1991 Scud missile numbers...
1991 Gulf War casualty figures...
1991 UN Resolution 687...
1994 UNSCOM report...
1995 Defection of Hussein Kamal...
Summary of Scud missile counts - 1991 Gulf War - from various sources:
US Department of Defense = 88
Iraq / UNSCOM / H.M. Govt. September dossier (p.16) = 93
UK Ministry of Defence = 102
Missing Soviet Scuds = 2
Missing Iraqi indigenous Scuds = 7
Missing 'special' chemical warheads = 9
http://www.iraqwatch.org/un/UNSCOM/s-1998-176.htm (enclosure II)
(102-93 = 9) ( 7+2 = 9) ( 79-70 = 9)
UN 'Cluster Document' unaccounted for 'training' missiles = 14?
(102-88 = 14?)
© Copyright 2004 SCUDWATCH
Reported U.S. Military figures vary according to source. One contemporary Central Command account mentions 352 American deaths (151 combat and 201 non-combat). A second published record of the period, allegedly from Department of Defence sources, gives figures of only 231 deaths (124 combat and 107 non-combat), with 357 wounded-in-action, and another 21 still listed as missing-in-action. These included the 14 man crew of an AC-130 Spectre aircraft hit by an Iraqi SAM missile on January 31st 1991. A third U.S. Government source gave a total of 390 American fatalities (148 combat and 242 non-combat), with another 458 wounded-in-action.
Further details from Rick Atkinson's book: 'Crusade - The Untold Story of the Gulf War' (HarperCollins - 1994):
'Dover's goal was to identify every corpse, to have no unknown soldiers from the Persian Gulf War. The mortuary staff had quadrupled in size, and the building expansion was nearly complete. But with so many bodies anticipated, the mortuary doubted it could provide proper honour guard to receive each fallen soldier with a dignified ceremony. Thus, the Pentagon on January 21 had declared Dover off limits to the media, which would inevitably want to shoot demoralizing television footage of America's heroes being unloaded with a forklift.'
© Copyright 1993 Rick Atkinson
From the U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2001:
National Defense and Veterans Affairs
Disabled Veterans Receiving Compensation: 1980 to 2000
© Copyright 2001 U.S. Census Bureau
RESOLUTION 687 (1991)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2981st meeting,
on 3 April 1991
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 665 (1990) of 25 August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 September 1990, 667 (1990) of 16 September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 September 1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990, 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990, 677 (1990) of 28 November 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990 and 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991,
Welcoming the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate Government,
Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq, and noting the intention expressed by the Member States cooperating with Kuwait under paragraph 2 of resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with paragraph 8 of resolution 686 (1991),
Reaffirming the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait,
Taking note of the letter sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq on 27 February 1991 and those sent pursuant to resolution 686 (1991),
Noting that Iraq and Kuwait, as independent sovereign States, signed at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters", thereby recognizing formally the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and the allocation of islands, which were registered with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and in which Iraq recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait within its borders as specified and accepted in the letter of the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 21 July 1932, and as accepted by the Ruler of Kuwait in his letter dated 10 August 1932,
Conscious of the need for demarcation of the said boundary,
Conscious also of the statements by Iraq threatening to use weapons in violation of its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of its prior use of chemical weapons and affirming that grave consequences would follow any further use by Iraq of such weapons,
Recalling that Iraq has subscribed to the Declaration adopted by all States participating in the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, establishing the objective of universal elimination of chemical and biological weapons,
Recalling also that Iraq has signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972,
Noting the importance of Iraq ratifying this Convention,
Noting moreover the importance of all States adhering to this Convention and encouraging its forthcoming Review Conference to reinforce the authority, efficiency and universal scope of the convention,
Stressing the importance of an early conclusion by the Conference on Disarmament of its work on a Convention on the Universal Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and of universal adherence thereto,
Aware of the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles in unprovoked attacks and therefore of the need to take specific measures in regard to such missiles located in Iraq,
Concerned by the reports in the hands of Member States that Iraq has attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons programme contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968,
Recalling the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the region of the Middle East,
Conscious of the threat that all weapons of mass destruction pose to peace and security in the area and of the need to work towards the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of such weapons,
Conscious also of the objective of achieving balanced and comprehensive control of armaments in the region,
Conscious further of the importance of achieving the objectives noted above using all available means, including a dialogue among the States of the region,
Noting that resolution 686 (1991) marked the lifting of the measures imposed by resolution 661 (1990) in so far as they applied to Kuwait,
Noting that despite the progress being made in fulfilling the obligations of resolution 686 (1991), many Kuwaiti and third country nationals are still not accounted for and property remains unreturned,
Recalling the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, opened for signature at New York on 18 December 1979, which categorizes all acts of taking hostages as manifestations of international terrorism,
Deploring threats made by Iraq during the recent conflict to make use of terrorism against targets outside Iraq and the taking of hostages by Iraq,
Taking note with grave concern of the reports of the Secretary-General of 20 March 1991 and 28 March 1991, and conscious of the necessity to meet urgently the humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq,
