNSCOM umbrella. Ask you to make reflections on the main issues of significance, not on technical details or minor issues. My Government would be very much interested in our reflections.
Thank you for your patience.
Lt. General Amer M. Rasheed's final remarks
We have endeavoured before the start and during the meeting to make a very successful TEM, took every measure on technical level, logistical level and in the mode of discussion except for some instances which do not affect the overall cooperation, to make it a success. We think it is quite a success. It could be better. I ask to continue this modality to resolve this file as soon as possible.
I ask you officially to review seriously your conclusions, taking the conclusions and remarks I gave you on behalf of Iraqi side. (Do it) thoroughly for better understanding between Iraq and UNSCOM. Failing this, or if you can take only part of the conclusions, I ask you, Mr. Smidovich to give to Mr. Butler not only your conclusions, but also to pass to him our conclusions. Annex I (to be) our conclusions, Annex II -- Iraqi conclusions.
Make the report in a very constructive, objective language, which highlights the significant issues and does not put a lot of importance on minor issues or technical details. In the end I assure you of our full cooperation and full transparency. We have a very good reason to do this, to remove the suffering and the genocide that is being conducted every day on our people and no one cannot have a conscience about this. This is driving us above all other elements and factors. And thank you very much for your patience with us, and I have one extra thanks that you have accepted one day longer, even if it is part of the modality. I know it was not your pleasure, but you've done it to finish the job. I thank you for your understanding.
(1)Words shown thus has been added to aid clarity.
© 1998 UNSCOM
LETTER DATED 30 NOVEMBER 1998 FROM THE EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ESTABLISHED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 9 (b) (i) OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 (1991) ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
I have the honour to forward to you, and through you, to the members of the Security Council, a copy of the letters that I addressed to Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, on 27 November 1998.
I would appreciate it if the two letters could be circulated as documents of the Security Council.
(Signed) Richard BUTLER
Letter dated 27 November 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations
I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter of today's date addressed to Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq. I would be grateful if you could arrange for its immediate transmission to Baghdad.
(Signed) Richard BUTLER
Letter dated 27 November 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq
With reference to the letter of 26 November 1998 addressed to me by Mr. Riyadh al-Qaysi, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, I should like to respond to the proposals that I send three United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspection teams to Iraq.
We note with satisfaction that the Iraqi side is ready to cooperate with the Special Commission on several specific issues referred to in the Schedule for Work of 14 June 1998. As you are aware, the Commission has already proposed, and was ready to conduct, at the beginning of August 1998, the missions now requested by Iraq. It is for this reason that the Commission had kept the necessary technical resources at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre for a period of two months, that is, until October 1998.
Concerning the specific proposals contained in Mr. Riyadh al-Qaysi's letter, I should like to state the following:
1. With respect to the request that a team from UNSCOM assist in investigating the disposition of 155-mm shells filled with mustard, the Commission is ready to assist the Iraqi side with its search. To accomplish this effectively, we need to receive Iraq's clarifications on what specific support Iraq seeks from the Commission. As was mentioned in the Schedule for Work, "Iraq will give UNSCOM two weeks advance notice in case it would request deployment by UNSCOM of survey and verification equipment". If Iraq were to request ground-penetrating radar technology, we would need information on the possible locations to be examined and the size of those locations. This would enable the Commission to dispatch to Iraq the necessary resources and equipment. The Commission would also like to receive, in advance, records of all investigations referred to in the letter of 25 November 1998 from Mr. Riyadh al-Qaysi (S/1998/1125, annex). Such records would then be translated so that the discussions could be most productive. To date, the Commission has received only one such report. The procedures suggested would enable this work to be carried out as quickly as possible.
2. With respect to the request that a team from UNSCOM be sent to verify the accounting of tail units for R-400 aerial bombs, the Commission is preparing a mission which would be tasked to verify Iraq's declaration on the accounting for R-400 aerial bombs, including their tail sections. This mission will be sent to Iraq as soon as is practically possible.
3. With respect to the third request concerning the location of the pits which were used for the storage of special warheads, we intend to task the missile monitoring group now stationed at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre to carry out this mission in cooperation with their Iraqi counterparts.
It is evident that the preparation and implementation of these missions will take a certain amount of time. So that there will be no misunderstanding between us, I wish to state that it is not my intention that the implementation of these joint tasks should impact on the Commission's responsibility to report to the Secretary-General in accordance with the statement to the press by the President of the Council on 15 November. As I informed the Council during its informal consultations on 24 November, I expect to be in a position to formulate a report in two or three weeks time on whether or not Iraq has returned to full cooperation. This should be sufficient time to proceed with the full spectrum of our work.
(Signed) Richard BUTLER
Letter dated 27 November 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations
I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter of today's date addressed to Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq. I would be grateful if you could arrange for its immediate transmission to Baghdad.
(Signed) Richard BUTLER
Letter dated 27 November 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq
As you know, the members of the Security Council held informal consultations on 24 November 1998 to consider, in particular, issues related to the provision by Iraq of documents and access to relevant archives as requested by the Special Commission in its letter dated 17 November. I attended that meeting. During the consultations, members of the Council supported the Commission's requests, contained in its letter of 17 November, that had been made in order to significantly advance work with respect to accounting for Iraq's proscribed weapons and related capabilities, and to increase the Commission's confidence in the level of verification already achieved.
On the issue of the Air Force document on the consumption of special munitions, and in the light of the discussions in the Council, I request that the Iraqi side hand over to the Acting Director of the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre, by 30 November, the sealed envelope containing the document, so sealed, on 18 July 1998. If you deem it appropriate, the transfer of the document may be accompanied by a written statement with explanations that Iraq may wish to make, on this occasion, concerning the format and content of the document. Upon completion of translation and examination of the document by the Commission's experts, I will be ready to take appropriate decisions on follow-up steps, including, if required, meetings between experts from Iraq and the Commission, their timing and format.
In its letter dated 19 November, Iraq expressed its readiness to submit the documents which would meet the request of the Commission related to documents concerning the creation and armament of Missile Unit 223. I would appreciate it if these documents were handed over to the Acting Director of the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre in the coming days so that the Commission may start translation and examination of them.
