Collection 8


Extracts from S/1998/332 dated 16 April 1998...

Extracts from S/1998/920 dated 6 October 1998...

Extracts from S/1999/94 dated 29th January 1999...

Extracts from the 'Amorim Report' S/1999/356...

UNSCOM chronology from late 1998...



UNSCOM documents (continued)...



Extracts from S/1998/332 dated 16 April 1998. (5th report under UN Resolution 1051)


II. STATUS REPORT: DISARMAMENT

A. Background

12. Before providing detail on the substantive disarmament issues, a number of central points are recorded, briefly, because they form the indispensable context for any consideration by the Council of the current state of Iraq's compliance with its obligations.

13. Throughout the period of crisis, Iraq has claimed that it no longer has prohibited weapons "in the control of the Government of Iraq, in the territory of Iraq". It has stated, further, that it has made available to the Commission all that is necessary to enable the Commission to verify that claim and that nothing further, of substance, will be made available by Iraq.

14. Iraq's claim that it has no more prohibited weapons, which it has not been possible for the Commission to verify, does not in itself satisfy the three-step system the Council established in order to enable Iraq to fulfil its obligations under resolution 687 (1991). Those three steps are full declaration by Iraq, verification by the Commission and destruction, removal or rendering harmless under international supervision. These three steps form the integrity of a whole process. They are not separable into individual parts.

15. While Iraq's present claim might be able to be interpreted as satisfying, at least partly, the first of these steps, its consistent refusal to provide the Commission with the information and materials needed to verify its claim, clearly fails to satisfy the second step. Taken together, these two circumstances make the third step impossible. Thus, the integrity of the whole process has not yet been satisfied.

16. This difficult circumstance is made even more complicated by Iraq's claim that it has unilaterally destroyed those of its prohibited weapons which were not destroyed under international supervision. While it is clear that in a number of weapons areas unilateral destruction did take place, again, Iraq's refusal to provide adequate and verifiable details of that destruction has meant that, up to the present time, the Commission has not been able to verify all of Iraq's claims with respect to such unilateral destruction.

17. It needs to be recorded that in relevant discussions between the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz, and the Executive Chairman, the Deputy Prime Minister indicated that, in his view, the main reason why Iraq's claims with respect to its weapons status were not accepted by the Commission was the Commission's lack of technical competence and bias against Iraq. Such views do nothing to alter the fact that Iraq's basic declarations of its holdings and capabilities in prohibited weapons areas have never been "full, final or complete", as required by the Council. Further, Iraq's failure to provide all of the materials and evidence required to fill in the gaps left by those declarations and its acts of unilateral destruction have significantly obfuscated the situation.





Further extract from S/1997/332.


3. Priority issues

Operational missile assets

32. After the accounting for imported proscribed missiles and their launchers as reported in the Commission's report of October 1997, work continued in the areas of missile warheads and propellants. Warhead issues were the subject of consideration by a technical evaluation meeting that was held in Baghdad from 1 to 6 February 1998. The meeting concluded that the level of verification achieved so far was not satisfactory and stated that further work was required. The meeting made specific recommendations for continuing verification activities by the Commission and actions to be taken by Iraq, including provision of documentation and new declarations. The excavation and analysis of warhead remnants continues with advanced survey equipment. Iraq has not yet provided the information, data and documentation specified by the meeting.

33. The accounting of proscribed missile propellants is still outstanding. As Iraq has not provided the new declarations or documentation requested by the Commission, no substantive progress is able to be recorded in the six months since the Commission's last consolidated report to the Security Council.

Indigenous missile production

34. Iraq was required to provide verifiable declarations on its achievements in indigenous production of proscribed missiles, including a verifiable material balance of their components. The work, in particular in the area of verification of indigenously produced missiles and the unilateral destruction of components acquired for their production, has not yet yielded satisfactory results.

35. In its last consolidated report, the Commission stated that Iraq needed to provide solid documentary support for its declarations. It indicated that a full understanding of Iraq's operational considerations that led to the retention of proscribed missile assets after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991) was also required. The same was true for concealment measures that had been taken by Iraq to protect those assets. The Commission's various requests for clarifications, explanations, supporting evidence and documentation related to the outstanding issues in the missile area have been reiterated to Iraq on numerous occasions, in particular during the Executive Chairman's visits to Iraq and in his correspondence with the Government of Iraq.

36. It remains the case that, unless such data is furnished by Iraq, the Commission will continue to be unable to render a full and verified accounting of Iraq's proscribed missile capabilities and their elimination, as required by the Security Council.





Further extract from S/1997/332.


III. STATUS REPORT: ONGOING ISSUES

G. Concealment investigations

123. This issue remains a vexing and pertinent one, for the Commission has information that contradicts Iraq's statements. For example, in March 1998, the Commission discovered documents in Iraq, dated 1993, that reflect Iraq's concealment activities at that time involving the destruction, removal and safeguarding of documentation relating to proscribed activity in the field of ballistic missiles.

124. More importantly, the documents reflect, yet again, a systematic attempt by Iraq - not solely by an individual - to deceive the Commission, as late as 1993, regarding the true nature and extent of Iraq's proscribed missile programmes. The documents contradict current Iraqi declarations concerning its earlier concealment activities and underscore the importance of continued vigilance and activity on the part of the Commission on the issue of concealment.


IV. COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS

125. The period covered by this report has been one of intense activity in the relationship between Iraq and the Special Commission; in the Security Council's consideration of the question of Iraq; and in actions taken by the Secretary-General in fulfilment of his unique role in conjunction with the Charter's requirement that disputes be settled, wherever possible, by peaceful means.

126. Four developments deserve to be singled out as having been of major importance during the period covered by this report.

127. Firstly, while Iraq has claimed for some time that it no longer holds prohibited weapons or systems, this claim has perhaps never been voiced so categorically as in the period under review. That this claim has been made is perhaps not, in itself, remarkable, but the associated insistence by Iraq that it has already made available to the Commission all the materials and information it needs to verify its claim and that no more evidence would be made available by it is significant.

128. Secondly, in particular during the period of crisis, Iraq repeatedly failed to comply with the Council's requirements, especially those relating to immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to relevant sites, documents and persons. It was therefore of major potential significance that the Secretary-General was able to obtain Iraq's promise, in the Memorandum of Understanding of 23 February, to comply henceforth with the Council's requirements.