Bearing in mind its objective of restoring international peace and security in the area as set out in recent resolutions of the Security Council,
Conscious of the need to take the following measures acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
1. Affirms all thirteen resolutions noted above, except as expressly changed below to achieve the goals of this resolution, including a formal cease-fire;
2. Demands that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary and the allocation of islands set out in the "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters", signed by them in the exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 and registered with the United Nations and published by the United Nations in document 7063, United Nations, Treaty Series, 1964;
3. Calls upon the Secretary-General to lend his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, drawing on appropriate material, including the map transmitted by Security Council document S/22412 and to report back to the Security Council within one month;
4. Decides to guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international boundary and to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
5. Requests the Secretary-General, after consulting with Iraq and Kuwait, to submit within three days to the Security Council for its approval a plan for the immediate deployment of a United Nations observer unit to monitor the Khor Abdullah and a demilitarized zone, which is hereby established, extending ten kilometres into Iraq and five kilometres into Kuwait from the boundary referred to in the "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters" of 4 October 1963; to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone; to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one State to the other; and for the Secretary-General to report regularly to the Security Council on the operations of the unit, and immediately if there are serious violations of the zone or potential threats to peace;
6. Notes that as soon as the Secretary-General notifies the Security Council of the completion of the deployment of the United Nations observer unit, the conditions will be established for the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end consistent with resolution 686 (1991);
7. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972;
8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:
(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;
(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities;
9. Decides, for the implementation of paragraph 8 above, the following:
(a) Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution, a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site inspection as specified below;
(b) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the appropriate Governments and, where appropriate, with the Director-General of the World Health Organization, within forty-five days of the passage of the present resolution, shall develop, and submit to the Council for approval, a plan calling for the completion of the following acts within forty-five days of such approval:
(i) The forming of a Special Commission, which shall carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission itself;
(ii) The yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless, taking into account the requirements of public safety, of all items specified under paragraph 8 (a) above, including items at the additional locations designated by the Special Commission under paragraph 9 (b) (i) above and the destruction by Iraq, under the supervision of the Special Commission, of all its missile capabilities, including launchers, as specified under paragraph 8 (b) above;
(iii) The provision by the Special Commission of the assistance and cooperation to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency required in paragraphs 12 and 13 below;
10. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items specified in paragraphs 8 and 9 above and requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Commission, to develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with this paragraph, to be submitted to the Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of this resolution;
11. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968;
12. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above; to submit to the Secretary-General and the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts, and types of all items specified above; to place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General discussed in paragraph 9 (b) above; to accept, in accordance with the arrangements provided for in paragraph 13 below, urgent on-site inspection and the destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items specified above; and to accept the plan discussed in paragraph 13 below for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of its compliance with these undertakings;
13. Requests the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, through the Secretary-General, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General in paragraph 9 (b) above, to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission; to develop a plan for submission to the Security Council within forty-five days calling for the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items listed in paragraph 12 above; to carry out the plan within forty-five days following approval by the Security Council; and to develop a plan, taking into account the rights and obligations of Iraq under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 above, including an inventory of all nuclear material in Iraq subject to the Agency's verification and inspections to confirm that Agency safeguards cover all relevant nuclear activities in Iraq, to be submitted to the Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of the present resolution;
14. Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the present resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons;
15. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the steps taken to facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, including a list of any property that Kuwait claims has not been returned or which has not been returned intact;
16. Reaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait;
17. Decides that all Iraqi statements made since 2 August 1990 repudiating its foreign debt are null and void, and demands that Iraq adhere scrupulously to all of its obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt;
18. Decides also to create a fund to pay compensation for claims that fall within paragraph 16 above and to establish a Commission that will administer the fund;