It would also be helpful if the other documents specified in the annex to my letter of 17 November (S/1998/1106, annex) could be provided as soon as possible.
In the light of the discussions in the Security Council, I hope that you can now find it possible to respond constructively so that progress may be achieved in resolving outstanding disarmament issues.
(Signed) Richard BUTLER
© 1998 UNSCOM
UNSCOM CHAIRMAN BUTLER'S REPORT TO UN SECRETARY GENERAL
New York -- The Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), Richard Butler, reported to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan December 15 that since inspectors returned to Iraq November 17 "Iraq's conduct ensured that no progress was able to be made in either the fields of disarmament or accounting for its prohibited weapons program."
"It has not been possible to verify Iraq's claims with respect to the nature and magnitude of its proscribed weapons programmes and their current disposition," Butler said.
"In light of this experience, that is, the absence of full cooperation by Iraq, it must regrettably be recorded again that the Commission is not able to conduct the substantive disarmament work mandated to it by the Security Council and, thus, to give the Council the assurance it requires with respect to Iraq's prohibited weapons programs," Butler's letter to the Secretary- General concluded.
Following is the text of Butler's letter to Secretary-General Annan, as released by the United Nations:
The Executive Chairman
15 December 1998
I refer to the Press Statement by the President of the Security Council (SC/6596) of 15 November 1998, in which the Council noted, on the basis of communications of 14 November 1998 received from the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the Ambassador of Iraq, "that Iraq has decided, clearly and unconditionally, to cooperate fully with the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that this decision constitutes a rescinding of the decisions of 5 August and 31 October and that Iraq's cooperation with the Special Commission and the IAEA will allow the return of inspectors to resume all their activities on an immediate, unconditional and unrestricted basis, in accordance with the relevant resolutions and with the Memorandum of Understanding 23 February 1998."
In the same statement, "Council members reaffirmed their readiness to proceed with a comprehensive review, once the Secretary-General has confirmed, on the basis of reports from the Special Commission and the IAEA, that Iraq has returned to full cooperation, on the basis of resolution 1194 (1998) and the Council President's letter of 30 October to the Secretary-General."
Mr. Kofi Annan
The present letter provides the report called for from the Special Commission. It is guided, in particular, by the provision in the press statement to the effect that: "Council members underlined that their confidence in Iraq's intentions needs to be established by unconditional and sustained cooperation with the Special Commission and the IAEA in exercising the full range of the activities provided for in their mandates in accordance with the relevant resolutions and the Memorandum of Understanding of 23 February 1998."
Before providing an account of the Commission's experience during the past month, I believe it is essential to provide, briefly, some background contextual material which, in addition, provides explanation for the range of activities which the Commission chose to follow since 17 November 1998.
From the inception of the Commission's work in Iraq, in 1991, Iraq's cooperation has been limited. Iraq acknowledges that, in that year, it decided to limit disclosure for the purpose of retaining certain prohibited weapons capabilities. Three main Iraqi policies ensued:
(a) its disclosure statements have never been complete;
(b) contrary to the requirement that destruction of prohibited capabilities be conducted under international supervision, Iraq undertook extensive, unilateral, secret destruction; and
(c) it also pursued a practice of concealment of proscribed items, including weapons.
This situation, created by Iraq, in particular through the inadequacy of its disclosures, has meant that the Commission has been obliged to undertake a kind and degree of forensic work which was never intended to be the case. The work of the verification of Iraq's disclosures should have been far easier and been able to be undertaken far more quickly than has proved to be the case.
In addition, these circumstances have meant that, in spite of the years that have passed and the extensive work that has been undertaken, it has not been possible to verify Iraq's claims with respect to the nature and magnitude of its proscribed weapons programmes and their current disposition.
With respect to this later point, two comments are apposite.
First, Iraq's current claims that it has fulfilled all of its disarmament obligations in each weapons area; ceased concealment policies and actions; and that it has neither proscribed weapons nor the ability to make them, cannot be accepted without further verification.
Secondly, documents or records available in Iraq in which relevant details of its proscribed programmes and actions are reported: production records; records of disposition of weapons; and, records of claimed destruction, relevant policy decisions and decisions on termination of concealment, would be invaluable in helping to close remaining gaps and achieve acceptable confidence in Iraqi declarations. The Security Council recognized these two aspects in resolution 707 (1991) when it demanded Iraq provide immediate and unconditional access to, inter alia, records, and, demanded that Iraq cease attempts to conceal prohibited materials.
In response to the Commission's requests for relevant documents, Iraq has repeatedly claimed that they no longer exist or cannot be located, a claim which very often has been shown to be false, either because inspection activities have in fact located precisely such documents or because Iraq has reversed its stated position and then produced relevant documents. The Commission briefed the Council on its assessment of the existence and importance of documents in June 1998. The Commission has assessed since the "chicken farm" event of 1995 that only selected categories of documents were provided and that other categories were retained by Iraq. It remains the Commission's strong view that, under the present circumstances, relevant documentation must exist in Iraq and that provision of such documentation is the best hope for revealing the full picture, as required by the relevant resolutions.
On 17 November 1998, the Commission began to resume its work in Iraq across the full range of its activities. Accordingly, that work was focussed on four main areas, pursuant to the Commission's mandate: requests for information through access to documents and interviews of Iraqi personnel; monitoring inspections; inspection of capable sites; and, disarmament inspections relating to proscribed weapons and activities.
The following is a summary of the Commission's experience in each category, from 17 November 1998 to date:
Requests for access to information through documentation and interviews of Iraqi personnel:
On a number of occasions, the Security Council has demanded that Iraq allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to documents and records relevant to the Commission's activities. On 17 November 1998, the Commission requested Iraq to provide certain documentation related to the chemical weapons and missile areas. The purpose of this request was to increase the Commission's level of verification in these areas. It comprised a selection of 12 particular sets of documents and a request for access to the relevant archives of Iraq's Ministry of Defense and Military Industrialization Corporation and other Government departments.
