Collection 2


Designation of a Combat Zone...

The Envoy and the King of Jordan...

1990 DoD assessment...

January 4th 1991 assessment...

January 25th 1991 assessment...



Designation of a Combat Zone...



Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Designation of the Arabian Peninsula as a Combat Zone

January 21 1991

The President today signed an Executive order designating the Arabian Peninsula areas, airspace, and adjacent waters as a combat zone. This designation means that for Federal tax purposes military pay received by enlisted personnel while serving in the combat zone will be exempt from tax. For commissioned officers in the combat zone the exclusion is limited to $500 a month.

© Copyright 1991 The White House



The King of Jordan...



From Rick Atkinson's book 'Crusade - The Untold Story of the Gulf War'

Published by HarperCollins (1994)

ISBN 0 00 638324 6

Chapter 4 (part):

'As Eagleburger and Wolfowitz performed their kabuka rituals in Israel, another envoy flew to Amman for a different kind of dance with Jordan's King Hussein. Richard L. Armitage, a former Defence Department assistant secretary now working for Baker, had spent three tours in Vietnam after graduating from the Naval Academy. Son of a Boston street cop, he possessed a barrel chest, a voice like a rock slide, and the reputation of an official enforcer periodically dispatched for what he called ''the wet work'' of American diplomacy - thrashing an recalcitrant adversary without leaving any permanent scars. At 11:00 on Monday, January 21, he arrived at the royal palace for lunch and a blunt conversation.

'King Hussein was playing a dangerous game. Although the Jordanian monarch was said to be a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, Hussein ruled less than by divine right than by guile and an ability to play off one opponent against another. The subjects of his small kingdom overwhelmingly supported Iraq. Four hundred newborn males in Jordan had been named Saddam since the invasion of Kuwait, and others now bore the name Scud. Barbers in Palestinian refugee camps reported a great demand for Saddam-style mustaches, and hundreds of women has tramped through the Jordanian capital chanting, ''Saddam, our beloved, hit Tel Aviv with chemicals.''

'While privately assuring the Americans and Israelis that he was merely appeasing ''my people in the street'' by rhetorically supporting Baghdad, the King was also suspected of turning a blind eye to rampant smuggling across the border in defiance of the United Nations embargo. During Desert Storm, the White House had warned Hussein that he risked forfeiting Washington's economic assistance if he failed to join the chorus condemning Iraq.

'Armitage was not unsympathetic to the king's predicament. By the standards of Middle East royalty, Hussein was something of a populist; his support of democratic ideals had earned him rancour and snubs from the reactionary monarchs of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Armitage suspected that Hussein had endorsed Saddam's efforts to frighten the ''Gucci sheikhs'' of Kuwait before he realised that Iraq would invade and pillage the emirate. Now, Armitage believed, the king was like an errant youth who had succumbed to the pressure to join in a robbery only to find himself an accessory to murder after the victim was shot.

'Armitage found Hussein wearing an open-necked shirt and a gaudy cowboy belt, smiling nervously and gripping the arms of his chair as though awaiting the first truncheon blow of the inevitable wet work. Instead, the American played good cop to his own bad cop image. It is very much in Jordan's interest to refrain from attacking Israeli jets if they overfly your country, Armitage said. "We're going to get past this. We've got some immediate business to deal with now," he added, ''but the United States respects Jordan.'' Hussein sighed and settled back into his chair as the court chamberlain handed him a cigarette. The king, Armitage realised was utterly petrified.

"Be very clear in telling Saddam Hussein," Armitage advised, "that the use of weapons of mass destruction will be dealt with in the harshest fashion." The king nodded and replied, ''I do not think they will use chemical weapons.''

