Collection 7

UNSCOM testimony to the Presidential Advisory Committee...

Extracts from S/1996/258 dated 11 April 1996...

Extracts from S/1996/848 dated 11 October 1996...

Extracts from S/1997/301 dated 11 April 1997...

Extracts from S/1997/774 dated 6 October 1997...

UNSCOM testimony to the Presidential Advisory Committee...

UNSCOM testimony to the PAC.

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The meeting convened at the Ambassador West Hotel, 1300 North State
Parkway, at the hour of 9:00 o'clock a.m.
2 I-N-D-E-X
Mr. Burnett 4
Mrs. Burnett 13
Mr. Samuel Ramos 23
Mr. Nick Kresch 30
Ms. Laura Olah 36
Mr. Troy Albuck 51
Ms. Marguerite Barrett 72
Mr. Terry Reese 78
Ms. Kathi Kelly 84
Ms. Penny Pierce 89
Mr. Chris Kornkven 100
Ms. Christine Eismann 108
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Ryczak 114
Dr. Timothy Gerrity 126
Dr. Duelfer 163
Mr. Igor Mitrohkin 176
Colonel David Schreier 217
Mr. Jack Ross 222
Ms. Patricia Campbell 267
Mr. Tom McDaniels 273

163 1 will resume. We're going to have to cut lunch short
2 because -- has arrived, I gather. And so we will have
3 to resume promptly at 1:45.
4 (Whereupon a recess was taken.)
5 DR. LASHOF: We're ready to resume our
6 session. And I'm very pleased that Dr. Duelfer was
7 able to get out of New York and get here. And he is
8 accompanied by, correct? And they are
9 from the United Nations Special Commission and will
10 proceed to discuss their findings.
11 DR. DUELFER: Thank you very much. And I
12 apologize for the delay and the disruption to your
13 schedule. I wanted to begin with a few brief comments
14 on the background, what the Commission is and what
15 it's tasks are. And then I will turn to our
16 understanding of what Iraq had in its inventory and in
17 its possession with respect to chemical weapons and
18 with respect to biological weapons. I will then
19 discuss our destruction activities in Iraq, and that's
20 an activity which in fact we're rather proud of. Then
21 I will turn to the specific questions related to the
22 area and the depot of Khamissiyah, where we have had
164 1 three inspections. And then finally, I have a video
2 that we've put together with some segments of our
3 activities in these areas, and I will ask Igor to
4 narrate that.
5 So, let me begin by stating, first of all,
6 that the Special Commission was created by the
7 resolution which ended the Gulf War, the cease fire
8 resolution known as Number 687. And among other
9 requirements, it required Iraq to rid itself of its
10 weapons of mass destruction. It created this Special
11 Commission to render harmless, destroy or remove all
12 of the agents and associated materials that were part
13 of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program.
14 This is chemical weapons, biological weapons and
15 ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150
16 kilometers.
17 I'll just mention that in the nuclear
18 area, the International Atomic Energy Agency had
19 primary responsibility for removing the Iraqi nuclear
20 program. The slide, you know, basically is an excerpt
21 from that resolution. There are a lot of other
22 requirements on Iraq. The Commission, however, is
165 1 strictly focused on the weapons of mass destruction.
2 What Iraq had. The next line. What I am
3 going to tell you is a mix of what the Iraqis have
4 told us and what the Commission believes. And when
5 I'm telling you something that the Commission
6 believes, I will try to separate that. Because our
7 experience with the Iraqis has not been one of -- we
8 don't have a lot of confidence in what they tell us.
9 And that's been part of the problem why it's taken us
10 so long to get to the bottom of what in fact they were
11 doing.
12 In the period between 1981 and 1991, Iraq
13 produced about 4,000 tons of chemical weapons agents
14 and approximately 100,000 chemical munitions. During
15 the period 1987 to 1991, Iraq produced around 30,000
16 liters of biological weapons agents, that's
17 concentrated agents, and more than 200 biological
18 weapons munitions. You can see from this that the
19 biological weapons program began later. That's why
20 the starting point that I mentioned is 1987 to 1991.
21 In January 1991, after the beginning of
22 the Gulf War, both chemical and biological weapons
166 1 were deployed to over a dozen different sites in Iraq.
2 And these are indicated on this chart. According to
3 Iraq's declaration, most recent declaration that is,
4 in June 1996, most of these sites, as you can see on
5 the chart, were located in the central part of Iraq
6 and only two locations were in the southern area of
7 Iraq, namely, Nassiriyah and Khamissiyah ammunition
8 depots.
9 Iraq has told us that they deployed 6,240
10 artillery shells with mustard agent in them at the
11 Nassiriyah ammunition depot and 2,160 rockets with
12 Sarin were declared to be stored at the Khamissiyah
13 ammunition depot. At the time of the war, Iraq's
14 chemical weapons arsenal consisted of about 30,000
15 filled munitions. And these included all sorts of
16 munitions, that is to say warheads for ballistic
17 missiles, the Al-Hussein scud warheads, aviation
18 bombs, artillery shells and various types of 122
19 millimeter rockets.
20 Now, some of these munitions were dual
21 capable in the sense that they were both for chemical
22 and biological. In this case, I'm pointing
167 1 specifically to the missile, the scud missile
2 warheads. They were to be used with both biology and
3 chemical agents, not at the same time obviously, but
4 for either one.
5 The BW arsenal, per se, was smaller
6 according to the Iraqi declaration. They had roughly
7 200 aviation bombs and 25 warheads for ballistic
8 missiles. That's the next line. These are the
9 warheads for the Al-Hussein -- I use the term Al-
10 Hussein and scud interchangeably. Al-Hussein is the
11 Iraqi-built scud missile.
12 Let me turn to the destruction activities
13 that we've conducted in Iraq. In order to fulfill the
14 requirements of this Resolution 687, the Commission
15 had to conduct and build facilities for the
16 destruction of all these agents and munitions. Our
17 approach was to require Iraq to bring to its main
18 chemical weapons facility, Muthanna Estate
19 Establishment, all of the munitions and agents that
20 they had in the country. That was our goal. And at
21 that location, we would build a destruction facility
22 which would serve this purpose.
168 1 This slide shows an incineration unit
2 which the Iraqis constructed specifically for the
3 purpose of destroying mustard agent. In addition to
4 that, we had, there was already existent a hydraulysis
5 unit which had been used in the production of chemical
6 agents and it was modified for the destruction, by
7 hydraulysis, of nerve agent.
8 Next slide. That's the hydraulysis unit.
9 Now, that was the procedure which we established, and
10 in fact, which we accomplished. We had a chemical
11 destruction group operating at Muthanna from 1992, the
12 summer of 1992, until the summer of 1994. They
13 destroyed roughly 28,000 munitions, 480,000 liters of
14 live agent, 1.8 million liters of precursor chemicals,
15 liquid form, and also one million kilograms of solid
16 precursor material.
17 The one exception to this pattern of
18 destruction on the part of the Commission was at
19 Khamissiyah. In 1991, when we did our initial survey
20 of where Iraq had agent and munitions, our team went
21 to Khamissiyah and found that the condition of the
22 munitions there was so fragile, that they were so
169 1 damaged, that they did not want to remove those
2 munitions to Muthanna Estate Establishment for
3 destruction. What they found, and this is in October
4 of 1991, was approximately 463 122-millimeter rockets
5 with chemical, these were the chemical versions.
6 Later, let me go to the next slide. Wait.
7 I'm sorry. No, stay with that one. I'm sorry. In
8 February and March of 1992, we sent a special mission
9 to that area to destroy those munitions and agent at
10 that location so as not to risk moving them the 500
11 kilometers to the Muthanna Estate Establishment. Now,
12 I'm going to be discussing three locations, and I, if
13 you get confused, I apologize, but just bear in mind
14 there are going to be three locations around
15 Khamissiyah. One of them is the depot, and that's
16 where the Iraqis stored the 122-millimeter rockets
17 initially. Then I'm going to discuss a second area
18 which is variously described as a pit or open area.
19 That is an open area where they moved some of the 122-
20 millimeter rockets. A third location is going to be
21 a location not far from Khamissiyah, but it's also an
22 open area and it's the area where they moved mustard
170 1 artillery rounds.
2 Now, those mustard artillery rounds were
3 in fact in good condition when we found them, and
4 those were moved back to Muthanna Estate Establishment
5 for destruction. We developed with a team of experts
6 a procedure for the destruction of these munitions at
7 Khamissiyah which involved both the explosion of the
8 rocket as well as at the same time the incineration of
9 the agent. What we did was dig out these pits, as you
10 can see there, filled half rounds of these 55-gallon
11 drums with diesel fuel mixed with a little benzene.
12 The rockets were laid across them, usually about 20 at
13 a time, or some number about like that. The rockets
14 were opened with plastic explosives, small amount, I
15 guess, perhaps a detonation cord. And at the same
16 time the explosion went off, the diesel fuel and
17 benzene ignited and burned the agent. We took a lot
18 of precautions with respect to personal protection,
19 with respect to setting up clean zones, testing the
20 weather, the wind and so forth. Before the
21 destruction activity was taking place, we had a
22 helicopter in place which, you know, launched and did
171 1 a visual survey of the area to make sure there was no
2 wind in the area. And in this process we destroyed
3 the rockets which we found at Khamissiyah.
4 One other point I want to mention which
5 drives a lot of our work. And that is that our
6 responsibility is to assure the Security Council, the
7 U.N., that all Iraqi munitions and agents have been
8 destroyed or accounted for. Accounting for this stuff
9 is a very difficult problem because even when we know
10 how many things were brought into Iraq, and we know
11 how many things we destroyed in Iraq, there is an
12 uncertainty because Iraq claims to have destroyed a
13 large number themselves. They claim that in 1991,
14 after the war, they, through unilateral action,
15 destroyed a large amount of their weapons of mass
16 destruction, particularly munitions in the chemical
17 area and also biology area. They claim that they
18 destroyed all their biology agent and a large number
19 of their chemical munitions. We have inspected
20 locations where they claim to have done this, and we
21 have not found that their claims are inconsistent with
22 other information we have, but we're not able to
172 1 verify it.
2 That uncertainty in our ability to conduct
3 an accounting has driven a lot of our work. And that
4 uncertainty caused us to send yet another inspection
5 mission to Khamissiyah this past spring. And here
6 again, I mentioned that Igor was the Chief Inspector
7 at this inspection. But again, now turning strictly
8 to the area of Khamissiyah.
9 In October 1991, we sent our first
10 inspection to that area and we found 300 122-
11 millimeter rockets at the depot. Now, there's three
12 locations again. I don't know if you can see it.
13 There's the arrow pointing straight down, that's the
14 depot. Then there's also an open storage area, below