129. Thirdly, there was a significant trend towards substituting consideration of issues of process for consideration of issues related to the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of Iraq's prohibited weapons and systems.

130. Fourthly, as is evident in the disarmament section of this report, a major consequence of the four-month crisis authored by Iraq has been that, in contrast with the prior reporting period, virtually no progress in verifying disarmament has been able to be reported. If this is what Iraq intended by the crisis, then, in large measure, it could be said to have been successful.

131. Iraq's heightened policy of disarmament by declaration, no matter how vigorously pursued or stridently voiced, cannot remove the need for verification as the key means through which the credibility of its claim can be established.

132. The Memorandum of Understanding contains a clear promise by Iraq of compliance with the resolutions and decisions of the Council and full cooperation with the Commission. It is thus a document of irreducible significance. If Iraq offers full and real cooperation, it will not find the Commission lacking in its willingness or ability to verify honestly, with a high degree of scientific and technical competence and with all possible dispatch, materials that would validate Iraq's claim and lead to a full accounting in all weapons areas.

133. The Commission is fully cognizant of the fact that all policy matters are the prerogative of the Security Council, including with respect to any judgement it might make on whether or not the obligations set forth in resolution 687 (1991) and the particular provisions of paragraph 22 of that resolution have been fulfilled.

134. The Commission is aware that the Council will want to be sure that any judgements it makes, in that context, are fully informed by the best scientific and technical advice available to it. The Commission will continue to strive to provide that advice and to fulfil, to the best of its ability, the mandate given to it by the Council.





Further extracts from S/1998/332.


Annex

Iraq's compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Security Council resolution 1115 (1997)

22. Within the framework of its efforts to improve monitoring of Iraq's missile activities, the Commission, in a letter dated 26 November 1996, requested Iraq to provide some additional technical data on its missiles and their major components, which were under development or production. As Iraq did not provide this data, the Executive Chairman, in a letter of 8 December 1997, stated that this failure was an instance of non-cooperation. He asked that Iraq rectify the situation without further delay. Up to the present, the Commission has not received the data sought.





Extracts from S/1998/920 dated 6 October 1998. (6th report under UN Resolution 1051)


III. DISARMAMENT: PRIORITY ISSUES

A. Missiles

24. In the missile area, the schedule for work covered issues related to warheads and indigenous missile production. Iraq refused to discuss the issue of proscribed liquid missile propellant and did not respond positively to the Commission's requests for access to specific documents that would facilitate the completion of the verification of outstanding missile disarmament issues.

25. The following is an account of progress achieved in the missile area and the status of the outstanding issues:

(a) Missile warheads, both special and conventional

- The Commission was able to account for the destruction of between 43 and 45 of the 45 operational special warheads declared by Iraq as having been unilaterally destroyed in 1991. This constituted a major accomplishment;

- The VX issue needs to be resolved for the Commission to be in a position to assess whether the current accounting of special warheads is sufficient to verify fully both the declared production of proscribed special warheads and their claimed unilateral destruction (see para. 29 (b));


- The Commission arrived at an assessment, based on the discussions with international experts, that Iraq's declarations on the unilateral destruction of the special warheads did not match all the physical evidence collected at the destruction sites. On 3 August, the Commission asked Iraq to discuss this issue;

- The Commission and Iraq have been able to identify jointly steps to clarify some of the problems related to Iraq's actions of 1991 to hide special warheads. The Commission briefed the Security Council on this issue on 3 and 4 June. This effort was terminated by Iraq on 30 July when it refused to provide access to relevant sites and to discuss this issue any further;

- Accounting of proscribed conventional warheads, as a part of resolution of the overall issue of proscribed warheads, has been significantly advanced. Issues related to remnants of some 50 conventional warheads (both imported and indigenously produced by Iraq) that have not been recovered still remain outstanding and clarifications were sought from Iraq. Iraq was also asked to state its opinion on whether the current accounting, regardless of the remaining gaps, should be considered final or further useful work by Iraq and the Commission could be undertaken to close the remaining gaps. No answer has been received;

(b) Indigenous missile production.

Considerable progress has been achieved in this area through the conduct, as agreed in the schedule for work, of expert meetings in Baghdad in July 1998 to review the status of indigenous production, the material balance and the unilateral destruction thereof. In order to obtain sufficient information for verification assessments in this area, it was decided to focus only on complete missiles and on such key missile parts as engines, gyroscopes and warheads;

- Missiles. The issue of seven indigenously produced missiles that were in the possession of Iraq's missile force in 1991 remains unresolved. Iraq maintains that they were training missiles and that they were unilaterally destroyed in 1991. No remnants of indigenous missiles or their engines have been recovered by the Commission at the declared destruction sites;

- Missile engines. The team of international experts, invited by the Commission to the July meeting on this issue, came to an assessment that, by the end of 1990, Iraq had the capability to assemble a limited number of engines for its indigenously produced proscribed missiles. The international experts considered that Iraq needed to account for the key components from this programme. Progress has been achieved in the development of a rough material balance of components for the production of engines for proscribed missiles. Additional verification work has been recommended;

- Missile gyroscopes. The team of international experts came to the conclusion that, by the end of 1990, Iraq did not have the capability to manufacture either indigenously, or to assemble from foreign components, gyroscopes for its indigenous missiles. Although the team recommended some additional verification activities to be undertaken by the Commission, it came to the conclusion that, owing to the methods used by Iraq in its unilateral destruction and the incompleteness of destruction inventories provided by Iraq, the establishment of even a rough material balance of proscribed guidance and control components may not be able to be achieved;

- Conventional missile warheads. Through joint work, Iraq and the Commission were able to account for most of the proscribed missile warheads. However, remnants of some 30 indigenously produced conventional warheads, which Iraq declared as unilaterally destroyed, have not yet been found;

(c) Proscribed liquid missile propellants. Iraq refuses to address this matter. The Commission still considers that a solution to the issues related to the unilateral destruction of proscribed liquid missile propellants could be obtained through the provision by Iraq of existing documentation. Were this to be provided, verification could be achieved immediately.