Iraq provided documents in response to one of the Commission's requests. It gave some 64 pages related to Missile Unit 223. These pages are currently under translation and examination. A preliminary assessment indicates that they do not contain the information sought by the Commission.
The Commission reiterated its request for the document found by an inspection team at the Headquarters of the Iraqi Air Force in July 1998. The Security Council has asked Iraq to return the document to the Commission. This document details Iraq's consumption of special munitions in the 1980s, and therefore, is directly related to verification of the material balance of Iraq's chemical munitions. Iraq refused to return the sealed envelope with the document to the Commission and stated that it is ready only to "consider" with the Commission's experts the relevant portions of this document in the presence of the Special Representative of the Secretary General.
Iraq stated that the remainder of the request documents either do not exist, could not be found or are not relevant to Commission's activities.
With respect achieves, Iraq did not respond to the suggestion made by the Commission. It did not deny the existence of the archives, but stated that the Ministry of Defense and Military Industrialization Corporation had been inspected by the Commission. The teams did not find any relevant archives at the above mention sites during the inspections.
During the reporting period a biological inspection team requested Iraq's authorities to provide access to a number of specific documents. One document had already been seen by the Commission in 1995. These documents were not given to the inspection team.
On 19 November 1998, Iraq was requested to provide explanations and clarifications on outstanding disarmament issues in the chemical weapons and missile areas. Further, Iraq was requested to allow the removal for analysis of a number of missile engine components produced by Iraq.
In the chemical weapons area, Iraq provided, as requested, a report on its analysis of the samples from the special missile warhead fragments. On the issue of VX, Iraq for the first time claimed that the contamination of the warhead fragments had been the result of a deliberate act of tampering with the samples taken to the United States. Iraq made this statement despite the conclusion drawn by three international expert teams, which confirmed that all analytical results were valid and conclusive.
In the missile area, Iraq provided some clarifications sought by the Commission. On the requests, Iraq in essence, reiterated its known positions, which did not advance the verification process.
With respect to the Commission's request to allow the removal of missile engine components, Iraq has refused to do so stating that this request is not justified on "technical or scientific grounds".
On 18 November 1998, the Commission requested Iraq to provide new substantial information on its biological weapons activities that would enable the Commission to achieve an enhanced level of verification and to rectify inconsistencies in Iraq's current declarations. No new information or document have been presented by Iraq in response to this request.
Inspection teams -- resident and non-resident -- encountered several problems with the questioning of personal on site. The National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) representatives repeatedly intervened when a biological team attempted to question PhD and MSc students stating that UNSCOM was not allowed to interview students at university sites even though declarable research has taken place at such sites. NMD routinely interrupted and prompted site personnel when answering questions.
In statistical terms, the majority of the inspections of facilities and sites under the ongoing monitoring system were carried out with Iraq's cooperation. Problems arose which indicated that the limitations Iraq has imposed on the monitoring system, on 5 August 1998, have not been fully rescinded. Specific instances are given below.
During the reporting period, the Commission requested, on several occasions, access to specific data collected by Iraq during its test of indigenously produced missiles and rocket engines. Prior to 5 August 1998, Iraq had provided such data. In response to the Commission's recent request, Iraq stated that it is meeting its obligations with respect to the provision of data on its testing activity and denied access to the particular information requested by the Commission. In relation to the Commission's most recent request, on 6 December, Iraq stated it would reconsider its decision. It has not yet provided the data requested.
During a chemical monitoring inspection on 5 December, the National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) representatives placed unacceptable conditions on the photography of bombs, citing national security concerns. No photographs were taken.
During the reporting period, undeclared dual-capable items and materials subject to chemical and biological monitoring, were also discovered.
On 11 December the chemical monitoring group was told by the NMD representative that they would not be able to conduct and inspection at a specific monitoring site on that day because it was a Friday. The inspection group was not able to inspect the inside of the site. The incident underlined the position sited earlier that Iraq would facilitate entry to buildings "during the working days of the work, except Fridays".
Inspection of capable sites:
Identification of the nature of activities at locations where undeclared dual-use capabilities may exist is an important aspect of monitoring activity. During the reporting period, teams conducted no-notice inspections at a number of sites that had not been declared by Iraq. Access to these sites was provided and inspections took place with one exception which was at a facility occupied by the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iraq (PMOI). The site of this facility was declared as being not under the authority of Iraq. Discussions over access were left to the Commission and the organization. A dialogue has begun on this matter and the PMOI has accepted, in principle, that its sites are subject to access by the Commission.
During the recent period, a series of inspections were conducted which served both the purpose of searching for material related to prohibited programmes and investigation of possible ongoing prohibited activities. The team conducting these missions went to six locations. At the first two sites, (Taji military facility and a special security organization cable office), Iraq declared the sites to be sensitive, but offered no objections nor claimed any conditions on access.
The next site, designated for inspection on the basis of solid evidence presented to UNSCOM of the presence of proscribed material, was declared by Iraq to be a Ba'ath Party Headquarters. Iraq initially declared it to be sensitive and therefore subject to special procedures issued by the former Executive Chairman, Ambassador Ekeus, to his inspectors in 1996. The Chief Inspector was instructed to conduct his inspections according to the requirement he assessed he needed for a credible and timely inspection. Experience since 1996 had proved that the limited access procedures of 1996 did not allow effective inspections. Subsequent discussions between the Executive Chairman and the Deputy Prime Minister had addressed this point (as reported to the Security Council in a letter dated 17 December 1997 (S/1997/987) and new modalities had been agreed. Protracted discussions between the Chief Inspector and his Iraqi counterpart failed to yield satisfactory access. During the discussion, Iraq had introduced various new requirement, including a formal letter of request, indicating what was being sought at the site.
At a fourth site, while Iraq declared it to be sensitive, arrangements were ultimately agreed for the inspection. Iraq stated that this had been the former Headquarters of the Special Security Organization, claiming that it had now been moved to a new location. The building had been emptied of any relevant materials. Iraq would not disclose where those materials were now held.
A fifth site appeared to be a private residence and, with the permission of the residents, two female Inspectors made a brief walk through to confirm the nature of the site.