15 and to the right, that spot. Now, in between those
16 two locations are where we found all the
17 122-millimeter rockets. Some of them were at the
18 depot and some were at what is known as Bunker 73.
19 The rest were found at the open storage area.
20 These contain Sarin, a mixture of G
21 agents. The rockets which were on there each had two
22 plastic containers which contained this agent. The
173 1 bunker, when it was investigated in October '91, was
2 found to be completely destroyed. There were rockets
3 dispersed all over the area. There was a lot of
4 unexploded ordinants. An exact accounting was
5 impossible at that time. And again, for safety
6 reasons, due to the condition of the munitions, due to
7 the condition of the bunker area, we decided not to
8 conduct the full scale investigation of that until the
9 following spring.
10 In October of 1991, our inspectors also
11 went, if we go back to the previous. We also went to
12 the third spot which I mentioned, where that star is,
13 just below the -- that's the location of the 155
14 millimeter mustard rounds. And those in October 1991
15 were found to be in good condition. They were
16 subsequently shipped back to Muthanna for destruction
17 there. They had been moved to that site, according to
18 the Iraqis, from the Nassiriyah ammunition depot,
19 which is 20 kilometers northwest of Khamissiyah.
20 Now, the following spring we sent a team
21 to destroy the 122 millimeter rockets in that area,
22 February to March '92. They conducted the demolition,
174 1 as you saw in that photograph, roughly 463 rockets
2 were destroyed and then we asked the Iraqis to
3 continue some investigation in the area if they could
4 find others.
5 Now, in spring of this year, again, to
6 assure ourselves on the accounting of the munitions,
7 we had yet another inspection of the area and Iraq
8 described in greater detail their version of the
9 events surrounding the movement of the munitions to
10 Khamissiyah. They told us that they had moved 2,160
11 chemical rockets with GB and GF just before the
12 beginning of the war, that is in the period between 10
13 to 15 January, 1991. They moved them from Muthanna
14 Estate Establishment to the Khamissiyah depot, where
15 they were put into Bunker 73. Now, these were rockets
16 with the warheads attached. And as soon as you do
17 that, you know, it means they're prepared for use.
18 Unfortunately, the rockets also began to leak quickly,
19 the Iraqis found. And they claim that they began
20 moving them when they found the leaking ones to an
21 open area. And that was the reason why they moved
22 down to that second open storage area. By the time of
175 1 the Iraqi retreat, which was early March '91, they
2 state that they moved approximately 1,100 rockets to
3 that open storage area. So, roughly there's 1,000 at
4 the open storage area and 1,000 in Bunker 73.
5 They say that they were roughly intact at
6 the time of their retreat. They also state that when
7 they returned to the site after Coalition Forces had
8 withdrawn, that they found that Bunker 73 had been
9 destroyed and they also found that some of the rockets
10 located in the open area had been destroyed as well.
11 So, with respect to Khamissiyah, I would say, you
12 know, that roughly there were 2,000 122 millimeter
13 rockets filled with G agent. We have destroyed 463 of
14 them, but our numbers were all subject to some leveled
15 uncertainty. I think, you know, both -- even the
16 Iraqis given those numbers are subject to some
17 uncertainty.
18 Let me just comment that, and in all of
19 our discussions at all levels with the Iraqis, they
20 have stated that they never used either chemical
21 weapons or biological weapons. That, you know, they
22 were simply just not used. And we have seen no
176 1 evidence, by the way, that would contradict that.
2 And let me just leave my statement as it
3 is. I'll ask Igor if he has anything to add at this
4 point. We have a short video which he will narrate
5 which gives a little bit better flavor of our
6 activities.
7 MR. MITROHKIN: Thank you. I will just
8 give the reasons for our last inspection in the area
9 of Khamissiyah before as I became Executive Chairman.
10 And the one reason was to control the counting of
11 these weapons provided by the Iraqi side. And the
12 other reason was to confirm particular type of 122-
13 millimeter chemical warheads which Iraq stored at this
14 particular site.
15 And if we will come back to our slides, we
16 need to show three more slides. Yeah. So, we go
17 there. As a result of this mission, the result was to
18 rid them of these type of weapons and we've got some
19 evidence and now we can prove that indeed the same
20 type of chemical weapons have been stored in both
21 ammunition depot and the open area. This is how
22 Bunker 73 looks like now. The Iraqis backfilled this
177 1 area with soil because of the severe construction
2 activities being built around this area.
3 Next slide please. But even now from what
4 remains of 122-millimeter chemical warheads and the
5 regional footprints in this area. And next slide
6 please. And even found some strong evidence of the
7 chemical origin of these weapons. You can see a
8 plastic container and residue covered with plastic.
9 This construction has been used only for GW
10 application by the Iraqis. Thank you very much.
11 MR. DUELFER: We can go through a video
12 very quickly.
13 DR. LASHOF: Please do, yeah. Okay.
14 Yeah.
15 MR. MITROHKIN: I will give you some
16 comment concerning this.
17 MS. LARSON: While we're switching the
18 plugs, could you just elaborate on how the Iraqis said
19 the scuds were destroyed or the rockets were
20 destroyed. By whom and how?
21 MR. DUELFER: They claim that they
22 destroyed them unilaterally in 1991, excuse me, 1992.
178 1 But again, you know, we have still some uncertainty
2 about the accounting for those, and that's one of the
3 greater problems of our work right now, to assure that
4 they still do not have new inventory of some of these,
5 both missiles and warheads.
6 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: Question also. Is
7 there any evidence of contamination of the ground
8 surrounding this area?
9 MR. DUELFER: At Khamissiyah?
11 MR. MITROHKIN: In May 1996 there was no
12 evidence. In '91, yes. There were a lot of evidence
13 and we had eight, ten buses leading on camps and was
14 a serious contamination. In February, March '92,
15 there was a serious contamination, too, especially
16 when we conducted the transportation of munitions from
17 one area, open area, to the destruction site, several
18 missiles leaked heavily and we even put them into the
19 plastic sleeves, in order to prevent contamination.
20 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: Both mustard and the
21 GB?
22 MR. MITROHKIN: No, only GB because, as
179 1 Mr. Duelfer mentioned, all mustard 155 millimeter
2 shells were in good condition. They were not leaked
3 and they were transported to the Muthanna Estate
4 Establishment where they had been filled for the
5 destruction purpose.
6 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: In your last
7 inspection, did you try to disturb the soil and see if
8 you could get a positive reading from elements of soil
9 that were shaded from sunlight?
10 MR. MITROHKIN: Yes, sir. We used the
11 standard equipment including cams and also some French
12 equipment designed not only for military application
13 but also for the civilian chemical industries which
14 allows to identify subproducts or single elements.
15 And both types of equipment didn't give us any
16 reading.
17 DR. LASHOF: We're going to go ahead with
18 the videotape and then we'll take more questions.
19 MR. DUELFER: Let me just point out. Igor
20 was at each of our inspections to Khamissiyah, in
21 October '91 and the spring of '92 as well as the last
22 one.
180 1 DR. LANDRIGAN: Igor, could you move
2 closer. We're having a little difficulty hearing you.
3 MR. MITROHKIN: Okay. This is Khamissiyah
4 ammunition depot in February '92. This is Bunker 73.
5 The remains of Bunker 73. You can see a lot of
6 122-millimeter missiles in the area around, the
7 surrounding area, and also in the bunker.
8 At that time the Commission didn't know
9 exactly the type of these weapons and we were not able
10 to confirm that the same 122-millimeter rockets were
11 stored in the open area outside the facility.
12 This is the open area, which is located
13 about three kilometers to the southeast of the bunker.
14 This is the Iraqi workers trying to put chemical
15 rockets, especially those of them which were leaked,
16 into plastic sleeves. It's also February '92.
17 The first inspection in October '91 found
18 approximately 300 missiles. By the second inspection
19 sent to Iraq to destroy rockets fond before identified
20 more rockets. When the inspection team decided to
21 leave the site after the destruction of 300 rockets,
22 the search for other remaining munitions was carried
181 1 out. And we found more munitions under the bank,
2 under the soil. We used a land mine detector. This
3 is the British piece of equipment. Worked very good.
4 MR. DUELFER: That's Igor holding it.
5 MR. MITROHKIN: Yeah, that's me. I was
6 the safety officer for this mission.
7 MR. DUELFER: Safety always comes first.
8 MR. MITROHKIN: But when identified some
9 metal pieces we were not sure that those were chemical
10 rockets, and we asked the Iraqis to check it. A lot
11 of metal fragments were identified in this area. We
12 put yellow flags, according to our procedure. It was
13 the more informational approach. And this is the
14 example of the Iraqis trying to get it out. And
15 indeed, a lot of chemical rockets were taken out of
16 the bank.
17 DR. LANDRIGAN: Now, were these fused?
18 MR. MITROHKIN: Yeah. No, no, no. Sorry.
19 The rockets were completely, I would say, prepared for
20 use, but without fuses, of course, because fuses
21 according --
22 DR. LANDRIGAN: First they discharge the
182 1 propellant?
2 MR. MITROHKIN: Yeah. Warheads were
3 attached, cables connected, because the assembling
4 procedure includes not only the installment of booster
5 tubes but also the connection of cables.
6 This was a real live chemical rocket.
7 MR. DUELFER: We had absolutely zero
8 injuries during our entire destruction process, by the
9 way.
10 MR. MITROHKIN: But the duration, of
11 course, was quite dangerous. And of course, being
12 responsible for carrying out of such operation we
13 tried to arrange our own decontamination procedures
14 which applied also for the Iraqi personnel involved.
15 When we found the evidence that a lot of rockets were
16 still under the bank, we decided to continue the
17 collection of rockets. And we used water, the
18 simplest way. Okay, next.
19 As I mentioned, we didn't believe to the
20 Iraqi, to the effectiveness of the Iraqi
21 decontamination procedures and all decontamination
22 activities were carried out by the Commission's
183 1 personnel. In this particular case, we might use a
2 Swedish personnel. Okay, next please.
3 All the rockets found in this area were
4 transported by the Iraqi site under the Commission's
5 supervision to another site. This is the destruction
6 site. Stop here please. The pit and we transported
7 rockets using regular trucks.
8 We destroyed not more than 40 rockets for
9 a single demolition because we calculated the quantity
10 of agents to be destroyed, the purity of agents, and
11 we took into account the particular location, because
12 in back the Basra Highway was located about five miles
13 to the south of this place. This is the destruction