26. On 3 August 1998, the Executive Chairman outlined specific steps to Iraq directed at bringing remaining issues in the missile area to closure. This schedule included: the provision by Iraq of clarifications on the outstanding issues in the warhead area; a meeting of experts on this issue; and an inspection to verify accountable aspects of the material balance and the unilateral destruction of major components for indigenous missile production. The Executive Chairman also proposed to undertake, during his stay in Iraq, serious consideration of the issue of unilateral destruction of special warheads. These proposals were not accepted by Iraq.


C. Biological weapons

34. The July meeting examined each component of the material balances as presented in Iraq's biological weapons full, final and complete disclosure.

(a) Biological weapons munitions. Iraq declared that it had produced and filled with biological weapons agents special warheads for the Al Hussein missiles and R-400 aerial bombs. Iraq also disclosed the development of biological weapons spray tanks and some other weapon systems for the delivery of biological weapons agents. The experts' assessment of major declared biological weapons weapon systems are summarized below:

- Al Hussein missile warheads. The Commission has not been able to verify the biological weapons missile warheads material balance, including production and destruction. This assessment was also madeby the team of international experts. One week after the end of the July meeting, a senior Iraqi official stated that instead of the declared five anthrax and sixteen botulinum toxin missile warheads, there had been in fact sixteen anthrax and five botulinum toxin missile warheads filled. The official insisted that this change in disclosure would not affect Iraq's declaration on the total quantity of biological weapons agents produced and weaponized. Iraq did not present any supporting documents or other specific evidence to substantiate the new statement. This new explanation contradicted all accounts of the unilateral destruction of special warheads, including those filled with biological warfare agents, that had been provided for the previous three years by Iraqi personnel directly involved in warhead filling and destruction activities;

38. Iraq acknowledges concealment actions during the period 1991-1995. The goal was to satisfy the initial inspectors with limited amounts of missile and chemical weapons capabilities, which were duly destroyed in accordance with Security Council resolutions. However, as the Commission pursued the objectives of those resolutions, the Government of Iraq took further steps, including the secret unilateral destruction of retained weapons.

39. The pervasive extent of actions by Iraq to conceal proscribed weapons, production capability and documents and to limit knowledge about the degree of advancement of Iraq's weapons development efforts became obvious after the departure from Iraq of Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamal in August 1995. The Commission was then confronted with the fact that Iraq had successfully implemented concealment on a large scale.

40. Examples exist in all weapons areas. Programmes which were hidden include: indigenous missile production programme, the VX programme and the entire biological weapons programme. Over 150 boxes of documents preserving know-how of proscribed activities had been carefully selected and hidden from the Commission for years.


VI. CONCLUSIONS

75. The Security Council may need to consider, at some stage, that these actions by Iraq may have the ultimate effect that the Commission will be obliged to conclude that it is unable to provide 100 per cent verification of the claimed fate or disposition of prohibited weapons.

76 -




Extracts from S/1999/94 dated 29th January 1999.


Priority issues in the missile area

Proscribed Missile Warheads

Special Warheads

26. Analysis at the laboratories designated by the Commission has detected the presence of degradation products of nerve agents, in particular VX, on a number of warhead remnants which had been excavated at the sites of the unilateral destruction. The October 1998 meeting of international experts convened by the Commission concluded that "the existence of VX degradation products conflicts with Iraq's declarations that the unilaterally destroyed special warheads had never been filled with any chemical warfare agents. The findings by all three laboratories of chemicals known to be degradation products of decontamination compounds also do not support Iraq's declarations that those warhead containers had only been in contact with alcohols." Clarification by Iraq of these issues as recommended by the meeting would allow the Commission to make a determination whether or not the current assessment of the quantity of special warheads identified amongst the remnants excavated, accounts for all special warheads declared to have been produced by Iraq and provides for the verification of their unilateral destruction.

27. The Commission found that Iraq's explanations on procedures and methods of unilateral destruction of the special warheads were, in general, plausible. In one aspect related to the destruction of BW warheads, the Commission, after consulting a group of international experts, assessed that Iraq's declaration that 15 warheads had been destroyed simultaneously conflicted with physical evidence collected at the declared location of their unilateral destruction. This finding indicated that not all BW warheads had been destroyed at the same time as claimed by Iraq and that Iraq had retained some BW warheads after the date of the declared July 1991 unilateral destruction. Obviously, any retained warheads after the declared destruction date would be an indication that not all proscribed missiles for such warheads were destroyed as claimed by Iraq. The discrepancies between Iraq's declarations and the physical evidence collected need to be resolved. In addition, the Commission's investigations showed that, despite repeated attempts, Iraq had not provided the true locations of the hiding, immediately prior to the declared unilateral destruction, of at least half of the special warheads including above mentioned 15 BW warheads. Iraq's continuous inability to disclose hide sites of the special warheads has also prevented the Commission from verification of the declared unilateral destruction of the special warheads.

Conventional warheads

28. The full and verifiable accounting for proscribed missile conventional warheads remains outstanding in the verification of the premise that Iraq has not retained any holding of proscribed missiles and that all proscribed missiles and their warheads indeed had been destroyed. Issues related to remnants of warheads that have not been recovered, but which have been declared by Iraq as unilaterally destroyed (some 25 imported warheads and some 25 Iraqi manufactured warheads), remain unresolved in the accounting of proscribed warheads that Iraq claimed to have destroyed unilaterally. Iraq has not provided a definite explanatory statement for the Commission to be able to determine the reasons why no remnants to account for some 50 warheads declared as unilaterally destroyed, were recovered.

Proscribed Single-Use Liquid Missile Propellant

29. The full accounting for imported proscribed missile propellants is outstanding. Any retention of such propellants would be an indication that not all proscribed missiles were destroyed as claimed by Iraq. The propellants at issue are used exclusively for such proscribed missiles only. Documents, including an inventory list on their declared unilateral destruction, requested by the Commission, have not been made available by Iraq to support its declaration on the quantities (over 500 tonnes) of proscribed propellants it claims to have destroyed unilaterally.