19. Directs the Secretary-General to develop and present to the Security Council for decision, no later than thirty days following the adoption of the present resolution, recommendations for the fund to meet the requirement for the payment of claims established in accordance with paragraph 18 above and for a programme to implement the decisions in paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 above, including: administration of the fund; mechanisms for determining the appropriate level of Iraq's contribution to the fund based on a percentage of the value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq not to exceed a figure to be suggested to the Council by the Secretary-General, taking into account the requirements of the people of Iraq, Iraq's payment capacity as assessed in conjunction with the international financial institutions taking into consideration external debt service, and the needs of the Iraqi economy; arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the fund; the process by which funds will be allocated and claims paid; appropriate procedures for evaluating losses, listing claims and verifying their validity and resolving disputed claims in respect of Iraq's liability as specified in paragraph 16 above; and the composition of the Commission designated above;
20. Decides, effective immediately, that the prohibitions against the sale or supply to Iraq of commodities or products, other than medicine and health supplies, and prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall not apply to foodstuffs notified to the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait or, with the approval of that Committee, under the simplified and accelerated "no-objection" procedure, to materials and supplies for essential civilian needs as identified in the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 March 1991, and in any further findings of humanitarian need by the Committee;
21. Decides that the Security Council shall review the provisions of paragraph 20 above every sixty days in the light of the policies and practices of the Government of Iraq, including the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Security Council, for the purpose of determining whether to reduce or lift the prohibitions referred to therein;
22. Decides that upon the approval by the Security Council of the programme called for in paragraph 19 above and upon Council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions contemplated in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 above, the prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall have no further force or effect;
23. Decides that, pending action by the Security Council under paragraph 22 above, the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) shall be empowered to approve, when required to assure adequate financial resources on the part of Iraq to carry out the activities under paragraph 20 above, exceptions to the prohibition against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq;
24. Decides that, in accordance with resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent related resolutions and until a further decision is taken by the Security Council, all States shall continue to prevent the sale or supply, or the promotion or facilitation of such sale or supply, to Iraq by their nationals, or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of:
(a) Arms and related materiel of all types, specifically including the sale or transfer through other means of all forms of conventional military equipment, including for paramilitary forces, and spare parts and components and their means of production, for such equipment;
(b) Items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above not otherwise covered above;
(c) Technology under licensing or other transfer arrangements used in the production, utilization or stockpiling of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;
(d) Personnel or materials for training or technical support services relating to the design, development, manufacture, use, maintenance or support of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;
25. Calls upon all States and international organizations to act strictly in accordance with paragraph 24 above, notwithstanding the existence of any contracts, agreements, licences or any other arrangements;
26. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with appropriate Governments, to develop within sixty days, for the approval of the Security Council, guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24 and 25 above and paragraph 27 below, and to make them available to all States and to establish a procedure for updating these guidelines periodically;
27. Calls upon all States to maintain such national controls and procedures and to take such other actions consistent with the guidelines to be established by the Security Council under paragraph 26 above as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of paragraph 24 above, and calls upon international organizations to take all appropriate steps to assist in ensuring such full compliance;
28. Agrees to review its decisions in paragraphs 22, 23, 24 and 25 above, except for the items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above, on a regular basis and in any case one hundred and twenty days following passage of the present resolution, taking into account Iraq's compliance with the resolution and general progress towards the control of armaments in the region;
29. Decides that all States, including Iraq, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iraq, or of any person or body in Iraq, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in resolution 661 (1990) and related resolutions;
30. Decides that, in furtherance of its commitment to facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals, Iraq shall extend all necessary cooperation to the International Committee of the Red Cross, providing lists of such persons, facilitating the access of the International Committee of the Red Cross to all such persons wherever located or detained and facilitating the search by the International Committee of the Red Cross for those Kuwaiti and third country nationals still unaccounted for;
31. Invites the International Committee of the Red Cross to keep the Secretary-General apprised as appropriate of all activities undertaken in connection with facilitating the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990;
32. Requires Iraq to inform the Security Council that it will not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of such acts to operate within its territory and to condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism;
33. Declares that, upon official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council of its acceptance of the provisions above, a formal cease-fire is effective between Iraq and Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990);
34. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area.