14 pit, barrels. The procedure was extremely primitive
15 indeed. We use the plastic explosives basically only
16 quarts in order to open the munition. And after the
17 opening, the agent itself was burned.
18 All operations with explosives were
19 carried out by the Commission personnel only, because
20 we also didn't trust the Iraqi side of this. Stop
21 here. Of course, the area was secured. We used also
22 helicopter, this is the German. And then demolition.
184 1
2 And this is the area of Bunker 73 in May
3 '96, a couple weeks ago. The area was backfilled with
4 soil, but even after that several chemical rockets or
5 their components were found in the footprints. This
6 is the engine. There were rockets around.
7 This is the inspection team.
8 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: Was there any
9 evidence of unburned agent in the aerosol form from
10 the explosion?
11 MR. MITROHKIN: No, sir. The, again,
12 equipment was used but no any readings. The most
13 important for us was to find an evidence of the
14 chemical origin of these weapons, and we found it.
15 MR. TURNER: What is that?
16 MR. MITROHKIN: You see, this is the
17 plastic container inside the warhead. This is also,
18 but it's better to take the next, yeah, plastic
19 container. This is an indication of the chemical
20 nature of this warhead and also the booster tube is
21 probably ballistic.
22 DR. TAYLOR: And you say that there's no
185 1 evidence of contamination now in the soil there, in
2 1996?
3 MR. MITROHKIN: Yes, because the agent
4 used by the Iraqis in order to fill these weapons was
5 not stable. It was a makeshift Sarin and Cyclosarin.
6 The normal stability could not be more than a couple
7 days, under several circumstances. If, for example,
8 it was steel inside the warhead, maybe a couple years,
9 but not more than two years in any case. This is the
10 plastic container again.
11 We also checked other buildings
12 surrounding Bunker 73. All of them destroyed, but we
13 checked this in order to verify are there any remains
14 of chemical warheads or chemical rockets, or any other
15 122-millimeter rockets. We checked about 20 bunkers
16 around or remains of these bunkers and no any evidence
17 of 122-millimeter chemical rockets. Only in Bunker
18 73. Who's next?
19 Then we visit again the open area. The
20 landscape of this area has changed indeed. This is
21 the open area. Even now several rockets are still
22 existing because when the inspection team left Iraq in
186 1 March 1992 it was an understanding that more munitions
2 were still under the bank and the Iraqis were guided
3 to continue the situation, according to the
4 declaration. They indeed conducted during several
5 months the digging of this area. And when we visited
6 this site in May '96, we found that the whole bank
7 disappeared because of the digging.
8 What's interesting that we can confirm
9 that this the same type of chemical 122-millimeter
10 rockets which was found in Bunker 73. Thank you.
11 That's it.
12 MR. DUELFER: That's our presentation.
13 DR. LASHOF: Thank you very much. I don't
14 have questions for either Mr. Duelfer or for Igor.
15 John? Please.
16 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: In your central
17 demilitarization area, back at the, where you took
18 grounds to be demilitarized. How did you deal with
19 the assembled rockets and shells? How did you drain
20 the agent from those?
21 MR. MITROHKIN: Basically taking into
22 account that there were no fuses installed. The
187 1 munitions were transported from the open area to the
2 destruction area without any disassembly. The
3 probability of the explosion, according to our
4 calculation, the probability of the non-authorized, I
5 would say, explosion was not high indeed. And we
6 didn't disassemble any complete rockets.
7 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: In the central
8 facility, where you showed a picture of incinerator?
9 MR. MITROHKIN: You mean in Muthanna
10 Estate Establishment?
11 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: Yes. How did you
12 drain the agent from the munitions before
13 incineration?
14 MR. MITROHKIN: Normal procedures for most
15 of Iraq's munition we simply open the filling plug.
16 If no filling plug, were drilled manually.
17 MR. DUELFER: Some of the mustard rounds,
18 the artillery rounds, were opened explosively, with
19 just a small amount of plastic explosive.
20 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: In the incinerator
21 itself?
22 MR. DUELFER: No. No, no, no.
188 1 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: Outside the
2 incinerator?
3 MR. MITROHKIN: Yes. We established a
4 special area for DOD operations not far from the
5 incineration unit and some operations were carried out
6 there.
7 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: But some of the
8 munitions have a drain plug?
10 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: I assume some of the
11 rockets did not?
12 MR. MITROHKIN: Basically all munitions
13 had filling plug, with the exception of 122-millimeter
14 rockets and 155-millimeter shells. But with 155-
15 millimeter shells it was easy because there was a
16 possibility to take out the booster tube from those,
17 and most of them were stored also by the Iraqis
18 without boosters. This made the situation easier.
19 All aerial bombs, they had the filling plug. Even a
20 Hussein chemical warhead also had the filling plug
21 because it was the special aluminum container inside
22 the warhead and this container had the filling plug.
189 1 The warhead was fixed in the vertical position, the
2 filling plug was opened and the chemical agent was
3 liquidated from the filling hole.
4 DR. LASHOF: Elaine?
5 MS. LARSON: You did not destroy any
6 biologic agents; is that correct?
8 MS. LARSON: So, the information about
9 biologic agents was just what was reported by the
10 Iraqis, and you assume -- they reported that they
11 destroyed the toxins?
12 MR. DUELFER: That's correct. That's one
13 of the difficulties we have now is to verify their
14 statements and their claims. Now, there's, you know,
15 secondary evidence which we can endeavor to collect
16 through interviews of personnel, through, you know,
17 knowledge about fermenter capacity and so on and so
18 forth, and knowledge about the time they were
19 operating, you know. We can try to test elements of
20 their description to see if they're, you know, they're
21 consistent with other facts that we know.
22 But the short answer is, we never
190 1 destroyed any Iraqi agent. They claim they did that
2 all themselves. And we haven't seen such --
3 MS. LARSON: Are you aware of any
4 information that would lead you to believe that CBW
5 agents were in fact used?
6 MR. DUELFER: We have seen no evidence at
7 all that it had been used. The Iraqis have said they
8 deployed it, though. I mean, they deployed it before
9 the war, and out into, you know, various locations.
10 DR. LASHOF: Art?
11 MR. CAPLAN: I just want to go back to
12 your first visit to this depot, Bunker 73. When you
13 got there, you said they had moved some of the armed
14 missiles and then realized they were leaking so they
15 took them to the open pit. When you first got there,
16 and were looking for contamination, what sort of
17 radius did you look around in? I'm trying to get a
18 feel for what level of contamination and what distance
19 you were able to detect the presence of these agents
20 that might have leaked or that they might have
21 distributed by trying to destroy some of these weapons
22 there at that particular location?
191 1 MR. MITROHKIN: During our first visit, we
2 used only the chemical agent monitoring system, the
3 well-known cams, the British equipment. And the
4 equipment was used only when we had the evidence of
5 potential chemical weapons, munitions. Without this
6 evidence, of course, the area itself was not checked.
7 MR. CAPLAN: You made no general survey?
8 MR. MITROHKIN: No, sir. When 122-
9 millimeter chemical rockets or rockets supposed to be
10 chemical weapons were found. After that we carried
11 out the, I would say, search of this area. But also
12 it had been very limited. The area was covered with
13 unexploded ordinants and the, even movement in this
14 area was restricted. That's why we didn't visit all
15 of the bunkers in this area. The open area wasn't
16 rated much better because in the open area we even had
17 an accident. Being not familiar with this type of
18 weapons, we tried to take samples of agents from
19 chemical warheads. And during the drilling, the agent
20 makeshift, Sarin and Cyclosarin, under the high
21 pressure inside the munition was pushed and about two
22 liters of the agent leaked through the seal used by
192 1 our DOD expert.
2 Taking into account that we liberated the
3 special safety standards and for this particular
4 duration only the rubber protection seal could be used
5 because the German protection seal which normally is
6 used for the destruction of chemical munitions from
7 World War II in the specialized facility, but only the
8 regular protection seal. And only this fact saved us.
9 MR. CAPLAN: One other question. How long
10 would it take to fuse one of these ready-to-go rockets
11 and fire it?
12 MR. MITROHKIN: If the fuses are
13 calibrated, it means if this is a proximity fuse and
14 the timing is installed already, is the standard
15 operation that doesn't take more than couple seconds
16 per rocket. And if the personnel is trained, it's not
17 a problem. Could be done very quickly.
18 DR. LASHOF: Elaine?
19 MS. LARSON: I'm just curious why they had
20 produced all of these agents and deployed them and
21 then didn't use them. When were they going to use
22 them then? I mean, what were they waiting for?
193 1 MR. DUELFER: Iraq has long experience in
2 this area. And in our discussions with them they have
3 explained that, you know, in the war with Iran in fact
4 they felt that these weapons saved their country in a
5 sense, because they had enormous attacks on Iranians
6 and, you know, they had experience that led them to
7 believe that these weapons were useful. However, they
8 also have told us that in the case of the Gulf War,
9 that they were deterred from using them in that case.
10 We've gotten actually somewhat mixed
11 explanations. On the one hand they will say that
12 their possession of these weapons deterred the
13 Coalition Forces from attacks on them in Baghdad,
14 either directly or with other weapons of mass
15 destruction. On the other hand, they say that perhaps
16 they were deterred from using them because others
17 might have used such weapons. So, you know, it's a
18 question of deterrence, I suppose, that they're
19 fundamentally saying.
20 DR. LASHOF: Okay. Marguerite?
21 MS. KNOX: Yeah. I have a couple of
22 questions. Can you clarify for us what the difference
194 1 in the findings in 1992 versus 1996? I know you said
2 you left instruction with Iraq to destroy the rest of
3 those missiles. What were the differences in the
4 findings when you returned in 1996?
5 MR. MITROHKIN: Yes, indeed. I will start
6 with the second part of the question. We found that
7 Iraq did conduct the operations according to the
8 guidelines received from the Special Commission. We
9 found the rockets under the bank, because the open
10 area was located in a distance approximately 30 feet
11 from Kamal. All this bank is not existing now. The
12 Iraqis digged it out, trying to verify remaining
13 rockets. And what did we see in particular? A couple
14 complete rockets even in May '96, at least according
15 to our understanding, confirms that at least some