Proscribed Indigenous Missile Production

Complete missiles

30. An inventory of proscribed missiles that Iraq declared as destroyed unilaterally contained a reference to seven indigenously produced missiles which were in possession of the Army in 1991. No remnants which could prove such destruction, have been recovered. The Commission has not been able to verify the nature and destruction of these missiles and repeatedly requested Iraq to confirm, through physical evidence, the declared unilateral destruction of these seven missiles. The verification in this area is considered essential as it might involve operational missiles produced indigenously by Iraq. The November 1997 Emergency Session of the Commission determined that the accounting for these seven missiles was one of the priority requirements.

Major components

31. It should be noted that due to the methods used by Iraq for the declared unilateral destruction and lack of supporting documentation made available by Iraq, the verifiable material balance of major proscribed components for indigenous missile production could not be established, or that this work would take a prolonged period of time. Iraq is required to provide, inter alia, unambiguous physical evidence of the unilateral destruction of combustion chamber/nozzle assemblies for indigenously produced missiles and documentary evidence sufficient for complete accounting of all indigenously produced major missile parts and for verification of their unilateral destruction.





Further extract from S/1999/94.



Appendix 1


STATUS OF THE MATERIAL BALANCES IN THE MISSILE AREA


Introduction

1. In its resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, the Security Council required Iraq to unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities. To that end, Iraq was specifically required:

• to submit to the Secretary-General, within 15 days of the adoption of the resolution, a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all such items in the missile area;

• to agree to urgent, on-site inspection by the Special Commission of its missile capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission itself;

• to destroy, under supervision of the Special Commission, all its missile capabilities, including launchers.

2. The inadequacy of Iraq's initial declarations was one of the elements leading to the adoption of Security Council resolution 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, in which the Council, inter alia, demanded that Iraq provide full, final and complete disclosure (FFCD), as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations.

3. With Iraq's full cooperation and its commitment to the implementation of its obligations under the Security Council resolutions, these tasks in the missile area could have been accomplished in a relatively short period of time. Instead Iraq has chosen a course of withholding its proscribed missile capabilities and obstruction of the Commission's work. Examples of this policy were Iraq's decision, immediately after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991) in April 1991, to retain two-thirds of its operational force of proscribed missiles and the concealment of its capabilities to indigenously manufacture proscribed missiles with liquid propellant engines.

4. By the end of 1991, the Commission had completed the task of the destruction of proscribed missile weapons and materials that Iraq had chosen to declare immediately after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991). At that time, the Commission came to the conclusion that Iraq had not declared all its holding of such weapons nor disclosed all its proscribed capabilities and programmes. In March 1992, Iraq admitted that it had withheld from the Commission a considerable amount of proscribed weapons and their component, and declared that it had destroyed them unilaterally in Summer 1991 without the Commission's supervision. This unilateral destruction by Iraq was in direct violations of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

5. The Commission's verification has subsequently focussed on the following main tasks:

• the accounting of all proscribed missiles and related operational missile assets, including missile launchers, warheads and propellants in particular those declared as destroyed unilaterally;

• the accounting of indigenous production of proscribed missiles and related major parts;

• obtaining a full understanding of other issues related to Iraq's missile activities and capabilities proscribed by the Security Council.


6. Through its verification process, the Commission has been accumulating evidence that Iraq's initial and subsequent disclosures of proscribed weapons holdings and missile capabilities were inadequate. This required additional actions by the Commission to dispose of proscribed items, identified through the verification process, as well as new declarations to be presented by Iraq. In August 1995, Iraq admitted that important information on its proscribed programmes had been hidden from the Commission including a considerable amount of documentation. As a consequence, Iraq agreed to prepare a new Full, Final and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) in the missile area. Such an official declaration was provided by Iraq in November 1995. The Commission did not accept this declaration as either a full or complete disclosure. Iraq submitted another FFCD in June 1996. The latter document, supplemented subsequently by numerous Iraqi explanations and clarifications, has been the basis for the Commission's verification activities.

7. In June 1996, Iraq and the Commission established a Joint Programme of Action and agreed to concentrate work on certain fundamental areas. The first priority among them was the material balance of proscribed weapons and their major components. The other established priorities were: the unilateral destruction of proscribed items; further provision of documentation, when available, related to proscribed weapons programmes; and the identification of measures taken in 1991 and the measures used by certain individuals to retain some proscribed items until August 1995. Subsequently, the June 1996 Joint Programme of Work was elaborated through discussions between the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the Executive Chairman.

8. This paper provides, in broad terms, information on the current status of the material balances of proscribed operational weapons and capabilities in the missile area. The material balance approach has been the cornerstone of the Commission's verification effort. This approach has been designed to allow the Commission to reconcile, in a reasonable but verifiable manner, the quantities and the types of proscribed weapons and their major parts, acquired by Iraq either through production or importation, with the quantities of these items disposed of through consumption or destruction or rendering harmless. Throughout this process, it has been Iraq's responsibility alone to provide sufficient evidence to support its own data and declarations on both sides of this equation.

9. The methodology adopted in this paper, is to indicate, based on the most recent declarations from Iraq, quantities of proscribed items available to Iraq, and then provide factual statements as to how the declared quantities have been accounted for. Where feasible, the data is presented in a tabular format for ease of comprehension.

10. The paper's focus is on proscribed missile systems that either had been made operational by Iraq or had been close to an operational status. The paper also provides a report on the status of missile repair and production facilities which were required to be destroyed or rendered harmless under resolution 687 (1991). Iraq's other proscribed missile capabilities are dealt with only to the extent required for the paper's main focus.

11. Beyond the material balances related to proscribed missiles and the status of relevant facilities, the paper does not address other issues that were investigated by the Commission and which may or may not have reached a satisfactory resolution. This includes Iraq's efforts related to the development of missiles or their sub-systems which have been assessed by the Commission as not having achieved operational status or which would not contribute substantially to proscribed operational capabilities already available to Iraq. Examples of such issues are missile delivery means for nuclear weapons, parachute retarded missile warheads "Meteo 1", separating missile warheads, undisclosed warhead designs, Iraq's efforts to develop missiles with ranges from 1000 to 3000 kilometers and Iraq's space launch vehicle, Al-Abid. Issues related to retention by Iraq of expertise in the proscribed missile area, and design/production/assembly documentation as well as military infrastructure of the proscribed missile operational force have not been addressed in this paper. The paper does not describe the Commission's investigations of Iraq's foreign procurement in support of its proscribed missile activities.