© Copyright 1991 United Nations
(Source: United States Senate, 103d Congress, 2d Session, May 25 1994.)
On 30th July 1991, Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Director of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), charged with overseeing the elimination of Iraq's Chemical, Biological and Nuclear arsenals, told the Security Council that the U.N. Inspectors had found chemical warheads armed with nerve gas. Mr. Ekeus claimed that some warheads found were already fitted to Scud missiles. Of particular concern were the chemical warheads of Al-Hussein modified Scud missiles, each filled with five gallons of Sarin. Twenty-eight of these warheads were drained and destroyed by U.S. Inspectors. These weapons were not destroyed at the Muthanna gasworks by Gulf War bombing, because they had been moved to other locations before the war had started.
© Copyright 1994 U.S. Senate
On August 22nd 1995 Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, the then Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, along with Prof. Maurizio Zifferero of the International Atomic Energy Agency and Nikita Smidovich, former Deputy Director for Operations of UNSCOM, met and interviewed General Hussein Kamal.
General Kamal (elsewhere spelled 'Kamel') was Saddam Hussein's son-in-law and the former director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation (MIC), and he had been in overall material charge of Iraq's weapons manufacturing programme. He had defected to Jordan in August 1995 and taken with him considerable amounts of documentation (elsewhere referred to as being in 'crates') relating to Iraq’s WMD programmes.
The fact that this debriefing had been carried out was kept secret until UK academic Glen Rangwala was sent a copy of the debriefing notes annotated 'UNSCOM/IAEA SENSITIVE' on February 26th 2003. As a result of this disclosure, and due to the fact that this document was circulating on the Internet, UNMOVIC, who by this time replaced had UNSCOM as the UN designated weapons inspection agency in Iraq, placed their copy on their own website at:
On page 13 of the transcript of this interview, General Kamal is recorded as stating categorically: "I ordered destruction of all chemical weapons. All weapons - biological, chemical, missile, nuclear were destroyed".
With regard to Scud missiles, General Kamal spoke quite extensively, describing the eradication of prohibited missiles by the Iraqi regime as: "not a single missile left but they had blueprints and molds for production. All missiles were destroyed."
The sections of the briefing notes relating to Iraq’s missile capabilities are reproduced below:
(Page 8 of 15)
General Hussein Kamal - I made the decision to disclose everything so that Iraq could return to normal.
Smidovich started to explain Iraq's acquisition from the Soviet Union of 819 missiles and 11 launchers.
General Hussein Kamal - not a single missile left but they had blueprints and molds for production. All missiles were destroyed.
Smidovich - what about launchers?
General Hussein Kamal - I don't have precise information but I know that two Russian launchers were hidden by the Special Forces. One was in dismantled status; and the second was complete. There was also a missile and a launcher from Yemen. During the Gulf War the missile was hit. The Russian missile was extremely accurate and they want to produce them in Iraq because we have only Luna and SCUD missiles. They want to produce such missiles in Iraq and they studied gyroscopes for pinpoint accuracy. Now they are working with Ukraine to modify gyroscopes.
Smidovich referred back to two SCUD launchers.
General Hussein Kamal - these two launchers are with the Special Guards. They are hidden in the same location where computer disks with information on nuclear programmes are.
If you find one you will find the other. It is difficult to pinpoint a specific location. President Saddam's son, Qussay, knew where they are. Also General Kamal Mustafa knows. He was with the Special Guards and now he is with the Republican Guard.