16 activities were carried out in this area by the
17 Iraqis. And the Iraqis also didn't deny that there
18 was a possibility of more rockets under the bank of
19 Kamal.
20 Concerning the first part of the question,
21 what's the difference between findings. In '91, of
22 course, the Special Commission was not familiar with
195 1 the system of chemical weapons produced and procured
2 by Iraq. For example, in '91, the Commission thought
3 that it was only one type of 122-millimeter chemical
4 rockets produced by the Iraqis. A couple years later,
5 we found that Iraq produced in total about five types,
6 five different types of 122-millimeter chemical
7 rockets.
8 MS. KNOX: And can you name those?
9 MR. MITROHKIN: Basically, there are
10 technological differences and the differences in
11 construction. Looking from outside, you will never
12 recognize the difference. For example, how many
13 containers, what material was used for the containers
14 and for the warhead, what was the range of missiles,
15 and several issues like this. And we tried in '96 to
16 confirm that warheads found and rockets found in
17 Bunker 73 completely adequate to rockets found in the
18 open area, because we didn't believe the Iraqis that
19 1,100 rockets were moved when they found that they
20 were leaking in Bunker 73. We're being suspicious in
21 this respect because they are the Iraqis.
22 Why you found that they're leaking only
196 1 after the transportation, not during the
2 transportation, if you have leaking weapons, that's
3 very strange that you found this only after putting
4 them into the bunker.
5 MS. KNOX: Right.
6 MR. MITROHKIN: This was our concern. And
7 taking this into account, we had a feeling that maybe
8 there were different types of chemical 122-millimeter
9 rockets in the bunker and in the open area. And
10 that's why we need to collect some information
11 concerning the construction of this type of chemical
12 weapons, and what did we find? Basically the
13 confirmation of two plastic containers in warheads,
14 inside Bunker 73, and two plastic containers in
15 warheads in the open area, which is the confirmation
16 of the same type of weapons.
17 MS. KNOX: Right. If you were suspicious
18 in '91 and you returned in 92, why did you wait four
19 years to return in 1996?
20 MR. MITROHKIN: There are several reasons
21 for this. One of the reasons is related to the level
22 of our investigation. Before 1995, Iraq completely
197 1 denied any deployment of chemical weapons to any
2 military facilities. Before '95, the Iraqi refusal
3 line was that chemical weapons have never been
4 deployed to the Minister of Defense, which was the
5 main concern for us because we found this illogical,
6 that the weapons produced was not designated to be
7 used by the Minister of Defense. And even this
8 information, which has been provided by the Iraqis
9 concerning the location of chemical weapons, this
10 information was requested to be provided by Iraq in
11 1991. Finally it was provided first time only in '95.
12 In the latest of our declarations there were several
13 modifications of this latest declarations. And I
14 could not say that the situation is clarified
15 completely now.
16 DR. LASHOF: Okay. Phil, go ahead.
17 DR. LANDRIGAN: Do you have information
18 that you could produce maps of areas of contamination.
19 Perhaps not fully quantitative, but at least
20 qualitative or semi-quantitative. I'm thinking that
21 the generation of that sort of map would help define
22 focus areas for subsequent epidemiologic studies.
198 1 MR. MITROHKIN: Of course we can do this.
2 But I must say from the beginning that we didn't find
3 any large areas of contamination with G agent because
4 of the nature of this CW agent. The contamination was
5 very limited and basically it was the radius of dense
6 feets around particular warheads. But not more. For
7 example, after the demolition, we, of course, checked
8 the, not only potential distances of contamination,
9 but practical distances. And the distance was not
10 more than about 800 meters.
11 DR. LANDRIGAN: Do you have reason to
12 think that there were areas in southern Iraq, apart
13 from this area that you've been describing, the
14 general area, where also there might have been
15 contamination with this agents, or was it restricted
16 to this one area?
17 MR. MITROHKIN: In central Iraq?
18 DR. LANDRIGAN: Southern, mainly in
19 southern. I'm thinking mainly in southern.
20 MR. MITROHKIN: We have no any other
21 evidence that there were other contaminated areas in
22 southern Iraq. In central Iraq, there were
199 1 contaminations in the area around the Mohammadia
2 storage facility, was the primary storage area located
3 not far from the Muthanna Estate Establishment. In
4 central Iraq, in the area was contaminated indeed, but
5 not more than for couple square kilometers.
6 DR. LANDRIGAN: Yeah. Thanks.
7 MR. MITROHKIN: And of course around the
8 Muthanna Estate Establishment was contaminated
9 heavily, because agents in bulks were destroyed there
10 during the war.
11 DR. TAYLOR: I guess the question I have
12 about the contamination again. So none of these
13 chemicals can remain airborne for any specific length
14 of time? They can't become airborne.
16 DR. TAYLOR: No?
18 DR. TAYLOR: Only the -- I'm a little
19 confused still. The contamination again, only
20 specific areas when that small section that you were
21 talking about?
22 MR. MITROHKIN: Right. Because this agent
200 1 would be vaporized immediately, being put on the
2 ground. And this is the reason of this agent, this G
3 agent, it's not persistent agent. It was not designed
4 for the contamination of the area. It was designed
5 for the inhalation exposure. And that's why it's
6 difficult to believe that this agent can create any
7 contaminations or any long scale contaminations.
8 Only if the source of contamination is
9 still available, like leaking munition, there is a
10 possibility of some contamination. But again, the
11 agent itself was not persistent.
12 DR. TAYLOR: It's not persistent.
13 DR. CUSTIS: Not to belabor the question,
14 we have been briefed on the opinion that Sarin
15 specifically does get into the explosive cloud and
16 that winds will disperse those particles and it would
17 be contradictory as to the direction and distance of
18 that dispersion. You're saying none of this is true?
19 MR. DUELFER: Let me just throw -- our
20 responsibilities are strictly to find munitions in
21 Iraq and get rid of them. I mean, we're not appearing
22 before you as experts on the effects of these agents.
201 1 So I'm a little bit -- I want to caution, you know,
2 what we say with respect to contamination, those sorts
3 of things, that is not -- our expertise and why we are
4 here is to tell you what we have found in Iraq. So,
5 I mean, I just -- don_t take us as experts on
6 dispersion or inhalation or any of those sorts of
7 things. Igor Mitrohkin happens to know a great deal
8 about that, and because he was a safety officer on a
9 lot of our destruction activities, you know, has
10 intimate knowledge of these things. But, you know,
11 our role is we are a U.N. body charged with certain
12 activities under the resolution. So, if we offer
13 opinions on these types of things, they are opinions
14 only. Forgive me for sounding a bit bureaucratic.
15 I'll turn to Igor to answer your question.
16 DR. LASHOF: You may answer, Igor, any way
17 you want. There's no independent -- individual or
18 whatever.
19 Let me try a few and then I'll get back
20 and give us a round because we're going to run short.
21 I'd like to review a little bit the time table here.
22 As I understand it, our forces went in in March of '91
202 1 and blew up the rockets and things that were in Bunker
2 73. At that time, assuming that none of them were,
3 they didn't contain rockets with chemical weapons.
4 You went in October of '91, several months
5 after we had been in, and found evidence that they had
6 obtained chemical weapons. Is this correct? And at
7 that time you did notify our government of that
8 finding, our DOD, that you think that they might have
9 blown up some weapons that had contained chemicals?
10 MR. DUELFER: We make regular reports to
11 the Security Council, who are our bosses, as it were,
12 public reports that are official U.N. documents, that
13 describe our activities. And we have described what
14 we found at Khamissiyah ever since we first made that
15 inspection in October '91. I mean, this is, you know,
16 it's common knowledge that we in fact were rather
17 pleased with ourselves of destroying the weapons at
18 Khamissiyah in the spring of '92. And that was our
19 first chemical weapons destruction activity.
20 DR. LASHOF: And so, and then you have
21 similar reports for your other visits in '95 and of
22 course we know you've reported in '96?
203 1 MR. DUELFER: Yes.
2 DR. LASHOF: That's your routine all the
3 time. So that our government was informed, obviously,
4 all along the way. And what I gather you're telling
5 us is that in '95 you were more convinced that there
6 were more weapons there than you might have thought
7 there were in '92. But in '92 you were convinced that
8 there were chemical weapons?
9 MR. DUELFER: Oh, absolutely. We knew in
10 October '91 that there were chemical weapons there.
11 DR. LASHOF: Yeah. I mean, in October '91
12 that there were chemical weapons. But this question,
13 if that's not in your realm to answer I'll understand,
14 what were the things you saw in '91 that enabled you
15 to determine that there were chemical weapons and yet
16 our government had gone in earlier in '91 and blown it
17 up, thinking there were no chemical weapons.
18 MR. MITROHKIN: If I may, I have one
19 comment. In '91, we didn't establish the fact that
20 the weapons, the chemical weapons stored in the area
21 of Khamissiyah ammunition depot was destroyed by the
22 Coalition Forces. We are not able to make this
204 1 assessment even now. If representatives of other
2 institutions, U.S. governmental agencies, have more
3 information, they will admit this to you, I am sure.
4 But we are not able to prove this fact. We can tell
5 you only what Iraq admitted with this respect. Being
6 asked to provide explanations, how the weapons were
7 destroyed, they provided us in May '96 these
8 explanations. In October '91, Iraq was not able to
9 explain how the weapons were destroyed. The
10 explanation provided to the Special Commission was
11 very general, that the weapons were destroyed during
12 the war, but how it was destroyed in particular, no
13 explanations were presented by the Iraqis.
14 Even now when Iraq admitted during this
15 inspection with the Chief Inspector that the weapons
16 were destroyed by Coalition Forces, as the Chief
17 Inspector, I cannot prove this or I cannot disprove
18 this. I can tell you only what I was told by the
19 Iraqis.
20 MR. DUELFER: I think part of your
21 question is how did we know that there were chemical
22 weapons in October '91 and if the Coalition Forces
205 1 were there in March, why didn't they know. One
2 important factor is the Iraqis did not mark a
3 conventional munition any differently from the
4 chemical munition. When we went there in '91, they
5 were already dissected as it were. And so you can
6 readily determine and see that they were chemical
7 agents and munitions.
8 DR. LASHOF: You mean because they were
9 partially destroyed?
10 MR. DUELFER: They were intact.
11 DR. LASHOF: If they were intact, you
12 could have told.
13 MR. DUELFER: The regular chemical
14 detectors, as I understand it, I'm not the expert, but
15 regular chemical detectors would not be able to
16 determine a conventional rocket from a non-