12. Section 1 of the paper provides a status report of the material balances of proscribed missiles and related operational assets. Section 2 describes the status of the material balances of proscribed indigenous missiles, their related major parts, production equipment, and the status of missile repair and production facilities. Section 3 summarises missile activities in Iraq after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991) relevant to the verification of its proscribed activities.

Section 1: "Status of the material balance of proscribed missiles and related operational assets"

13. For the purpose of the verification of the material balance of proscribed missiles and related operational assets, the Commission has focussed on the following key items: the missiles as well as their launchers, warheads and single-use propellants for proscribed missiles. The Commission has also investigated the accounting for other elements of operational assets such as key missile guidance and control instruments and auxiliary vehicles for missile fuelling, transportation and testing. The Commission has determined that the full accounting of these latter elements, despite remaining ambiguities, could be considered secondary in importance, provided a solid and verifiable accounting of the selected key items is established.

Missiles

14. Iraq declared that it imported 819 long-range combat missiles that fall under prohibitions established by resolution 687 (1991). Over half of them were modified by Iraq, since 1987, into missiles known in Iraq as Al Hussein class missiles. Al Hussein missiles used by Iraq during recent wars had a range of some 650 kilometres.

15. The Commission does not have evidence to confirm reports of Iraq's importation of SCUD-B class missiles from any but a single supplier. The data on the missile deliveries, serial numbers of missile engines and other components that was provided to the Commission by the supplier, was essential in establishing the material balance in this area. Table 1 provides a summary of the material balance of the 819 proscribed combat missiles imported by Iraq.

Table 1


s19999401


16. As a result of the emergency session of the Special Commission on 21 November 1997, the members of the Commission stated that they were "satisfied that 817 of the 819 proscribed missiles imported by Iraq have been effectively accounted for".

17. In late 1995, Iraq provided to the Commission an inventory of missiles destroyed unilaterally. This inventory contained a reference to seven indigenously produced missiles, in addition to the 85 imported missiles. The November 1997 emergency session determined that accounting for these seven missiles was one of the priority requirements. The Commission has not been able to verify the nature and destruction of these missiles. (For more details, see Section 2, below)

18. In July 1991, the Commission supervised the destruction of 9 Fahad missiles. Fahad missiles were Volga/SA2 surface-to-air missiles that Iraq modified for a surface-to-surface application, with ranges over 150 kilometres. Twenty-one flight tests of Fahad missiles were declared to have been conducted by Iraq before the Gulf War. No supporting documentation has been provided by Iraq to ascertain how many such missiles were modified. Unmodified Volga missiles declared by Iraq in 1996 are currently under the Commission's monitoring in order to ensure their non-modification for a surface-to-surface application or for delivery of non-conventional warheads.

Missile Launchers

19. Iraq declared that, during the Gulf War, it had 14 combat mobile launchers for Al Hussein class missiles, including ten which had been imported and four which were indigenously produced. It also imported one launcher of this type for training purposes. Iraq declared that it had indigenously constructed two mobile launchers that had not been made operational, and that it had three experimental prototype mobile launchers.

20. The quantity of imported launchers has been confirmed by the supplier. The Commission does not have evidence to confirm reports of Iraq's importation of this class of proscribed missiles launcher from any but this supplier.

21. Iraq declared that it had acquired from a foreign supplier ten 50-tonne flatbed trailers suitable for the construction of indigenous mobile launchers. This information has been confirmed by the supplier. Six of these trailers were converted to the abovementioned indigenously produced mobile launchers, called Al Nida. The Commission verified the destruction of the launching equipment erected on these six trailers, and allowed Iraq to use, for non-proscribed purposes, these and the four other, unused trailers that had been imported.

22. Iraq declared that 28 operational fixed launchers for Al Hussein class missiles had been deployed. In addition, 28 "stand-by", training, testing or decoy fixed launchers were constructed or were under construction.

23. Table 2 provides a summary of the material balance of mobile and fixed missile launchers.

Table 2


s19999402


24. The Commission's verification efforts, with respect to Iraq's declarations on combat missile launchers, have been frustrated by Iraq's misleading statements. Prior to March 1992, Iraq claimed that several imported mobile launchers had been destroyed during the Iran-Iraq war. In March 1992, it declared that those launchers had been unilaterally destroyed by Iraq in the summer of 1991. This statement was repeated in Iraq's June 1996 FFCD. In the course of its follow-up verification, the Commission established that Iraq's statement on the unilateral destruction of mobile missile launchers was wrong. This finding was presented to Iraq by the Commission in July 1997. Iraq then made a new statement, in August 1997, that five imported launcher chassis had in fact been destroyed in October 1991, and not in July 1991, as had previously been declared by Iraq. A fuller explanation of Iraq's actions to retain mobile launchers after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991) and to conceal the events and timing of their unilateral destruction was requested. In September 1997, the Commission asked Iraq to explain the operational requirements for the retained proscribed missile assets that Iraq had concealed after April 1991. In response, the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq gave an explicit order, in the presence of the Executive Chairman, to the Iraqi experts not to discuss such issues with the Commission.

Missile Warheads

25. Iraq declared that it had imported 819 combat warheads for proscribed missiles of SCUD/Al Hussein class and that 121 combat warheads of the same type had been produced indigenously or had been under production at the time of adoption of resolution 687 (1991). Iraq's declarations on the material balance in this area have changed several times. Table 3 provides a summary of the material balance of declared warheads based on Iraq’s most recent declarations of 1998.

Table 3 (Warheads.)


s19999403
s19999404


26. Pursuant to the programme of work established in July 1997, survey and excavation work started August 1997 at the declared sites of the unilateral destruction and the burial sites of warhead remnants. By June 1998, all sites declared by Iraq, where warhead remnants could be found, were surveyed and excavated. Thus, a strong presumption is that all remnants have been collected. Table 4 provides a summary of the assessment of recovered warheads remnants relevant to the material balance.

Table 4


s19999405


27. Issues related to remnants of warheads that have not been recovered, but which have been declared by Iraq as unilaterally destroyed (some 25 imported warheads and some 25 Iraqi manufactured warheads), remain outstanding in the accounting of proscribed warheads that Iraq claimed to have destroyed unilaterally. The full and verifiable accounting for proscribed missile conventional warheads remains essential for the verification of the premise that Iraq has not retained any proscribed missiles and that all proscribed missiles and their warheads indeed have been destroyed.