Smidovich asked why they had decided to keep launchers while all missiles had been destroyed.
General Hussein Kamal - it is the first step to return to production. All blueprints for missiles are in a safe place - those for Al Hussein or longer range.
Smidovich - you mean for their own production?
General Hussein Kamal - yes, for Al Hussein. They produced engines for Al Hussein. Some parts were purchased up to a thousand. They were all destroyed. Most important was gyros. There are two missiles - one worked by General Raad and another by Dr. Modher. They had two designs and worked for one year. One is of aluminium and another is of steel. The engines have differences and gyros are different. Warheads are also different. The aluminium missiles are lighter and have bigger warheads. Raad is working on them. Steel missiles have smaller warheads.
Smidovich - are you referring to Ababil 100 missiles with a range of 150km?
General Hussein Kamal - there was Ababil 100. They also produced missiles with a 50km range. Dr. Modher also worked on a motor design for a missile with a range of 3,000 km. He had blueprints.
Smidovich - was this two-stage or a single stage missile?
General Hussein Kamal - a single stage with a very big engine. It was a vertical launch. They also did some studies on cruise missiles after the war. You know, some US cruise missiles landed intact, so they studied them.
Smidovich asked about Chinese involvement in 3,000km missile.
General Hussein Kamal - It was only design. There was a Czech professor who helped Modher with this. He worked before the war. An engine for a 150km missile is even more difficult than an engine for 3,000km range missiles. Smaller engines are more complicated. It's a lot easier to work with big ones. They had only blueprints, nothing was implemented. After engines they needed to work on gyros, fuel and launchers. But fuel was not a problem. It was easy to make both liquid and solid. They succeeded in manfacturing solid propellants in a new way. They succeeded in giving more power to solid propellant.
Smidovich returned to the issue of two SCUD launchers.
General Hussein Kamal - the only thing I know is that they have them. The two launchers are at the same location as computer disks. Both Mudif Ubeidi and Modher have a lot of information on microfiches. People who work in MIC were asked to take documents to their houses. I think you will have a new war of searches.
Amb. Ekeus - the launcher issue is very sensitive,
General Hussein Kamal - I have a person with me who had a farm where molds for missiles were hidden. I will call for him.
Smidovich - there were some rumours that you had been present at missile tests in 1989 on a chemical biological weapons test in late 1990.
General Hussein Kamal - I have not been present at any tests. They need 2 or 3 days to conduct tests. There were no flight tests of biological or chemical warheads. Possibly there could have been a test of chemical but I don't remember.
Major Ezzeddin arrived at 9.40 pm.
Major Ezzeddin - I remember there were two molds hidden in my farm but they were taken away in 1992. As to the two launchers, I don't know.
General Hussein Kamal - two launchers are with the Special Guards. They are moved. One is totally disassembled but the other is complete. I don't understand why you consider launchers to be a big problem. In MIC, they could build launchers anytime.
Smidovich asked if other components were remaining in Iraq.
General Hussein Kamal - In Al Hussein they had Soviet- made gyroscopes not Iraqi ones. They were building a factory to produce gyroscopes in Iraq. They also ordered gyroscopes in the United Kingdom. Are you aware of this?
Smidovich said that the Special Commission was aware that the gyroscope parts were ordered by Iraq through Mr. Aws Hassan and his company, Cimarron. These parts were to be manufactured by different British companies but primarily at Norcroft.
General Hussein Kamal mumbled something in Arabic. In 1993 they tried to obtain gyroscopes from Russia. General Naim wanted to order them from Russia after the war but went to Ukraine.
Smidovich said that UNSCOM had a protocol between Iraq and Ukraine.
General Hussein Kamal - this was not for complete gyro system. It was to get know-how for missiles with a 150km range.
Smidovich asked him about a project related to a supersonic retarding parachute.
General Hussein Kamal - this was a preliminary work for modification of SCUD. But in general, we do not need to minimize the speed as separation succeeded. The faster the warhead is moving, the more difficult it is to intercept. This was the whole purpose. At the beginning, we have done some modification tests but it was stopped. The more speed, the better. This is the difference between Al Hussien and SCUD. Although Al Hussein has less explosive in a warhead,
it has more destructive power than SCUD because its speed is higher and it is more difficult to intercept.