The final site, the management offices of the Military Industrialization Corporation (MIC), was also declared sensitive by Iraq. However, agreement on access by a small team was achieved. This site, too, had been prepared to avoid any disclosure of relevant materials and the team assessed Iraq had expected their arrival.
In light of the clear evidence that Iraq had taken advance actions at certain of the locations planned for inspection in order to defeat the purposes of inspection, the Executive Chairman decided not to conduct the full range of inspections the team had planned. No inspection of presidential sites took place.
National Implementation Measures:
Both the Special Commission's and the IAEA's Plans for ongoing monitoring and verification, which were approved by Security Council resolution 715 (1991), provide that Iraq shall adopt the measures necessary to implement its obligations under section C of resolution 687 (1991), resolution 707 (1991) and the Plans. In particular, Iraq is required to adopt legislation prohibiting all natural and legal persons under its jurisdiction from undertaking anywhere any activity prohibited by the relevant resolutions and the Plans, and to enact penal legislation to enforce the aforesaid prohibitions. Such legislation was required by the Plans to have been enacted within 30 days of their adoption by the Security Council on 11 October 1991. To date, the legislation has not been enacted.
This is an issue on which Iraq's cooperation has been sought since 1991. It would have been an indication of full cooperation had Iraq taken action on this issue in the period under review.
As is evident from this report, Iraq did not provide the full cooperation it promised on 14 November 1998.
In addition, during the period under review, Iraq initialed new forms of restrictions upon the Commission's work. Amongst the Commission's many concerns about this retrograde step is what such further restrictions might mean for the effectiveness of long-term monitoring activities.
In spite of the opportunity presented by the circumstances of the last month, including the prospect of a comprehensive review, Iraq's conduct ensured that no progress was able to be made in either the fields of disarmament or accounting for its prohibited weapons programmes.
Finally, in the light of this experience, that is, the absence of full cooperation by Iraq, it must regrettably be recorded again that the Commission is not able to conduct the substantive disarmament work mandated to it by the Security Council and, thus, to give the Council the assurances it requires with respect to Iraq's prohibited weapons programmes.
Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
(Signed) Richard Butler
© 1998 Richard Butler/UNSCOM
UNSCOM documents S/1999/94 dated 29 January 1999 and the 'Amorim Report' S/1999/356 dated 30 March 1999 (see Collection 8) give the most complete accounts of the status of Iraq’s missile programmes at the time of the end of the UNSCOM inspection regime. These documents are referred to in UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Hans Blix's report to the UN Security Council of 19 December 2002, following Iraq’s submission of its 12,000 page dossier in response to UN Resolution 1442 of 8 November 2002 requiring it to provide a 'Full, Final and Complete Disclosure' (FFCD) regarding its WMD programmes.
Extracts from UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Hans Blix's report to the Security Council on 19th December 2002.
"During the period 1991-1998, Iraq submitted many declarations called full, final and complete. Regrettably, much in these declarations proved inaccurate or incomplete or was unsupported or contradicted by evidence. In such cases, no confidence can arise that proscribed programmes or items have been eliminated."
"Such was the situation at the end of 1998, when inspectors left Iraq. The many question marks are documented in a report to the Council early in 1999 (S/1999/94) and in the so-called 'Amorim Report' (S/1999/356). To these question marks, nearly four years without any inspection activity have been added."
"In resolution 1441 (2002), Iraq was given an opportunity to provide a fresh declaration and to make it verifiable to the inspecting authorities by submitting supporting evidence. It remains to analyse in detail how much is clarified by the new declaration and supporting material. When we have performed a more thorough analysis, we may ask Iraq for supplementary information and clarifications."
"As there is little new substantive information in the weapons part of Iraq's Declaration, or new supporting documentation, the issues that were identified as unanswered in the Amorim report(S/1999/356) and in UNSCOM's report (S/1999/94) remain unresolved. In most cases, the issues are outstanding not because there is information that contradicts Iraq's account, but simply because there is a lack of supporting evidence. Such supporting evidence, in the form of documentation, testimony by individuals who took part, or physical evidence, for example, destroyed warheads, is required to give confidence that Iraq's Declaration is indeed accurate, full and complete."
© 2002 UNMOVIC
The Cluster Document - UNRESOLVED DISARMAMENT ISSUES - IRAQ'S PROSCRIBED WEAPONS PROGRAMMES - 6 March 2003
6 March 2003
CLUSTERS OF UNRESOLVED DISARMAMENT ISSUES
I. MISSILE CLUSTERS...................................................................................21
a. Scud type missiles........................................................................................21
b. SA-2 Missile Technology ............................................................................27
c. Research and development (R&D) on ballistic missiles capable of proscribed ranges .............................................................................................................31
d. FROG (Luna) Special Warheads .................................................................35
e. Development of solid propellant missile systems before and after the Gulf War.................................................................................................................37
II. MUNITIONS AND OTHER DELIVERY MEANS, CLUSTERS............41
a. Scud-type Biological and Chemical Warheads ...........................................41
b. R-400 and R-400A Bombs...........................................................................45
c. Major Aerial Bombs ....................................................................................49
d. Major Rockets and Artillery Projectiles ......................................................53
e. Spray devices and Remotely Piloted Vehicles ............................................57
f. Other Chemical and Biological munitions ..................................................63
III. CHEMICAL CLUSTERS.........................................................................67
a. Tabun ...........................................................................................................67
b. Sarin and Cyclosarin ....................................................................................71
c. Mustard ........................................................................................................75
e. Major Chemical Process Equipment............................................................85
g. BZ Analogues (psychoactive compounds) ..................................................93
IV. BIOLOGICAL CLUSTERS.....................................................................95
b. Botulinum Toxin..........................................................................................99
c. Mycotoxins: Aflatoxin and Trichothecenes.............................................. 103
d. Wheat cover smut ..................................................................................... 107
e. Clostridium perfringens ............................................................................ 111
f. Ricin .......................................................................................................... 115
g. Undeclared BW agents ............................................................................. 117
h. Drying of BW Agents ............................................................................... 119
i. Bacterial BW agent production................................................................. 123
j. Genetic Engineering and Viral Research.................................................. 127
k. BW Agent Simulants ................................................................................ 131
I. MISSILE CLUSTERS
a. Scud type missiles
In 1974, Iraq started taking delivery of the foreign made Scud-B, a surface-to-surface combat missile with a range up to 300 kilometres, and associated equipment (launchers, ground support equipment). At the beginning of 1987, Iraq started modifying Scud-B missiles to extend their range. After several tests, on 3 August 1987, a test missile achieved a range of approximately 615 kilometres. This modified missile was subsequently designated as Al Hussein. After this success, Iraq decided to reverse-engineer the Scud-B missile. At the beginning of 1988, the director of the Military Industrialization Commission (MIC) tasked a facility designated as Project 1728 to indigenously develop and produce Scud-type engines.