28. As a result of the Technical Evaluation Meeting on the proscribed missile warheads held in February 1998 in Baghdad, the Commission's team of international experts determined that Iraq's warhead production and acquisition records were the best way to obtain the full picture of Iraq's warhead production. No documents have been provided by Iraq in response to this request. According to the team, issues related to the warhead material balance and accounting such as duplicate counting, warhead destruction activities and warhead markings, need to be fully resolved to enable the establishment of a solid and verifiable material balance in the warhead area. In July and November 1998, the Commission again asked Iraq for clarifications to be provided to facilitate the completion of the verification. The Commission has not received answers from Iraq that would allow to achieve this goal.

Warheads with chemical and biological warfare agents

29. A priority aspect of the accounting for proscribed missile warheads relates to the missile warheads that were filled or were designed to be filled with chemical or biological warfare agents (special warheads). Iraq's declarations on the acquisition and disposal of the special warheads, for both CW and BW delivery, have changed several times. The current Iraqi declarations could be summarised as follows:

Iraq stated that it had produced 25 combat special warheads for BW (16 warheads filled with botulinum toxin, 5 warheads with anthrax and 4 warheads with aflatoxin) and 50 combat special warheads for CW (16 warheads filled with sarin and 34 warheads with the alcohol component of the binary system). Out of 75 declared combat special warheads, 25 warheads were declared as indigenously produced (15 CW and 10 BW warheads) and 50 warheads were modified from imported warheads (35 CW and 15 BW warheads). In addition, Iraq declared that it had produced 3 special warheads for training purposes, and that 3 additional special warheads had been used in static tests and 2 special warheads had been used in flight tests.

• The 30 CW combat warheads (16 filled with sarin and 14 with the alcohol component) were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision in 1991-1993. Iraq's declarations on the disposal of the remaining 45 combat special warheads out of the 75 declared as produced, stated that they had been unilaterally destroyed in early July 1991. The assessment of the warhead remnants excavated since August 1997 allows for the identification of 43-45 special warheads coming from the sites of the declared unilateral destruction.

30. Iraq's declarations and supporting documents include a specific distribution, by their type and warfare agent filling, of the 45 special warheads unilaterally destroyed in July 1991. According to Iraq's declarations, 20 of them were chemical weapons and contained only the alcohol component of the CW binary system. Analysis at the laboratories designated by the Commission has detected the presence of degradation products of nerve agents, in particular VX, on a number of warhead remnants which were excavated. A meeting of international experts, including representatives of the three laboratories, which was held on 22-23 October 1998 concluded that "the existence of VX degradation products conflicts with Iraq's declarations that the unilaterally destroyed special warheads had never been filled with any chemical warfare agents. The findings by all three laboratories of chemicals known to be degradation products of decontamination compounds also do not support Iraq's declarations that those warhead containers had only been in contact with alcohols." Clarification by Iraq of these issues as recommended by the meeting would allow the Commission to make a determination whether or not the current assessment of the quantity of special warheads identified amongst the remnants excavated, accounts for all special warheads declared to have been produced by Iraq and provides for the verification of their unilateral destruction.

31. Iraq described in detail the procedures and methods of unilateral destruction of the special warheads by explosive demolition. After examination of the relevant destruction sites and the special warhead remnants recovered from them, the Commission found that Iraq's explanations were, in general, plausible. However, in one aspect dealing with the destruction of BW warheads, the Commission, after consulting a group of international experts, assessed that Iraq's declaration that 15 warheads had been destroyed simultaneously conflicted with physical evidence collected at the declared location of their unilateral destruction. This finding indicated that not all BW warheads had been destroyed at the same time as declared by Iraq and that Iraq had retained some BW warheads after the declared July 1991 unilateral destruction date. The discrepancies between Iraq's current declarations on its unilateral destruction of the special warheads and the physical evidence collected at the destruction site need to be clarified. In addition, the Commission's investigations showed that Iraq had not provided the true locations of the hiding, prior to the declared unilateral destruction, of at least half of the special warheads including the abovementioned 15 BW warheads. In December 1998, Iraq again identified new locations of storage pits from where the warheads had been moved to the unilateral destruction sites. The Commission could not again confirm that the newly identified locations had been used for hiding warheads. Iraq's continuous inability to disclose hide sites of the special warheads has also prevented the Commission's verification of declared unilateral destruction of the special warheads.

32. Evidence has been recovered pointing to Iraq's attempts to design and produce non-conventional warheads for missiles other than Al Hussein. Despite available documentary evidence of work on non-conventional warheads for so called FROG short-range missiles in 1990, Iraq insisted that all such work was done only in 1988 without any success or follow-up attempts. Iraq denied any activities related to non-conventional warheads for Volga/SA 2 surface-to-air missiles that it was modifying for surface-to-surface application.

Missile Propellants

33. Iraq declared that it acquired missile propellants together with imported long-range missiles in quantities required for the proper operation of these missiles. Two of these propellants (main fuel and oxidizer) are unique for use with proscribed missiles of SCUD/Al Hussein class and thus, are subject to destruction and full accounting. The third propellant (starting fuel) is also used in non-proscribed missiles in Iraq and thus, has been excluded by the Commission from the accounting.

34. Iraq declared that, in the late 1980's, it had also imported specific components for the indigenous production of the same type of main fuel for proscribed missiles. Iraq declared that it had never produced indigenously proscribed missile propellants from basic raw materials. (For more details, see Section 2, below)

35. A summary of the material balance of imported main fuel and oxidizer unique for proscribed missiles is provided below.

36. Imported missile main fuel (TM185): Iraq declared the importation of 818 tonnes of main fuel. No supporting documents were provided by Iraq to substantiate this declaration. Table 5 provides a summary of the material balance of the main fuel.

Table 5


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37. Imported missile oxidizer (AK 27I): Iraq declared the importation of 2,895 tonnes of this oxidizer. No supporting documents were provided by Iraq to substantiate this declaration. Table 6 provides a summary of the material balance of missile oxidizer.

Table 6


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38. The full accounting for imported single-use proscribed missile propellants is outstanding. Documents, including an inventory list on the declared unilateral destruction, specifically requested by the Commission, have not been made available by Iraq to support its declaration on the quantities (over 500 tonnes) of proscribed propellants it claims to have destroyed unilaterally.