© Copyright 1993 Rick Atkinson



1990 DoD assessment...



From the DoD GulfLINK website (obtained elsewhere under the US Freedom of Information Act):

(N.B. Redactions indicated thus)

IIR 6 832 0872 90/[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] VIEWS ON IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY - PART II TFKU01 (U)

Filename:68320872.90r
PATHFINDER RECORD NUMBER: 37553
GENDATE: 950504
NNNN
TEXT:
ENVELOPE CDSN = LGX674 MCN = 90246/21676 TOR = 902461458
OTTSZYUW RUEKJCS6064 2461459---RUEALGX.
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RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
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RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUEDADA/AFIS AMHS BOLLING AFB DC
RUFTAKA/CDR USAINTELCTRE HEIDELBERG GE
RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKCCG/USDP-CCC WASHINGTON DC
RUETIAQ/MPCFTGEORGEGMEADEMD
[ (b)(2) ]
RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
RUQYSDG/FOSIF ROTA SP
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT REAR MACDILL AFB FL //CARA//
[ (b)(2) ]
RUEAIJU/NPIC WASHINGTON DC//IEG//
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2//
RUFTAKA/USA INTEL CENTER HEIDELBERG GE
RUFTAKC/UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
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RHFPRWO/RWO RAMSTEIN AB GE//IN/IV/SP//
RUDOGHA/USNMR SHAPE BE//SURVEY//
RUEALGX/SAFE
O 031456Z SEP 90
FM [ (b)(2) ]
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAT-7// IMMEDIATE
INFO RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2// IMMEDIATE
RUSNTCC/JIC-EUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGB-C(RE)// IMMEDIATE
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RUQYSDG/FOSIF ROTA SP IMMEDIATE
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RUENAAA/CNO WASHDC//OP-092/OP-06// IMMEDIATE
RUDMNIC/COMNAVINTCOM WASHDC//NIC-03// IMMEDIATE
RUDMNSC/NAVTECHINTCEN WASHDC
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//J2// IMMEDIATE
RUHGBAA/COMIDEASTFOR IMMEDIATE
RUFRSCC/CJTFME IMMEDIATE
RHHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI IMMEDIATE
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RHHMBRA/FICPAC PEARL HARBOR HI
RUHGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT
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RUFRJRS/USS SARATOGA IMMEDIATE
RUHGIKE/USS DWIGHT D EISENHOWER IMMEDIATE
RUFRQJQ/COMSIXTHFLT IMMEDIATE
RHDIAAA/HQTAC LANGLEY AFB VA//IN//
RUCUAAA/HQSAC OFFUTT AFB NE//IN//
RUCIAEA/HQFTD WPAFB OH//XOCRI//
[ (b)(2) ]
RUDMNOP/NAVOPINTCEN SUITLAND MD IMMEDIATE
RUDMNSC/NAVTECHINTCEN WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHDLSRJ/SRJOIC NAPLES IT IMMEDIATE
[ (b)(2) ]
RUFRSCC/CTG EIGHT ZERO ZERO PT FOUR IMMEDIATE
RUFRSCC/CJTFME//J2/ IMMEDIATE/
RULSNDA/NRL WASHDC//5700// IMMEDIATE
RUHGTIC/USS TICONDEROGA IMMEDIATE
RUCDGDA/CDR USAMICOM REDSTONE ARSENAL AL//AMSMI-SI-F//IMMEDIATE
RUFRSCC/CTG SIX SEVEN POINT FOUR IMMEDIATE
BT
CONTROLS [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]

SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 832 0872 90.

/*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/

BODY COUNTRY: (U) [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]; IRAQ (IZ)

SUBJ: IIR 6 832 0872 90/[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] VIEWS ON IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY - PART II TFKU01 (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

-------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
-------------------------------------------------

DOI: (U) 900829.

REQS: (U) [ (b)(2) ]

SOURCE: [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]

SUMMARY: REPORT FORWARDS NEWLY OBTAINED INFORMATION ON IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE FIGHTING CAPABILITY. IRAQ HAS REPORTEDLY DEVELOPED A COCKTAIL CHEMICAL WEAPON THAT COMBINES MUSTARD GAS AND THE NERVE AGENT SOMAN.

TEXT: 1. IRAQI CHEMICAL "COCKTAIL".