Amb. Ekeus - could parachute system be related to a delivery of unconventional warhead so that one gets effective dispersal of agents? Otherwise, missiles will explode inside the ground.
General Hussein Kamal - if you are referring to chemical and biological warheads, they exploded before impact. We tested this method. We used proximity fuses. These fuses are also used in artillery shells and we used them. These are fuses from devices to install mines. We fired missiles with such fuses against Iran and they did explode before impact. Smidovich said that usually fuses from artillery shells would not work in missiles.
General Hussein Kamal - no, they are exactly the same as artillery. They measure distance from ground and explode. It is not easy to do. They were originally tested even with missiles that exploded in the air. Ababil 50 missiles are used to disperse landmines and they use the same fuzes. There were two groups working on proximity fuses - one under General Saadi and the other - General Rashid. Each of them had his own team that worked in parallel.
Smidovich - you are saying that warhead separation succeeded?
General Hussein Kamal - yes. At the very beginning they used parachute. But when they succeeded in separation, they stopped parachutes. Parachutes were only used for a short period in 1986, ten years ago.
Smidovich - so separation succeeded?
General Hussein Kamal - that's how we bombed Israel. Warheads separated in Israel. They must be separated for accuracy and speed. During the war, I was in the southern area and I received reports that Israel claimed that they shot down some of our missiles. I asked why. I was asking because I was more involved in manufacturing. I was told that Patriot missiles were actually hitting the body of missiles not the warheads.
Smidovich - there was a report that only one missile was destroyed by Patriot.
General Hussein Kamal - one or two were hit by Patriots but it was by chance, not accuracy. They fired many missiles against each incoming missile. We did a lot of studies of missile interception and what is the best solution - separation. We even had concrete missile warheads.
Smidovich - you mean Al Hijara missiles?
General Hussein Kamal - yes.
Smidovich - 5 missiles were fired?
General Hussein Kamal - The Americans and Europeans are spending a lot of money to produce interceptor missiles but the Russians are more advanced in this. In my View, it is a waste of money especially against multiple warheads.
Amb. Ekeus - The Patriot company should have become very rich.
General Hussein Kamal - I was with the General Staff and moved to the Presidential Security: the Special Guards. Then I was put in charge of the Republican Guard with only 30 people. The Republican Guard became very effective and contributed to the end of the war with Iran. I remember the battle called "Crown of Battles". We surprised the Iranians. The Iranians came in by boats along the Tigris River and blocked a road from Al Amara to Basrah. They moved into Hawr a1 Hammar. So they cut 1.5 million dunas of the Iraqi land. At that moment, the Republican Guard went into action. It was heavily armed. I was in Saudi Arabia to meet Crown Prince Abdullah. The Saudis were very worried. Their plan suggested a counterattack but I explained to Abdullah that the Iraqis can ouster the Iranians in 24 hours. The Iranians were well equipped with artillery, tanks and infantry but the Republican Guard pushed them out in 48 hrs. After that I came to the military industries. One of my first tasks was to produce rubber boats. I asked for authority to produce them. Before that, the Army was looking everywhere for them. But we bought fibre-glass and epoxy resin and soon we were producing 80 boats a day. This was our measure to counterattack in case of future attacks. We also built big boats for the Navy. They were 18 to 22 metres long and equipped with MLRS and machine guns. We operated them from the Gulf So the Iranians taught us about boats. We also installed 81mm launch tubes, bought from Italy, on these boats. They were specially purchased as there were no such mortars in the Iraqi Army. You know, the plantations are very high in the Gulf and the Iranians used this as cover. So we need to take countermeasures. Iraq built boats with mini hovers and clean the plantations. We also used to lob ammunitions. Before me, the military industries were under Taha Jazravi. They were producing 5-6 shells per day and 120 mortar shells per day. I came in and numbers changed. We spent a lot of time on this. This is how my involvement with the military industries started. It was by the necessity of war. Before that, if someone would offer 2,000 artillery rounds, they would immediately send aircraft to pick them up. There was a desperate need.
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