17 conventional one.
18 DR. LASHOF: I see. Go on.
19 MR. MITROHKIN: One more comment. What
20 Mr. Duelfer just mentioned, this is very important.
21 The Iraqi practice, practice, was not to mark chemical
22 munitions as a special weapons, as chemical munitions
206 1 or any other munitions other than conventional
2 munitions. This was the idea, this was the mentality
3 and this was the practice. Chemical weapons were not
4 marked and had not any marking system which could be
5 used in order to identify that this is a chemical
6 munition and this is a conventional munition. And
7 they tried to produce munitions, basically, using as
8 much as forcible empty casings from conventional
9 weapons. It's all private speculation, but, for
10 example, it was the problem for the Special Commission
11 because the Special Commission undertook several
12 additional steps in order to identify the origin of
13 the weapons.
14 For example, the drilled menu in
15 munitions, because there was not any other
16 possibility. The regular military detection equipment
17 doesn't work in this case, because even the munition
18 in good condition, chemical munition, if it's not
19 marked and if empty casings from conventional weapons
20 is used, there is only one way to drill munition and
21 to take sample. And this is what the field workers
22 did in two years.
207 1 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: But they must have
2 some numbering system.
3 MR. MITROHKIN: No. And this was, again,
4 this was the Iraqi idea to cover chemical weapons
5 under the conventional weapons purposes.
6 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: But how would they
7 know themselves?
8 MR. MITROHKIN: In this respect we had
9 several accidents. For example, when at first I found
10 a Hussein chemical warhead, and this was shown in
11 photo and slide, I also was the member of this
12 inspection team. I was Deputy Chief Inspector. The
13 Iraqis tried to assure us that the warhead held only
14 one component of the Iraqi binary system. And all of
15 us commissions experts and the Iraqis were standing
16 around the warhead without any protection equipment.
17 The warhead was open because the Iraqis were
18 absolutely assured that this was empty warheads from
19 the one component.
20 Finally, we found that this particular
21 piece was found with G agent. The Iraqis were
22 surprised, we had been surprised and since that, we
208 1 have been under procedures established by the
2 Chairman. Each Iraq's declaration should be
3 challenged. We have this experience.
4 MR. CAPLAN: So that does mean, though,
5 that it would be relatively easy for them to make a
6 mistake, fused a missile and shoot it in error,
7 perhaps, speculatively?
8 MR. MITROHKIN: I cannot give you any
9 response in this particular respect. But logically
10 you are right.
11 MR. TURNER: I have two questions about
12 Khamissiyah specifically, which I think are
13 clarifications. In Bunker 73, the U.N. has only found
14 evidence of rocket casings that are consistent with
15 Sarin and Cyclosarin nerve agents; is that correct?
16 MR. MITROHKIN: Yes, sir.
17 MR. TURNER: You found no evidence of
18 mustard rounds in Bunker 73?
19 MR. MITROHKIN: No. And we have no
20 evidence that these types of weapons, 122-millimeter
21 rockets, have ever been filled with mustard, only with
22 G agent.
209 1 MR. TURNER: The second area I'd like to
2 clarify about Khamissiyah is, if I understood your
3 testimony correctly, Mr. Duelfer, there is a
4 suggestion by the Iraqis that not only were Sarin and
5 Cyclosarin filled rockets at Bunker 73 destroyed
6 during the war, but also some in the site of the open
7 pit; is that correct?
8 MR. DUELFER: That's correct. That's what
9 the Iraqis have told us.
10 MR. TURNER: And you have nothing to
11 verify the latter part?
12 MR. DUELFER: We have no reason to believe
13 it or disbelieve it.
14 MR. TURNER: Okay. If you could put up
15 the map again, Mr. Ewing, of Iraq? Mr. Duelfer, if
16 you could indicate the other sites where the U.N.
17 found damaged chemical warfare munitions in Iraq on
18 the map when Miles gets it up, I think that would be
19 very helpful for the Committee.
20 MR. DUELFER: One location, Mohammedia,
21 which is, I can't find the end of this. There, yeah.
22 MR. TURNER: That's Mohammedia?
210 1 MR. DUELFER: There.
2 MR. TURNER: So they're both central Iraqi
3 sites?
4 MR. DUELFER: That's correct.
5 MR. TURNER: Can you give us some idea of
6 the quantity and type of chemical munition that was
7 found at Al-Muthanna?
8 MR. MITROHKIN: In Mohammedia --
9 MR. TURNER: Mohammedia, that's fine.
10 MR. MITROHKIN: Mohammedia, we had several
11 hundred dumps filled with mustard that were destroyed.
12 Some of them had already leaked. Also, not more than
13 ten aviation bombs filled with G agent, also a mixture
14 of Sarin and Cyclosarin. A lot of empty 122-
15 millimeter casings and several thousand of mortar
16 bombs filled with CS were there.
17 MR. TURNER: That's what you found.
18 According to the Iraqi declarations, at Mohammedia,
19 how much in some kind of quantitative term of mustard
20 agent was destroyed during the war?
21 MR. MITROHKIN: In total, let me calculate
22 this. Let's take 200 aerial bombs, 60 liters in each,
211 1 couple times, not more.
2 MR. TURNER: You were going to talk about
3 Al-Muthanna also. I'm sorry, at Mohammedia, you also
4 had some Sarin-filled aerial bombs?
6 MR. TURNER: And my information is three
7 metric tons. Does that sound in the correct area?
8 MR. MITROHKIN: Couple tons. Yeah, couple
9 tons.
10 MR. TURNER: At Al-Muthanna, again, the
11 same kind of question. What can you tell us about
12 what the Iraqis had indicated is the quantity of
13 chemical munitions that may have been destroyed there
14 during the war?
15 MR. MITROHKIN: In general, in Muthanna,
16 in Muthanna, several thousand 122-millimeter rockets
17 stored in the bunker area of the Muthanna Estate
18 Establishment.
19 MR. TURNER: So those are the same kind of
20 Sarin, Cyclosarin rockets were destroyed at
21 Khamissiyah were the type --
22 MR. MITROHKIN: Same type, different kind.
212 1 Also, maybe you have this information that the
2 Muthanna Estate Establishment was consisted of
3 different areas and it was a huge storage area in the
4 Muthanna Estate Establishment with underground
5 bunkers. During the war when the facility was
6 destroyed, they stored 122-millimeter rockets, 155-
7 millimeter shells, also aviation bombs, including
8 different calibers. And heavy contaminated those who
9 were in the -- I believe the production facilities
10 located in the Muthanna Estate Establishment, because
11 the production was carried out also in January. The
12 day before the destruction the facility had produced
13 chemical weapons. And as a result of the destruction,
14 the area was heavily contaminated.
15 And also, stocks of agents in bulks.
16 Mainly in mustard.
17 MR. TURNER: What information does the
18 U.N. have on the quantity of agent that may have been
19 released around there? Can you give us any kind of
20 idea with respect to nerve agent or mustard agent?
21 MR. MITROHKIN: Several tons of mustard.
22 MR. TURNER: And this is at Al-Muthanna.
213 1 MR. MITROHKIN: Yes. Basically bulk
2 agents.
3 MR. TURNER: Bulk agents were released
4 there, presumably during the air war.
6 MR. TURNER: Just kind of a final point to
7 clarify. The testing that you described doing for
8 contamination. Now, that is conducted when you're
9 there, obviously, which is several months after the
10 end of the war. So that, if I understood your
11 testimony again correctly, or your comments here
12 today, correctly, the likelihood of finding evidence
13 of Sarin after that kind of passage of time is pretty
14 remote; is that correct?
16 DR. LASHOF: If they're urgent, we're way
17 over time. But, just on important issues.
18 MR. CAPLAN: Just one last question which
19 has come up in our hearings frequently, and I'm just
20 curious to have an opinion about it. In your view,
21 were the chemical and biological weapons, well, you
22 didn't find any biological weapons. The chemical
214 1 weapons you found, is it your view that the Iraqis had
2 ample capacity to manufacture these that nothing came
3 from outside the country, the source of the actual
4 chemical weapons?
5 MR. MITROHKIN: This is a most complicated
6 question addressed to us. If you consider chemical
7 weapons as a system including agents, precursor
8 chemicals, equipment required for their production,
9 filling technology, empty casings of munitions,
10 components of these munitions, parts of the components
11 of munitions, of course Iraq was not able to create CW
12 arsenal on its own. Several components, including
13 precursor chemicals, key pieces of equipment,
14 basically dual use equipment, had been procured by
15 Iraq from the outside.
16 We have no evidence that Iraq imported
17 chemical weapons itself as a final product, either CW
18 agents or CW munitions. But we have evidence that
19 some empty casings supposed to be used later for CW
20 purposes have been exported by Iraq. The same is
21 related to minor precursor chemicals and equipment,
22 but not to chemical weapons itself as a final product.
215 1 DR. LASHOF: One more, John.
2 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: Let me come back to
3 the question of lot numbers and serial numbers. In
4 their manufacture, did the Iraqis have any system of
5 identifying lots and serial numbers on individual
6 munitions?
7 MR. MITROHKIN: Depending on type of
8 munitions. For some munitions they had serial
9 numbers. For example, Al-Hussein missiles.
10 Al-Hussein missile was a strategic weapons for Iraq.
11 It was, it delivered the most sufficient range. After
12 the modification, regular munitions had 300
13 kilometers. Al-Hussein had 600 kilometers. Because
14 they had the serial numbers for the missile itself and
15 for its particular components, for engine, for the
16 warhead, but not for the piece of chemical weapons.
17 And without any knowledge, it was not possible to
18 differentiate, for example, the chemical missile and
19 the conventional missile. Both of them had serial
20 numbers, but only some Iraqi responsible agencies had
21 lists of numbers that applied to chemical weapons and
22 to conventional weapons. And no special marking
216 1 system. Of course, not any instructions or menus,
2 like in other countries that processed chemical
3 weapons by the regular procedure that a short menu was
4 even put on the box. This is not the case for Iraq.
5 DR. BALDESCHWIELER: Could you follow a
6 forensic trail. For example, if you found a munition,
7 could you establish where it had been assembled, for
8 example, and, you know, where the individual parts,
9 for example, had been produced?
10 MR. MITROHKIN: Yes. We did this
11 individually for each particular type of chemical
12 weapons. But this was a long investigation for each
13 type. It took more than one year. For this
14 particular type found in Khamissiyah, it took us three
15 years to establish and to finalize the investigation
16 from the beginning to the end, who produced, how many
17 were produced, who assembled this, what was procured,
18 what was produced, indigenously, where it was filled,
19 and so.
20 DR. LASHOF: Okay. Thank you very very
21 much. We do appreciate your coming down. It's been
22 very helpful. We're going to proceed directly to the
217 1 presentation concerning compensation from the Persian
2 Gulf Coordinating Board's Compensation Working Group.
3 Colonel David Schreier and Mr. Jack Ross.
4 Colonel Schreier, are you going to start,
5 or is Mr. Ross going to start?