In August 1991, Iraq declared the import of a total of 819 Scud-B combat missiles with a matching number of conventional warheads. It also declared matching quantities for the import of main fuel (818 tonnes) and oxidizer (2895 tonnes) for those missiles. Iraq further declared that it had imported 11 Scud-B missile transporter-erector-launchers (TEL), and had declared the indigenous production of four additional launchers (known as Al Nida) from imported trucks and 50-tonne trailers. These missiles, launchers and propellants constituted the core elements of Iraq's missile force before the Gulf War. UNSCOM was satisfied that 817 out of 819 imported Scud-B missiles had been accounted for. This finding was endorsed by UNSCOM Commissioners in November 1997. However, UNSCOM could not account for approximately 25 imported warheads.
Iraq had declared the unilateral destruction of significant quantities of Scud-B propellants. However, this was not supported by documentation. Iraq did not provide two inventory diaries, known to UNSCOM and requested by it, that had covered the time of the destruction of the proscribed missile propellants. Iraq has maintained its position that it did not have these diaries when UNMOVIC repeated the request in January 2003. In June 1998, Iraq indicated that, due to the stated limited storage lifetime of the main fuel (7 years) and of the oxidizer (10 years), they would no longer have been usable.
UNSCOM could not confirm the existence of other suppliers of Scud-B combat missiles to Iraq.
Prior to the Gulf war (1988-1990), Iraq had also made extensive efforts to develop its capability to indigenously produce Scud-type missiles. In this respect, Iraq declared that it had been able to indigenously produce a total of 80 combustion chamber/nozzle assemblies, of which 54 to 57 had been rejected due to poor production quality. Iraq had declared the unilateral destruction of the combustion chamber/nozzle assemblies. However, the methods used for this destruction prevented UNSCOM from achieving a full accounting of the 80 assemblies.
Iraq also stated in 1997 that, in April 1990, it had indigenously produced seven "training" engines, which had been delivered to an operational missile unit for training purposes. Iraq stated that these engines had been unilaterally destroyed, along with the imported missiles in July 1991. UNSCOM did not find any remnants of such engines and, therefore, could not verify this declaration. These assertions were repeated in a document provided to UNMOVIC on 8 February 2003.
In February 1998, Iraq declared that, prior to the Gulf war, it had indigenously produced 121 Scud-type warheads. This was discussed during a Technical Evaluation Meeting in 1998 and, although Iraq orally provided information concerning the production of these warheads, it did not support the information with any documentation. UNSCOM could not find remnants for approximately 25 of the declared indigenously produced warheads. UNSCOM was not able to obtain a full picture of Iraq's warhead production.
In February 1996, Iraq admitted that, before the Gulf War, it had started to construct facilities to produce Scud-B propellants and that construction had continued after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991). However, Iraq stated that the facilities never became operational and were eventually converted to civilian use and submitted for monitoring by UNSCOM until December 1998.
Iraq imported key engine components that it could not indigenously produce. For example, Iraq declared that, between mid-1989 and mid-1990, it had received from a foreign supplier 35 turbo-pumps out of an initial order of 305. According to Iraq, a total of 14 turbo-pumps had been used in testing activities and the remainder had been unilaterally destroyed in July 1991. The extensive methods used for the unilateral destruction prevented UNSCOM from making a full accounting for the declared turbo-pumps. UNSCOM also obtained documentary proof that two turbo-pumps did not arrive in Iraq until six months after the date Iraq declared it had used them in static tests.
Iraq stated that, due to the lack of certain equipment, components and know-how, Project 1728 had not been able to produce a complete engine. However, in 1998, UNSCOM concluded that, by late 1990, Iraq had had the capability to indigenously manufacture, from indigenously produced and foreign parts, a limited number of Scud-type engines and missiles. It should nevertheless be noted that, in 1998, Iraq was experiencing some difficulties in indigenously producing/assembling an Al Samoud engine, a smaller liquid propulsion engine based on the same technology as that of the Scud-B.
Before the Gulf War, Iraq had the capability to indigenously manufacture warheads, airframes, and certain engine components but had to rely on imports for some key engine components as well as guidance and control (G&C) components. Iraq had attempted to indigenously produce Scud-B type propellants and was able to assemble an indigenous launcher.
UNSCOM found that Iraq had continued to engage in activities after they had become proscribed by the adoption of resolution 687 (1991). For example, Iraq had established working groups as late as November 1993 to work on Scud-B guidance and control systems. Iraq stated that the working groups were able to produce only preliminary production drawings and that they had been disbanded two weeks after having started work.
Following Lieutenant-General Hussein Kamal's defection, the Iraqi authorities handed over to UNSCOM a small number of Scud-B guidance and control equipment and various other parts that had been imported for its pre-Gulf War missile activities.
Iraq stated in early 1996 that, in 1995, a foreign middleman had offered Iraq five disassembled second-hand TELs of a size much larger than the Scud-B TELs. According to Iraq, since it had had no interest in the offer, the proposal had been rejected and the parts had never been delivered.
In 1995, Iraq declared that it had not informed UNSCOM of the work it had carried out at the Al Sadiq factory in 1992/1993 for some 18 months as the work had only been related to non-proscribed missile production. UNSCOM questioned this rationale given that Iraq had declared similar work at another facility.