Section 2: "Status of the material balances of proscribed indigenous missiles and related major parts, production equipment, and status of repair and production facilities"

39. In addition to importation of missiles and related operational assets that fall under prohibitions established by Security Council resolution 687 (1991), Iraq undertook major efforts to indigenously produce proscribed missiles. For this purpose, a number of projects were established and numerous facilities were involved.

40. Iraq's indigenous missile production depended greatly on parts, components, materials and equipment that it procured through foreign sources. The Commission has sought information from Governments on the supply of such items. Responses from a number of Governments were of great assistance in the Commission's verification work.

Al Hussein Missile System

41. Iraq sought to manufacture indigenously a complete missile system called Al Hussein. As with the imported missile system of SCUD-B class, the indigenous system was composed of missiles, warheads, launchers, guidance and control instruments, liquid propellants and support equipment required for the operational use of these missiles.

42. In practically all cases, indigenously produced assets and originally imported ones could have been used interchangeably by Iraq. For example, the Al Hussein missiles, whether modified from imported SCUD-B missiles or indigenously produced, could be launched from either imported launchers or indigenously produced launchers, both mobile and fixed. The same was true for missile warheads. For these reasons, issues related to launchers and warheads both imported and indigenously produced, are covered in Section 1. Section 2 focuses on issues related to indigenous production of missiles themselves, in particular their engines, guidance and control instruments and some items unique to the indigenously produced Al Hussein class missiles.

43. Iraq began the reverse engineering and production of Al Hussein class missiles in 1987. Its efforts included the acquisition and assembly/production of all airframe components (fuel and oxidizer tanks, engine covers, instrument compartments and warheads), guidance and control instruments and their components, and liquid propellant engines. By the time of the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq had achieved considerable progress, including successful testing of indigenously assembled engines, airframes, and some guidance and control instruments. In 1995, Iraq declared for the first time that it conducted four flight tests of missiles with indigenously manufactured engines, all of them in 1990. Iraq has declared that it was successful in the indigenous production of the whole missile airframe and warhead as well as missile launchers.

44. In April 1990, Iraq established a new military unit of Brigade size (Unit 223) to be equipped with operational missile assets. One of the available Iraqi documents of April 1990 referred to a task for different organizations in Iraq to secure the needs with respect to the brigade's combat supplies (missiles, launchers and ground support). Iraq has not responded positively to the Commission's requests to provide relevant decision level documentation on the equipping of Unit 223 with combat supplies. Such documentation could significantly clarify - Iraq's planned and actual capabilities to produce indigenously and deploy, with the Army, operational missiles and related missile equipment. In response to the Commission's request of 17 November 1998, Iraq provided some 64 pages of documents related to Unit 223. This documentation did not contain the information on combat supplies sought by the Commission. It dealt with personnel and non-combat equipment like radios and cars, to be assigned to the unit and did not discuss Iraq's capabilities and actions to equip this unit with missiles, launchers and other operational assets.

45. In its initial declarations in response to the requirements of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq did not disclose fully its efforts to manufacture indigenously Al Hussein class missiles or the progress it achieved. Iraq later admitted that it had a full scale programme to manufacture indigenously complete Al Hussein missiles and that it had established specialized factories for this purpose. The factories were directed, in early 1988, to plan for production of 1000 missiles. Iraq maintains that by January 1991, it had failed to produce a single operational missile.

46. After the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq sought to retain all available capabilities, components, materials, tooling and machines for its indigenous production of missile engines and guidance and control components, and attempted to conceal the true scope of its pre-Gulf War programme.

47. In the course of the Commission's verification activities, it became practically impossible to establish and verify material balances regarding airframes and related major parts due to the relative abundance of sources of their acquisition and methods of their unilateral destruction used by Iraq. Thus, missile engines and missile guidance and control systems, in particular their gyroscopic instruments, were selected as the focus for efforts to establish the material balance in the area of indigenous missile production. The Commission believed that if solid material balances could be established in these two areas, gaps in other areas of the proscribed indigenous missile production could be assessed as of secondary importance.

Complete Al Hussein Missiles

48. In late 1995, Iraq provided to the Commission, an inventory of proscribed missiles that it destroyed unilaterally. In addition to imported missiles that it destroyed, the inventory contained a reference to seven indigenously produced missiles. Iraq explained that these were missiles or missile engines that had been given to the Army's Surface-to-Surface Missile Forces as "training" missiles. No documentation has been provided to confirm that these particular missiles were for training purposes. Although Iraq declared that these seven indigenous missiles were destroyed together with 85 imported combat missiles, remnants of the indigenous missiles or their engines, which could prove their unilateral destruction, have not been recovered by the Commission at the declared destruction sites.

49. The declared unilateral destruction of these missiles has not been verified. The verification in this area is considered as a priority issue as it might involve operational missiles produced indigenously by Iraq.

Missile Engines

50. In response to the requirements of resolution 687 (1991) of April 1991, Iraq did not disclose its programme to produce indigenously liquid propellant engines for proscribed missiles. In October 1991, Iraq stated that it had a limited, unsuccessful effort within its Project 1728 for the reverse engineering of proscribed missile engines and had imported some components and equipment for that purpose. For years, Iraq insisted that the main purpose of Project 1728 had not been missile production, but the development of welding and other technologies for manufacturing agricultural pumps.