© 1996 PAC

UNSCOM reports...

Extracts from S/1996/258 dated 11 April 1996. (1st report under UN Resolution 1051)


A. Proscribed programmes

35. The discussions of Iraq's disclosures in the missile area proceeded for the most part in a constructive manner. It was obvious that the Iraqi counterparts were applying considerable efforts to provide a good account of past activities. However, in some cases the Iraqi side continued to adhere to its earlier behaviour and was unwilling to adopt a cooperative stance. This became even more apparent after mid-February 1996. This is a matter of concern. The Commission hopes that this is not a reversal of the overall positive and encouraging policy of cooperation and openness with the Commission followed by Iraq since August 1995.

36. As reported to the Council in December 1995, the Commission has not yet received from Iraq a clear and definitive account of proscribed weapons, equipment and materials. This leaves a suspicion that such items still exist in Iraq. The Commission also believes that Iraq is withholding important documents related to proscribed activities. In August 1995, Iraq admitted in an official letter that it had been engaged in a dedicated concealment effort to hide proscribed items and documents from the Commission. After that date, the Commission obtained from Iraq a significant amount of documents and hardware that had been hidden for years in different places such as a chicken farm, military installations, the Military Industrialization Commission's establishments, private houses, etc. Sensitive items were placed under special protection to avoid their detection by the Commission. Through its analytical work, the Commission has been able to identify several suspect sites where items and documents of relevance to the Commission might have been or were still hidden. The Commission's mandate from the Council specifically provides for inspections to address such concerns. For that purpose the Council imposed on Iraq specific obligations to allow the Commission's inspection teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation which they wish to inspect. The corresponding rights were given to the Commission to carry out inspections at any time and without hindrance.


113. It should be noted that if Iraq's evasive actions such as the withholding of documentary evidence and unilateral destruction had not taken place, the Commission would by now have had a good chance to make a conclusive report. The Commission has focused substantial effort over the last months on the processing and analysis of the documents obtained since August 1995. This work has yielded rich results and the Commission is now in possession of data which helps to clarify many elements with regard to Iraq's prohibited weapons programmes and to better define what is still outstanding. Significant has been that the recent draft declarations submitted by Iraq have included data for improved verification, in accordance with long-standing requests of the Commission. Nevertheless, the Commission is convinced that more documents remain in Iraq. The Commission urges Iraq to make them available.

Extracts from S/1996/848 dated 11 October 1996. (2nd report under UN Resolution 1051)


C. Missile area

17. Over the last five years, the Commission has made considerable progress in the identification and the elimination of Iraq's proscribed missiles and capabilities. As a result of its initial declarations in April/May 1991, the Commission supervised the destruction of its declared 48 operational missiles, 14 conventional warheads, 6 operational mobile launchers and other support equipment and materials in early July 1991. The destruction of the initially declared proscribed missile production tools, equipment and some facilities was carried out by April 1992. The destruction of the initially declared 30 missile chemical warheads was completed in April 1993.

18. Through the Commission's inspection efforts, a number of undisclosed proscribed weapons, equipment and items retained by Iraq were also uncovered. In March 1992, Iraq disclosed that it had concealed from the Commission the greater part of its operational missile force (85 operational missiles, over 130 warheads, both conventional and chemical, 8 operational mobile launchers and missile force support equipment) and a significant amount of other proscribed items and materials. These were alleged to have been unilaterally and secretly destroyed in late July 1991, without allowing the Commission to supervise the destruction, as required by resolution 687 (1991). Since March 1992, the Commission has been able to verify a number of these weapons and items as destroyed, although a full accounting has not been possible. Iraq claimed that the unilateral destruction operations had not been fully documented or recorded.


A. Proscribed programmes

94. Following its admissions since August 1995, Iraq submitted a declaration containing its full, final and complete disclosure in the missile area in November 1995. It comprised more than 2,500 pages, together with a substantial amount of supporting documentation. The Special Commission's assessment of the document was outlined in its December 1995 report to the Security Council (S/1995/1038). As stated in that report, Iraq's accounting in the November 1995 FFCD did not appear to constitute a firm basis for establishing a definite and verifiable material balance for proscribed weapons and activities.

98. Based upon the results of the previous inspection activities and the analysis of information obtained from different sources, the Commission determined that Iraq's statements in the FFCD relevant to these two topics were not complete and in certain aspects were even misleading. The Commission has a specific concern that some key items that Iraq had declared as having been unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991 had in fact been diverted from destruction and concealed.


133. The Commission has therefore yet not reached the stage where it can state with confidence that everything that is proscribed to Iraq has been identified and disposed of. It continues to believe that limited, but highly significant quantities may remain, as Iraq has not been able to account for a number of proscribed missiles and certain high-quality chemical and biological warfare agents and related capabilities which it had acquired. The Commission's information indicates that Iraq has still not told the full story of its weapons programmes and handed over all its proscribed weapons materials and capabilities for final disposal.