On 3 March 2003, Iraq provided two documents concerning the material balance for combat warheads and the local production of liquid fuel engines. Earlier, on 25 February 2003, Iraq also offered to provide UNMOVIC with metal fragments, which it had informed UNSCOM were from indigenously produced engines. At that time, it had refused to provide the items to UNSCOM as it had objected to UNSCOM seeking an analysis of the items at laboratories outside of Iraq.
In the material balance for combat warheads document, Iraq indicated its readiness to discuss the details of the unilateral destruction of the warheads in 1991, and offered to conduct a recount. It also suggested that joint excavations be conducted at the unilateral destruction site and at the site where destruction had been carried out under UNSCOM supervision. Iraq also provided the names of eight persons who it states had carried out the transport and destruction of warheads in 1991. UNMOVIC is still reviewing the information and other details provided in the document. It is still not clear whether the activities suggested could help resolve any part of the outstanding issues in this area.
As for the document on local production of liquid fuel engines, it states inter alia that Iraq did not reach the stage of producing a combat-level engine until 17 January 1991. The document also provides a list of 46 persons, in addition to the five senior staff that had been named in its 1996 FFCD, who it states were the main scientific and engineering staff in Project 1728. An analysis of the information provided is underway.
Although UNSCOM reported that all but two of the 819 declared imported Scud-B combat missiles had been "effectively" accounted for, the stated consumption of some missiles could not be independently verified. This was the case for 14 Scud-B missiles as targets in a missile interception project. While such use is supported by some documentation contained in the so-called Scud files, it is questionable whether Iraq would have really used, what were at that time, valuable operational assets in the pursuit of such a project. Furthermore, available data could only corroborate a very small number of declared missile launches at that time. It cannot be excluded that Iraq retained a certain numbers of the missiles. The additional information Iraq provided on 8 February 2003 on the missile interception project does not resolve the outstanding questions.
Iraq's thorough methods of unilateral destruction prevented an assessment of its achievements in the indigenous production of Scud-B engines. Furthermore, the methods used prevented a clear accounting of the "training" engines and some specific key components of the indigenously produced liquid propellant engine. The lack of evidence to support Iraq's declarations on its destruction of these indigenously produced "training" engines, as well as on the key engine components, such as turbo-pumps, raises the question whether they were all destroyed as declared. Iraq could, in fact, have produced a small number of Scud-type liquid propellant engines from both imported turbo-pumps and locally produced engine components.
Moreover, the lack of documentation to support the destruction of a significant amount of Scud-B liquid propellant, and the fact that approximately 50 warheads were not accounted for among the remnants of unilateral destruction, suggest that these items may have been retained for a proscribed missile force. After investigating Iraq's statement that, due to the limited storage lifetime, the propellants would now be useless, UNMOVIC has assessed that the propellants would in fact still be usable and would therefore need to be verified as destroyed.
Questions also arise with respect to activities related to proscribed guidance and control systems that Iraq had conducted from 1992 to 1995. It is difficult to accept Iraq's statement that they were for non-proscribed missiles. Of particular concern are the guidance and control working groups that Iraq says had been established for a very short period of time in November 1993.
The concern is that Iraq may have been conducting reverse engineering of proscribed guidance and control systems as part of its missile activities even after the adoption of resolutions 687 (1991) and 715 (1991). Furthermore, it cannot be excluded that Iraq has retained such guidance and control equipment.
Another indication of possible proscribed activity is the offer that Iraq said it received from a middleman for five disassembled TELs. Some parts were already shipped to an adjacent country. Although Iraq said that it had rejected the offer, no evidence has been provided in support. These parts might have allowed the assembly of one or two TELs, which would have been another piece for a reconstituted Scud-type missile force. In this connection, Iraq has, so far, been unable to locate a 50-tonne trailer that it declared it had imported for the indigenous production of the Al Nida mobile launcher and which it claims had been stolen. Iraq also did not provide UNSCOM with the parts of an imported Scud TEL, which it states it had disassembled.
The 2002 CAFCD and its supporting documents, the most recent semi annual declarations, and the material submitted to UNMOVIC on 8 February 2003 provide no significant new information relevant to the aforementioned issues.
The following action is required to address the foregoing issues:
To clear up the uncertainty as to whether Iraq has engines and key engine components that could be used for the production of proscribed missiles, Iraq should submit the remnants of the seven engines, which it claimed were "training" engines, to UNMOVIC to allow for their analysis and verification. The examination and analysis of these remnants could help determine the origin of the material used in the manufacture of the engines as well as their nature. Iraq should also submit to UNMOVIC the melted remnants of the destroyed key components for analysis. This could assist in the verification of Iraq’s declaration of the destruction of the turbo-pumps.
Iraq should also provide documentation such as production records and quality control documents to support the information it had submitted during the Technical Evaluation Meeting in 1998. This information could allow UNMOVIC to establish the number of indigenously produced warheads.
In order to address the broader question of the existence of a possible Scud-type missile force, Iraq should provide specific documentation in support of its declarations. An example would be the two reports written by the missile force commander on 30 January 1991 and in May 1991 that, on the basis of Iraq's own declarations and outside information, are known to exist. The first report could help clarify the state of the combat missile force at the end of the Gulf War.
The second report could allow clarification of the status of the missile force just after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991). Iraq should also provide technical documentation concerning the interception missile project in order to support its declaration on the use of Scud-B missiles as targets in the project. The provision of the two diaries that relate to the unilateral destruction of the proscribed missile propellants should also be provided. Iraq’s most recent response to UNMOVIC’s request on these matters provides no further clarification.
As for the activities related to guidance and control systems, such as gyroscope reverse engineering and procurement of various guidance and control components, Iraq should also provide UNMOVIC with all the Scud-B guidance and control drawings and hardware and documentation that it may still have.
Iraq's intent in conducting proscribed missile activities or procurement after the adoption and its acceptance of resolutions 687 (1991) and 715 (1991) needs to be clarified. In addition, the scope of these activities cannot be fully established until convincing evidence and answers are provided by Iraq.