51. In its first FFCD in May 1992, Iraq declared that all Project 1728 machines and equipment had been totally destroyed during the Gulf war. Following an intense effort to identify equipment procured for Project 1728, the Commission determined that Iraq's declared purpose for this programme was incorrect. The evidence obtained by the Commission indicated that the project had been established and operated specifically for the production of proscribed missiles, in particular their liquid propellant engines. Based on these findings, the Commission took the decision, in February 1995, on the disposal of Project 1728 equipment still available in Iraq at that time. Over a hundred machines and other major pieces of equipment were identified. Of these, the Commission requested the destruction of five machines, and established a prohibition on the use of eleven machines in any missile related production in Iraq. The remaining general purpose machines from Project 1728 were released since they could be used for non-proscribed activities and similar machines were readily available elsewhere in Iraq. Iraq protested the Commission’s decision of February 1995. It agreed to implement it only in July 1995. In its November 1995 FFCD, Iraq finally acknowledged that the main purpose for Project 1728 had been the reverse-engineering and production of proscribed missile engines, and that the equipment, identified by the Commission, had been used or acquired for use in proscribed activities. A summary of the material balance of Project 1728 machines and equipment is contained in Table 7:

Table 7 (Not relevant in the context of this review) Missile Guidance and Control Instruments (NR)

Missile Propellants (NR)

BADR-2000 Missile System (extract only)

76. Through its verification and assessments, the Commission has come to the conclusion that Iraq had not received complete operational BADR 2000 missiles nor other assets required for the operational use of such missiles. The facilities specifically dedicated to BADR 2000 missile production and testing were destroyed or rendered harmless under the Commission's supervision. What remains of these facilities is currently under the Commission's monitoring as a part of the on-going monitoring in Iraq.

Supergun System (NR)

Further sections (NR)





Extracts from the 'Amorim Report' S/1999/356.


II) Introductory questions

8. The phrasing of the mandate (how... to re-establish", etc.) carries with it an implicit recognition that the task of getting inspector's back to Iraq is not self-evident. In effect, the panel has been asked to contribute to such an objective by devising technically feasible options which the Security Council may choose to implement. The panel recognized that the scope of its mandate implied that it would devise its recommendations from a technical, and not a political, point of view, while conceding that it could not ignore the political and indeed the legal context in which those deliberations were taking place. The panel deliberated against the background of discussions in the Council, where a number of proposals on how to address the present situation are still under consideration. On the one hand, a clear line had to be drawn between what is technical, and therefore germane to the panel's work, and what is political in its content, which is the exclusive province of the Security Council. On the other hand, the panel had to be conscious that some of the technical options may propitiate political consequences if the Security Council so decides.

Current status/remaining questions

18. In the missiles area, the main concerns mentioned during the briefing related to the determination whether or not the current assessment of the quantity of special warheads identified among the remnants excavated accounts for all special warheads declared to have been produced by Iraq or if the declaration is indeed correct. Satisfactory resolution of the following issues was considered essential for the achievement of a satisfactory material balance: a) the reasons why no remnants of 50 conventional warheads declared as unilaterally destroyed were recovered; b) accounting for proscribed propellants claimed to have been unilaterally destroyed; c) accounting for the unilateral destruction of seven indigenously produced missiles; d) accounting for the unilateral destruction of combustion chamber/nozzle assemblies for indigenously produced missiles.




Late UNSCOM chronology...




UNSCOM chronology from late 1998.


6 Oct 1998 The Commission submits its semi-annual report to the Security Council (S/1998/920).

13 Oct 1998 The Executive Chairman briefs the Council on the Commission's semi-annual report.

22-23 Oct 1998 The Commission convenes a further international expert meeting to discuss the 1998 analysis of samples taken from remnants of Iraq's special warheads. The report of the meeting which is submitted to the Council.

31 Oct 1998 Iraq announces that it will cease all forms of interaction with UNSCOM and its Chairman and to halt all UNSCOM's activities inside Iraq, including monitoring. The Security Council, in a statement to the press, unanimously condemn Iraq's decision to cease all cooperation with UNSCOM.

4 Nov 1998 The Executive Chairman informs the Council (S/1998/1032) that, as a result of Iraq's actions, the Commission is not in a position to provide the Council with any level of assurance of Iraq's compliance with its obligations not to retain and not to re-establish proscribed activities.

5 Nov 1998 Security Council resolution 1205 (1998) unanimously condemns Iraq's actions and demands that Iraq rescind immediately and unconditionally its decisions of 31 October and 5 August.

15 Nov 1998 Press Statement by the President of the Security Council in which the Council takes note of Iraq's statement of 14 November to cooperate fully with the Special Commission and the IAEA. The Council members underline that their confidence in Iraq's intentions needs to be established by unconditional and sustained cooperation with the Special Commission and the IAEA in exercising the full range of their activities. The Council members also reaffirm their readiness to proceed with the comprehensive review once the Secretary-General has confirmed, on the basis of reports from the Special Commission and the IAEA that Iraq has returned to full cooperation on the basis of resolution 1194 (1998) and the Council President’s letter of 30 October to the Secretary-General (SC/65/96-IK258).

3 Dec 1998 The Special Commission submits the first of a series of weekly reports on its activities during the period 17 November to 2 December 1998. The report covers inspection activities during that period and also provides an account of correspondence exchanged with Iraq regarding matters such as the provision of documents, clarifications on a number of points previously raised with Iraq and asking that Iraq provide new substantial information on its biological weapons programme.

9 Dec 1998 The Special Commission submits its second weekly report to the Security Council describing monitoring activities and the difficulties encountered in the course of those activities, including blockage at a site.

15 Dec 1998 The Special Commission reports to the Security-General concerning UNSCOM's activities and the status of Iraq’s cooperation with the Commission in the period since 14 November 1998. The Executive Chairman concludes that Iraq did not provide the full cooperation it had promised on 14 November 1998 (S/1998/1172)

16 Dec 1998 The Special Commission withdraws its staff from Iraq.

January 1999 The Council discusses informal proposals submitted by France Russia and Canada including on ways to re-establish dialogue and cooperation between Iraq and the United Nations.

25 Jan 1999 The Executive Chairman submits a report (S/1999/94) to the President of the Security Council on disarmament and monitoring.

30 Jan 1999 Through a note (S/1999/100), the President of the Security Council announces that the Security Council has decided that it would be useful to establish three panels to, inter alia, provide the Council with recommendations on how to re- establish an effective disarmament/ongoing monitoring and verification regime in Iraq.

27 Mar 1999 The Chairman of the Panels forwards the reports of the Panels to the President of the Security Council (S/1999/356) (The 'Amorim Report'.)

9 April 1999 The Commission submits its semi-annual report to the Security Council (S/1999/401).

30 June 1999 Mr. Richard Butler completes his two year tenure as Executive Chairman of UNSCOM.

8 October 1999 The Commission submits its semi-annual report to the Security Council (S/1999/1037).

17 December 1999 Security Council adopts resolution 1284 replacing UNSCOM by the United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).

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