Extracts from S/1997/301 dated 11 April 1997. (3rd report under UN Resolution 1051)

I. INTRODUCTION .......................................... 1 - 3 3


8. Security Council resolutions 687 and 707 (1991) require Iraq to provide declarations containing its full, final and complete disclosures of its proscribed chemical, biological and missile programmes, and the Commission then to verify them. However, the inadequacies, incompleteness and lack of evidentiary documentation in many areas of Iraq's various declarations over the years have not allowed for credible verification by the Commission. This has constituted one of the main reasons for the delay in clearing up matters related to Iraq's programmes for weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, thus preventing the Commission from reporting to the Security Council under paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991) that, in its view, Iraq has completed all actions contemplated in section C of that resolution. In an effort to expedite the verification process, and to assist Iraq in identifying where further action on its part is required, an innovative process was agreed upon by the Deputy Prime Minister and the Executive Chairman, by which the Commission presents to Iraq, at the political level, its detailed findings and assessment of the outstanding problems. This process started in the December 1996 meeting at Baghdad between the Deputy Prime Minister and the Chairman, during which missile issues were addressed. It was followed by similar discussions in the chemical weapons area in February and April 1997, and in the biological weapons area in April 1997. Seminar-type meetings, associated with this process, were held at the technical level, with the participation of Iraqi experts and teams of international experts from the Commission.

13. The Chairman's next bimonthly visit to Baghdad took place from 8 to 11 December 1996. He made a presentation that included details of what the Commission knew of the disposition of prohibited missiles and pointed to the fact that the missiles that Iraq had acknowledged importing had not all been accounted for by Iraq. The Commission's experts demonstrated that none of the variety of analyses of information provided by Iraq produced a zero material balance of the proscribed missiles known to have existed at the end of the Gulf War. Furthermore, there were many other outstanding issues, including the rationale for the programme of secret destruction by Iraq and its recently admitted diversion of missiles, components and production tools, even during this destruction. In his response, the Deputy Prime Minister acknowledged that there were some issues where Iraq could do more to support its declaration that all proscribed missiles had been destroyed and undertook that it would further address the Commission's concerns.

14. The Chairman made it clear to the Iraqi side that its refusal to permit the removal from Iraq of missile remnants for analysis by the Commission (described in paras. 41-44) was a violation of the Commission's rights and a serious impediment in accounting for the proscribed missiles. However, Iraq continued to block the removal of the remnants. On 17 December, the Chairman wrote to the Deputy Prime Minister setting out his assessment of the meetings and again called on Iraq, in keeping with its obligations, to release the missile remnants. This letter was distributed to the members of the Council.

15. The Chairman next visited Baghdad from 20 to 23 February 1997. In addition to the remaining missile issues, the two sides began addressing the outstanding issues in the chemical weapons area. The Chairman explained the basis for the Commission's concerns that Iraq had still not provided a full and correct account of its chemical weapons programme. He, inter alia, addressed the production of the nerve agent VX, missing documents, unaccounted-for warheads, bombs and munitions and undeclared chemical weapons production equipment. The Deputy Prime Minister undertook to address the Commission's concerns, in part through the provision of written answers. It was agreed that a follow-up expert-level meeting would be held in March.

16. During the February meetings, Iraq provided further clarifications on the outstanding missile issues. There was some progress on the basic accounting, mainly cross-checking serial numbers and other data to ensure that both sides were working from the same premise. However, not much emerged on important problems such as concealment of missiles after the war and their unilateral destruction. A further issue addressed by the Chairman was Iraq's continuing refusal to let the Commission remove the remnants of destroyed missiles as called for in the statement by the President of the Security Council of 30 December 1996 (S/PRST/1996/49). The Deputy Prime Minister sought to have Iraqi personnel involved in the Commission's investigation and analysis of the remnants. The Chairman ruled that out. Ultimately, Iraq agreed to the removal of the remnants for out-of-country analysis. At the end of the meetings, on 23 February 1997, the two sides agreed on a joint statement (S/1997/152) describing the arrangements for the removal, the main results of the visit and the plans for the immediate future.


46. The accumulated effect of the work that has been accomplished over six years since the ceasefire went into effect, between Iraq and the Coalition, is such that not much is unknown about Iraq's retained proscribed weapons capabilities.

47. However, what is still not accounted for cannot be neglected. Even a limited inventory of long-range missiles would be a source of deep concern if those missiles were fitted with warheads filled with the most deadly of chemical nerve agents, VX. If one single missile warhead were filled with the biological warfare agent, Anthrax, many millions of lethal doses could be spread in an attack on any city in the region. With that in mind, the Special Commission has undertaken extraordinary efforts to bring to a satisfactory conclusion the full accounting of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, in order to be able to make sure that all the proscribed items have been disposed of.

48. The present report describes the many activities carried out over the last six months to seek the full implementation of the mandate given to the Commission. It has been a period of intensive work. The priority issues set out in the joint programme of action of 22 June 1996 have been explored in full, with the difficult questions of secret destruction, provision of documents, concealment and material balance being in focus.

49. A fusion of technical expert work and the political dialogue on the level of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Executive Chairman has been tried. The purpose of turning their bimonthly meetings into a political/technical seminar, with the participation of the Commission's and Iraq's scientific and technical experts, has been to narrow the major outstanding issues to a manageable quantity. With regard to the missile and chemical weapons, the Commission has achieved this objective. More distant from clarity is the biological weapons area where Iraq's presentations are rather chaotic. To help to solve the deficiencies, an agreement was recently reached that both sides should work together in order to arrive at a well-structured declaration which could be a workable basis for the accomplishment of its verification.

Further extract from S/1997/301.

Appendix I

Inspection activities and operational, administrative and other matters

III. Missile activities .................................... 24 - 41 19


24. During the reporting period, the Commission has continued its efforts to verify Iraq's declaration containing its full, final and complete disclosure in the missile area submitted in July 1996. Key outstanding issues were discussed at two rounds of political level talks held between the Deputy Prime Minister and the Chairman. During the December round, the Commission presented in great detail its concerns which focused on the accounting of Iraq's proscribed operational missile assets. As a result of the Commission's investigations, it had become apparent that Iraq had not presented sufficient evidence to account for the destruction of all proscribed missiles. Iraq's declarations on the secret destruction were inconsistent with facts established by the Commission. In an attempt to mislead the Commission, Iraq had tried to falsify evidence of this destruction. The Commission's investigations have also revealed a number of other areas requiring additional explanation and clarification. The Chairman stressed the Commission's concerns on Iraq's decision to conduct the secret destruction of the proscribed operational missiles assets in 1991 in violation of resolution 687 (1991). In particular, these concerns related to the political decisions taken to carry out such destruction, dissemination of follow-up orders and the actual implementation of these orders. In a letter of 4 November 1996, the Chairman requested Iraq to provide specific documentation related to the secret destruction in order to speed up effective verification. So far no response has been received from Iraq.

25. The arguments put forward by Iraq at the December meetings, which were aimed at proving that it had already accounted for all proscribed operational missile assets, were not satisfactory. The Deputy Prime Minister acknowledged that further work needed to be done by Iraq and suggested that the issue be discussed again during the next round of political level talks in February 1997.

26. During the February talks, Iraq presented its explanations which enabled further progress in the accounting for proscribed missiles. Iraq offered new clarifications on the numbers of missiles and missile launchers that had been secretly destroyed in 1991 as well as on the procedures and methods used. After the February round, in response to the Commission's request, Iraq presented new explanations on the material balance in such areas as missile fuels and missile guidance systems. These will be the subject of further verification. The Commission still awaits a report on the sites of the secret destruction and the provision of documentation in response to its specific requests.

27. In order to obtain solid data on the destroyed missiles, the Commission decided to excavate the remnants for technical analysis. After a prolonged delay described in the main body of the present report, on 23 February 1997, Iraq finally agreed to the removal of the remnants. The Commission then convened a seminar of international experts from 17 to 21 March 1997. The seminar was attended by representatives of national laboratories that offered to perform technical analysis, as well as experts who form the Commission's supervisory teams at these laboratories. The seminar participants conducted an examination of every engine to determine specific taskings for each laboratory. The seminar worked out procedures or speedy and effective analysis of the missile remnants and established practical modalities for the Commission's supervision of this work. The analytical work started in the United States and French laboratories, on 24 March and 7 April 1997, respectively. The Commission believes that this technical analysis will provide valuable data for verification of methods and procedures for the secret destruction, shed light on Iraq's efforts to produce missile engines and their components, and thus help to resolve the issues related to the counting of missiles.

28. Separately, the excavation of missile remnants was resumed in January 1997, under the supervision of a new team (UNSCOM 177). This time the search was extended to the declared sites of the secret destruction. As a result of this two-month long effort, an additional four complete engines were found that had not previously been presented by Iraq to the Commission. This discovery proved that the Commission's assessment at the December meetings that not all engines had been accounted for and presented for verification, was correct.

29. The Commission continued its inspections to verify Iraq's full, final and complete disclosure submitted in July 1996. Pursuant to the joint programme of action of 22 June 1996, this effort focused on material balances regarding missiles and related materials, as well as specialized tools used in Iraq's production of prohibited missiles. In order to verify the material balance, the Commission sought to establish the "chain of custody" that would account for relevant items in the period of time after the adoption of resolution 687(1991) until the time when Iraq declared that the items had been destroyed. Owing to the lack of documentation, the Commission has to continue to resort to interviews of the personnel involved in relevant activities.