Guidance and control activities, including research and development, will need specific attention due to their particular dual-use nature.
Actions that Iraq could take to help resolve the issue
- Present any retained proscribed missiles and associated equipment, including the 50-tonne trailer declared to have been stolen and the parts from a disassembled imported Scud TEL.
- Present the remnants of the seven engines, which it claimed were "training" engines, for analysis and verification. As proposed by Iraq on 8 February 2003, the fragments found by Iraq on 4 August 1997 should also be presented for analysis.
- Present the melted remnants of the destroyed key components, including the turbo-pumps for analysis.
- Present documentation or other evidence to support the information it had submitted during the TEM in 1998 on the number of indigenously produced warheads.
- Present other specific documentation, such as the two reports written by the missile force commander on 30 January 1991 and in May 1991; technical documentation, such as videotapes and tracking data, concerning the interception missile project; and the two diaries that relate to the unilateral destruction of the proscribed missile propellants.
- Present any remaining Scud-B guidance and control drawings, documentation and hardware.
- Explain and present credible evidence on why it had conducted proscribed missile activities and procurement after the adoption and acceptance by Iraq of resolutions 687 (1991) and 715 (1991).
d. FROG (Luna) Special Warheads
The 9K52 Luna rocket, also known as Free Rocket Over the Ground ("FROG"), is an unguided, spin-stabilized, short-range, battlefield support artillery rocket with a range between 70 to 90 kilometres, depending on its configuration. The FROG was originally conceived to be fitted with a 450-kilogramme high explosive (HE), nuclear or chemical warhead. An improved version of the FROG can also carry a cargo warhead for delivering bomblets or mines. During the Cold War it was one of the most common rockets in the Short-Range Nuclear Force (SRNF) at the division level in the Warsaw Pact. Iraq had only received the conventional warhead version.
The FROG rocket system is not proscribed under resolution 687 (1991). However, it was subject to monitoring under paragraph 43 of the OMV plan.
In its 1996 FFCD, Iraq stated that, in May 1988, a project designated "Luna S" was initiated to convert the FROG rocket warhead into a cluster warhead constructed of aluminum and certain components of the Ababil 50 rocket. According to Iraq, Al Muthanna State Establishment rejected the proposal to use an aluminum shell as a container for CW agents and the project was abandoned in July 1988. Iraq stated that only sketches had been produced and that no prototypes had been built.
Documents found at the Haidar Farm in 1995 were sent to a supporting Government for analysis in April 1996. In June 1997, the supporting Government provided a written assessment that the documentation contained all the necessary files and specifications to build a non-conventional warhead, probably a chemical warhead for the FROG rocket. The assessment also stated that some documents had been dated in March 1989 and in August 1990, which contradicted Iraq's statement that all work relating to non-conventional warheads for such rockets had been abandoned in 1988.
Iraq had the capability to develop indigenously and produce non-conventional warheads for weapons system such as the Scud missile. It can, therefore, be assumed that Iraq also had the same capability for a short-range missile like the FROG. In addition, documentary evidence suggests that Iraq had worked on developing this capability at least until August 1990.
While there is no evidence that Iraq continued such work after 1990, given the inconsistencies and inaccuracies in Iraq's missile declarations, the possibility cannot be ruled out. Iraq should provide further evidence to support its assertion that it had abandoned its work on producing a non-conventional warhead for the FROG and to explain the documents, which contradict this assertion.
Actions that Iraq could take to help resolve the issue
- Present credible evidence to support its assertion that it had abandoned its work on producing a non-conventional warhead for the FROG and explain the documents, which contradict this assertion.
II. MUNITIONS AND OTHER DELIVERY MEANS, CLUSTERS
a. Scud-type Biological and Chemical Warheads
Iraq produced warheads for Scud-type missiles. These warheads were designed for the delivery of chemical and biological agents, and are referred to throughout this paper as "special warhead." The special warhead was designed to accommodate a canister made of either aluminum or stainless steel and capable of holding approximately 150 litres of agent. UNSCOM found in almost all cases that Iraq's biological warheads had stainless steel canisters and chemical warheads had aluminum canisters. The payload of the special warhead was less than that of the original high explosive warhead. To compensate for the lesser weight and consequent change in the centre of gravity of the missile, lead ballast was added to the nose cone of the special warhead.
To produce these special warheads, Iraq both modified original Scud warheads and indigenously manufactured warheads using some imported components, for example structural rings, which it purchased from a foreign supplier.
In 1991, Iraq declared that it had possessed 30 Scud-type chemical warheads. UNSCOM confirmed that these warheads had been used for chemical agent. Iraq destroyed 29 of these warheads under UNSCOM supervision. One warhead was removed from Iraq by UNSCOM for analysis.
In 1992, Iraq declared an additional 45 Scud-type chemical warheads, which it stated had been unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. Later, Iraq declared that some of these had actually been biological warheads. By 1998, UNSCOM managed to verify the destruction of 43 to 45 of these warheads from remnants, but not before Iraq's declarations had changed many times. In addition, Iraq admitted to UNSCOM that it had added warhead nose cones to a declared warhead destruction site inspected by UNSCOM in an attempt to convince UNSCOM that all declared warheads could be accounted for. Some aspects of the filling and destruction processes remained unverified.
Immediately after the defection in August 1995 of Lieutenant-General Hussein Kamal, Director of the Military Industrialization Corporation (MIC), General Ra'ad, Director General of Project 144 (Iraq’s former prime missile facility), stated "initially there was an order for 75 containers, later another 25 were ordered. The order was fulfilled and sent to Al-Muthanna". [Muthanna was only filling special warheads with agents and later in the same statement Ra'ad describes how the warheads were filled at Al Muthanna]. However, on 29 and 30 September 1995, Lieutenant-General Amer Al Sa'adi, then Acting Director of MIC, stated that the total number of special warheads was 75 (25 biological and 50 chemical). Later, during a high level meeting in April 1997, Lieutenant-General Amer Al Sa'adi stated that it had been wrongly reported to UNSCOM that there had been 75 chemical plus 25 biological warheads produced.