30. During the reporting period, the Commission conducted two full, final and complete disclosure verification missions. The first one, UNSCOM 168 in November 1996, attempted to trace the movement and storage of proscribed items primarily related to Project 1728, the main Iraqi effort to produce proscribed missile engines. Through interviews and site inspections, including excavation at the location of a hide site, the Commission was able to obtain some evidence that corroborated portions of Iraq's declarations on the secret destruction. However, many inconsistencies were revealed between information in the full, final and complete disclosure and the facts available to the Commission. Additional efforts will be required by Iraq to account fully for proscribed items and equipment related to Project 1728. The team also pointed to inconsistencies in the material balance of proscribed components related to the Karama project, the main activity in Iraq to produce guidance and control systems for proscribed missiles. The UNSCOM 168 team undertook preparatory work for the December political level talks which included interviews of personnel involved in the storage, movement and destruction, and in accounting of proscribed missile assets declared to have been secretly destroyed in 1991.

31. In January 1997, the UNSCOM 176 team was sent to receive a number of explanations that had previously been requested, to discuss them with Iraqi counterparts and to conduct interviews to verify relevant parts of the full, final and complete disclosure. However, it turned out that most of the explanations sought were not ready although some of them had been requested well in advance. Despite repeated requests since September 1996, Iraq failed to provide access to personnel with knowledge of certain events relevant to the secret destruction. The situation deteriorated to the point where the team had to suspend its activities. Although later on Iraq provided or offered to provide the documents requested, the UNSCOM 176 effort was essentially wasted and valuable time was lost in verification of Iraq's full, final and complete disclosure.

32. In verifying Iraq's declarations, the Commission has spent considerable effort in mapping out Iraq's proscribed missile programme. In 1994, in a spirit of cooperation, the Commission even undertook to write a history of Iraq's proscribed missile programme so that Iraq could authenticate it as an official description of relevant Iraqi activities. By mid-1995 this project was close to its completion with many parts certified by Iraq as accurate. However, shortly thereafter, it became obvious that, in many important aspects, Iraq had been intentionally misleading the Commission by providing incorrect information as cover for important progress achieved in its proscribed missile programmes. This required the Commission to resume verification of those areas.

33. During the reporting period, the Commission made progress in the verification of the new full, final and complete disclosure of July 1996. However, in a number of cases, the Commission found that it was incorrect and incomplete. A new impetus was given through the December round of political level talks between the Deputy Prime Minister and the Chairman with Iraq's undertaking to address thoroughly the Commission's concerns. After December, Iraq submitted a number of new papers related to the issues discussed at the meeting. These are currently under study.

35. Since the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq has continued undeclared missile programmes. The Commission has uncovered specific cases of proscribed missile activities. Iraq has also been engaged in covert acquisition of missile components and technologies. Such Iraqi activities remain under close scrutiny and are being investigated both through ongoing monitoring and special inspections.

36. -

Extracts from S/1997/774 dated 6 October 1997. (4th report under UN Resolution 1051)

22. With respect to the first task, the July 1997 programme of work put special emphasis on achieving a solid and verifiable material balance in the relevant areas.


23. The core of Iraq's proscribed missile force was 819 long-range operational missiles that Iraq imported in the period ending in 1988. As a result of its inspections, investigations and analysis over the past six years, the Commission is now in a position to be able to account for 817 of those 819 missiles. The following table presents the accounting for 817 missiles by category of expenditures or disposal:


Note. Sources of accounting for each of the missiles vary. In most cases, accounting has been provided through Iraqi documentation. In some cases, multiple sources have provided corroborative accounting. In the case of unilateral destruction, accounting has been provided, for example, by reference to a key numbered component of an engine.

24. During the reporting period, the Commission carried out laboratory analysis of remnants of those missiles which were declared by Iraq as unilaterally destroyed in July and October 1991. As a result, the Commission has identified remnants of engines from 83 out of 85 missiles declared as unilaterally destroyed. The Commission is grateful to the Governments of France, the Russian Federation and the United States of America for providing facilities and other support for this work.

25. As is indicated in paragraph 20 above, the complete accounting of proscribed missile operational assets should also include key elements such as launchers, warheads and propellants.


31. The accounting of proscribed missile warheads has not yet been completed. The August 1997 excavation of missile warheads that Iraq claimed it had unilaterally destroyed produced findings that require further work to enable the Commission to verify relevant Iraqi declarations. In this area, it is essential to recognize that there is a major overlap between proscribed missile activities and chemical/biological weapons activities. During his September 1997 visit to Iraq, the Executive Chairman asked Iraq to undertake specific actions to enable the Commission to verify the accounting for special warheads for missiles. These have not yet been undertaken by Iraq. The Commission is pursuing this matter.


55. As the result of its verification efforts, the Commission has obtained, with some degree of confidence, a reasonable understanding of Iraq's CW activities in the period prior to 1988, with the exception of those quantities of chemical warfare agents and munitions which, according to Iraq, had been consumed or unilaterally destroyed. With respect to the latter phase of its chemical warfare programme in 1989 and 1990, instead of providing unilateral disclosure of the full extent of its proscribed CW activities as required by the Council, Iraq has only addressed issues on which the evidence of its inconsistencies has been made clear to it by the Commission.

56. In verifying Iraq's chemical FFCD, the Commission identified some other areas of concern related to Iraq's chemical warfare programme. The most important among them are the accounting for special missile warheads intended for filling with chemical or biological warfare agent, the material balance of 155 mm mustard shells, the extent of the VX programme and the rationale for the acquisition of various types of CW. These areas need to be clarified by Iraq.

57. One element of Iraq's presentation illustrates certain of the Commission's problems. Iraq states that a flight test of an indigenously produced Scud warhead, filled with a chemical agent simulant, was conducted in 1985. It stated that the reason for the test was to determine if it were possible for another country to threaten Iraq by such a means. It claimed to have learned from the test that this was possible. It then claimed further that it did no further work in response to this discovery and did not restart its special warhead development until five years later, in 1990. Iraq claimed that it then designed, developed, produced and began filling special warheads in less than three months. Two such warheads were flight-tested. Apart from finding this narrative unconvincing, the Commission affirms that it is unable to verify it at present.

58. On the issue of the accounting for special warheads for Al Hussein missiles, Iraq now maintains that 80 warheads were produced in total, namely, 50 for chemical, 25 for biological and 5 for trials of CW. Special warheads for the Al Hussein missiles were filled with both chemical and biological agents prior to the Gulf War. Iraq's declarations on the types and quantities of warheads have changed several times during the past six years. Iraq's accounting for these munitions is illustrated in the table below:


59. The Commission has been able to establish that the minimum number of warheads filled with chemical and biological warfare agents was 75, and 5 additional warheads were used for trials. In addition to those special warheads, the Commission has evidence of the probable existence of a number of additional special warheads. The question of how many and which of the declared special warheads were filled with various types of chemical and biological warfare agents may only be able to be answered after the verification of Iraq's biological weapons FFCD presented to the Commission one month ago, seven years after it was demanded by the Security Council.

60. At present, the Commission is only able to verify that 16 warheads were filled with sarin and 34 with chemical warfare binary components. The Commission has confirmed the destruction of 30 chemical warheads under its supervision (16 filled with sarin and 14 with binary components). It is also able to confirm, in part, the unilateral destruction by Iraq of a portion of the 45 other special warheads. It is impossible to confirm the destruction of all of these 45 special warheads because of the absence of data from Iraq. Those data, sought by the Commission, include filling records of agents for the warheads, clarifications of inconsistencies in the destruction documents and the physical retrieval of remnants of special warheads. In September 1997, Iraq was once again requested to provide the documentation required for such verification. No response has been given.

61. In June 1996, Iraq declared some 550 artillery munitions (155 mm) filled with mustard chemical warfare agent to have been destroyed during the Gulf War. However, Iraq has not been able to provide evidence of destroyed munitions. In August 1997, Iraq was asked to clarify the circumstances related to the declared destruction. Those data have not yet been provided.

VX -

Further extract from S/1997/774.

C. Biological weapons

82. A note provided by Iraq describes receipt and destruction of Al Hussein special warheads at Al Nibai on 9 July 1991. This note has been subject to many discussions with Iraq during which Iraq has essentially discredited information contained in this document. Interview testimony by Iraq's personnel did not support the official account. Even with the recent changes introduced by Iraq into its FFCD, there is evidence that no activities occurred, as described by Iraq, on that date.

Further extract from S/1997/774.

106. For example, it is established that Iraq decided, in April 1991, to divide its missile force into two parts. It would present one part to the Commission for destruction and illegally retain the second part. Iraq claims it subsequently decided to destroy the retained missile force, unilaterally. It was claimed that this unilateral destruction took place in July 1991. The Commission has recently been informed by Iraq, however, that some prohibited weapons and materials were still withheld, even after this unilateral destruction, until October 1991. The Commission has conducted several missions with the objective of determining the full picture of these decisions and actions to include who made the decisions, for what rationale, who was involved in the concealment and when and where subsequent destruction decisions were taken. This information is needed in order to be able to verify fully the facts with respect to Iraq's proscribed missile capability.


Issues of substance

122. Three weapons areas are at issue - missiles, chemical weapons and biological weapons.


123. Significant progress has been achieved in the missile area. The Commission is now in a position to be able to account for practically all, except two, imported combat missiles that were once the core of Iraq's proscribed missile force. The Commission has also accounted for all declared operational missile launchers, both imported and indigenously produced. To achieve the ultimate objective of full disposal of Iraq's proscribed operational missile assets, the next important step is to account for proscribed missile warheads. This is of particular importance as the issue overlaps the chemical and biological weapons areas. Once this is accomplished, the Commission's ability to report to the Security Council with confidence that Iraq does not possess a proscribed missile force would greatly increase. Remaining issues, such as accounting for missile propellants, would not be insurmountable if Iraq would cooperate with the Commission and provide the evidence required to complete the process of verification. More work is still required to achieve the same results in the area of Iraq's indigenous production of proscribed missile systems.

© 1996, 1997 UNSCOM