The numbers resulting from Iraq's latest statements on the subject were 50 chemical warheads and 25 biological warheads.
Iraq purchased Scud missiles with conventional (high explosive) warheads. Iraq used several missiles in testing that did not require the use of a warhead. UNSCOM did not find any indigenously produced warheads that had been filled with high explosive, but did find some that had been filled with agent. The foregoing suggests that all of Iraq's indigenously produced warheads had been intended for special purposes.
In 2003, Iraq declared that it was able to produce Scud-type warheads, including the U-ring from raw material. However, because the material specification of the raw material was not appropriate and because it took a long time to manufacture, Iraq stated that it chose to import the U-rings, which it did in 2 groups. One group of U-rings was ready-to-use and one group required final machining. Iraq also declared that the structural rings for the Scud airframe were imported in the same 2 groups and that the group requiring final machining was interchangeable between the airframe and the warhead. Hence, for UNMOVIC to thoroughly account for warhead U-rings that were imported in the condition requiring final machining, an accounting would have to be made of all such airframe and warhead rings. During recent inspections it was noted that several thousand of these rings were in Iraq's possession in 1998 and that approximately half were used in the Al Samoud 2 programme during the absence of inspections. Therefore, an accurate and verifiable accounting of the rings imported in the condition requiring final machining is no longer possible.
After convening a Technical Evaluation Meeting, UNSCOM assessed that Iraq's declaration that 15 biological warheads had been destroyed simultaneously at a location in Nibai known as P3 conflicted with physical evidence collected at the site. This finding indicated that not all these warheads had been destroyed at the same time as declared by Iraq. This suggests that some special warheads were retained for a period and, if so, it would be logical to assume that some missiles and associated propellant might also have been retained.
UNSCOM's investigations showed that Iraq had not provided the true locations where, prior to the declared unilateral destruction, the above-mentioned 15 biological warheads had been hidden. In December 1998, Iraq pointed to new locations where it stated the special warheads had been hidden before being moved to the site where they were unilaterally destroyed.
UNSCOM inspected these new locations but did not have time to complete the discussions with Iraq on this matter. The location of the warheads prior to destruction is significant since the time of their departure from the hide site should agree with the time of their arrival at the destruction site. Previous declarations of this kind have been verified or refuted using high-altitude imagery. It was observed by UNSCOM that only chemical warheads were found during the period before Iraq's admission in 1995 that it had had an offensive biological weapons programme. This may suggest that Iraq destroyed the biological warheads only after it had declared the weaponization of biological agents, which would raise concerns over the possible retention of missiles as well during that period. In July 1998, Minister Amer Rashid promised UNSCOM that he would investigate how this could have occurred but failed to produce any findings before UNSCOM's departure in December 1998.
In April 1998, UNSCOM took samples from the excavated remnants of the special warheads. Chemical analysis revealed traces of degradation products related to nerve agents. Of the warheads sampled, Iraq had consistently maintained that those were filled with alcohol. (This is further discussed in the VX cluster).
Although UNSCOM verified the destruction of 73 to 75 of the 75 special warheads that Iraq declared, a number of discrepancies and questions remain, which raise doubts about the accounting of the special warheads, including the total number produced: statements by some senior Iraqi officials that Iraq had possessed 75 chemical and 25 biological Scud-type warheads; the finding that, at a minimum, 16 to 30 structural rings remain unaccounted for; Iraq's numerous changes to its declarations on these matters; Iraq's admitted action taken to mislead UNSCOM on the location and number of special warheads; the physical evidence which conflicts with Iraq's account of its destruction of biological warheads; and the fact that no remnants of biological warheads were found by UNSCOM until after Iraq's admission in 1995 that it had had an offensive biological weapons programme.
As a consequence of the accounting questions above, uncertainty remains concerning the types and numbers of chemical and biological agents it filled into the special warheads. The finding of degradation products related to nerve agents, on some warhead remnants suggests that its declaration may not be complete.
Iraq has declared that it only ever produced warheads using rings that were imported in the read-to-use condition and so suggests this as the means of accounting. If the original production records of the indigenously produced warheads were provided to UNMOVIC and were found to support this declaration, such an accounting method could be acceptable.
Some doubts exist regarding Iraq's assertion that it could not do the final machining required for the semi-finished structural rings. This has been reinforced by General Sa'adi's statement, in July 2002 to UNMOVIC, that the manufacture of such rings was easy. In 2003, Iraq explained that prototype warheads rings had been indigenously produced prior to the Gulf War. Although they were produced from the incorrect grade of material, they were found acceptable. However, Iraq did not pursue production due to the lack of appropriate material and the fact that it was a time consuming process.
To help resolve these issues, Iraq should provide documents to support its assertion that it had only produced 75 special warheads and provide an explanation for the evidence UNSCOM found which contradicts Iraq's assertion that it had simultaneously destroyed 15 biological warheads at Nibai. Such documents could include: all the meeting minutes from an Iraqi High Level Committee that, according to Iraq, had been formed, on 30 June 1991, to address the issue of retaining proscribed materials and weapons, official written records ordering the destruction of warheads and the diary of Brigadier Ismail dealing with missile-related activities in 1990 and 1991 in its entirety.
Iraq should follow up the investigation that Minister Rashid had promised UNSCOM as to why no biological warheads were found until after 1995.
This issue is linked to the wider issue of whether Iraq had retained Scud-type missiles, propellant and a launching capability after the declared destruction dates.
Actions that Iraq could take to help resolve the issue
- Present any remaining Scud-type special warheads to UNMOVIC.
- Present further evidence to support its declarations concerning the number of special warheads that it had produced, such as a complete production-planning chart and supporting documents.
- Provide a credible explanation for why no biological warheads were found until after 1995 and present documentary evidence in support.
- Verify its declaration of the locations of the biological warheads immediately prior to their transport to Nibai P3, where it said they had been destroyed.
- Present further explanation supplemented with verifiable evidence is required of Iraq concerning its declaration that it had unilaterally destroyed, at the same time and location, 15 biological warheads at Nibai, P3.
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