SOURCE INDICATED THAT [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] HAD VERY RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE DEVELOPED A "COCKTAIL" CHEMICAL WEAPON THAT IS A MIXTURE OF MUSTARD GAS AND THE NERVE AGENT SOMAN. SOURCE STRESSED THAT THERE WERE TWO REASONS WHY THE IRAQIS CHOSE TO DEVELOP THIS WEAPON. FIRST, BECAUSE THE VISIBLE GASES ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF MUSTARD GAS ARE NOT PRESENT, DETECTION IS DIFFICULT. SECOND, ACCORDING TO SOURCE, THERE IS NO TREATMENT TO COUNTER THE EFFECTS OF THE COCKTAIL. SOURCE INDICATED THAT THE IRAQIS MAY HAVE DEVELOPED A CAPABILITY TO DELIVER THE COCKTAIL VIA AIRCRAFT, ROCKET LAUNCHERS, OR POSSIBLY SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES.

2. IRAQI TOXIC AGENTS.

SOURCE PROVIDED [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] FOLLOW-UP INFORMATION ON IRAQI AGENTS. THE IRAQIS POSSESS MUSTARD GAS, AND THE NERVE AGENTS -- SOMAN, TABUN, AND SARIN. HYDROCYANIC ACID AND CYANOGEN CHLORIDE ARE ALSO AMONG IRAQI TOXICS EVEN THOUGH THEIR USE IN A VERY DRY CLIMATE IS RISKY. ( [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] COMMENT -- SUGGEST THAT, IN THIS CONTEXT, RISKY MEANS DIFFICULT TO HANDLE.) THE IRAQIS HAVE ALSO CONDUCTED RESEARCH ON BZ, AN AGENT WITH PHYSICAL INCAPACITATING PROPERTIES, AND VX A PERSISTENT NERVE AGENT. THE IRAQIS ARE ESTIMATED TO HAVE AN ANNUAL PRODUCTION CAPACITY OF BETWEEN 1400 AND 2500 TONS OF TOXINS.

3. DELIVERY MEANS.

A. ARTILLERY.

SOURCE INDICATED THAT, DUE TO THEIR LARGE QUANTITY, THERE IS UNDENIABLY A GREAT RISK OF A CHEMICAL ATTACK FROM ARTILLERY SHELLS THAT ARE LARGER THAN 150 MM IN CALIBER. THE MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS OF THE TYPE KNOWN AS "ABABIL," WITH A RANGE OF 50 TO 100 KILOMETERS, ALSO REPRESENT A RISK.

B. AVIATION.

SOURCE STATED THAT AIRCRAFT ARE THE PREFERRED MEANS OF DELIVERING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. ([ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] COMMENT -- SOURCE DID NOT EXPLAIN WHY AIRCRAFT ARE PREFERRED, BUT ONE REASON MAY BE FOR ADDED ACCURACY.) ACCORDING TO SOURCE, THE FOLLOWING IRAQI AIRCRAFT, DEPENDING ON THEIR CONFIGURATION, ARE CAPABLE OF DELIVERING TOXIC-FILLED GRAVITY BOMBS WEIGHING FROM 250 KG TO 1000 KG. --
-- TUPOLEV-16 AND 22
-- SUKKOI-22
-- MIRAGE F-1 EQ
-- MIG-29
THE ABOVE MENTIONED AIRCRAFT ALSO APPARENTLY HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF CARRYING AEROSOL OR SPRAY TANKS WITH TANKAGE OF BETWEEN 100 AND 300 LITERS.

C. SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES.

SOURCE STATED THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO KNOW FOR SURE EXACTLY HOW MUCH OF A THREAT SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES REPRESENT. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] HAVE VERY LITTLE INFORMATION ON THIS THREAT BUT CONCLUDE THAT ONE SHOULD NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY. SOURCE SEEMED CONFIDENT THAT THE 900 KM RANGE AL ABBAS MISSILE HAS BEEN MODIFIED TO CARRY A CHEMICAL WARHEAD. SOURCE INDICATED THAT THE IRAQIS HAD ON THE ORDER OF 100 SUCH MISSILES AND APPROXIMATELY TEN OPERATIONAL LAUNCH RAMPS. SOURCE STATED THAT THE RE-LOAD TIME FOR THE AL ABBAS IS ON THE ORDER OF ONE HOUR. SOURCE INDICATED THAT THE CEP OF THE AL ABBAS WAS ON THE ORDER OF 2 KM. AS FAR AS THE FROG, SCUD, AND AL HUSSEIN MISSILES ARE CONCERNED, SOURCE STATED THAT THESE MISSILES COULD BE MODIFIED TO CARRY A CHEMICAL WARHEAD, BUT HAD NO EVIDENCE THAT THIS HAD ACTUALLY OCCURRED.

4. THEORETICAL CONTAMINATION ZONES.

SOURCE PROVIDED [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] THEORETICAL CONTAMINATION ZONES FOR THREE OF THE FOUR MISSILES. THE DATA PRESENTED IS IN HECTARES AND REPRESENTS THE AREA CONTAMINATED FOR A TRANSIENT AGENT AND A PERSISTENT AGENT.

MISSILE TRANSIENT AGENT PERSISTENT AGENT

AL ABBAS 70 100 TO 150
FROG 7 30 30 TO 50
SCUD B 100 150 TO 250

SOURCE ADDED THAT IN ALL LIKELIHOOD THE CONTAMINATED ZONES WOULD BE SMALLER DUE TO THE EFFECT OF TEMPERATURE. IN URBAN AREAS, IT IS ALSO LIKELY THAT BUILDINGS WOULD SLOW DOWN THE NORMAL PROPAGATION OF TOXICS AGAIN REDUCING THE SIZE OF THE CONTAMINATION ZONE.

COMMENTS: 1. SOURCE COMMENT. SOURCE STRESSED AT LEAST TWICE THAT THE INFORMATION ON THE "COCKTAIL" WEAPON IS CONSIDERED VERY RELIABLE.

2. FIELD COMMENTS. THE POSSIBLE USE OF THE MIG-29 TO DELIVER A GRAVITY WEAPON SEEMS ODD, AND [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] SUGGESTS THAT THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE TREATED WITH SOME DEGREE OF SKEPTICISM. THE USE OF AN AIR-DEFENSE ASSET TO DELIVER CHEMICAL WEAPONS IS UNLIKELY, BUT CANNOT BE RULED OUT. FOR PREVIOUS [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] REPORTING ON [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] VIEWS ON IRAQI CHEMICAL CAPABILITY, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] . [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE IRAQI PREFERRED METHOD OF DELIVERING CHEMICAL WEAPONS IS VIA AIRCRAFT.

//IPSP: (U) PT 1600; PG 1100; PT 1620//.
//COMSOBJ: (U) 141; 111; 143//.
ADMIN PROJ: (U).
COLL: (U) [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
INSTR: (U) US NO.
PREP: (U) [ (b)(2) ]
ACQ: (U) [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
DISSEM: (U) [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
WARNING: (U)

##BT
#6064
INFODATE: 0

© Copyright 1990 DoD



January 4th 1991 assessment...



From the DoD GulfLINK website:

File: 961031_950719_72928819.txt
Page: 72928819
Total Pages: 167

DIA MIDDLE EAST-AFRICA INTSUM 37-91/13 JAN 91. (U)

Filename:72928819
PATHFINDER RECORD NUMBER: 28819
GENDATE: 950605
NNNN
TEXT:
ENVELOPE CDSN = LGX284 MCN = 91014/00948 TOR = 910140113
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS7775 0140111- --RUEALGX.
ZNY
HEADER P 140111Z JAN 91
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
P 131850Z JAN 91
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//JSI-6C//
TO AIG 947
AIG 11841
RHIPAAA/USCINCCENT//CCJ2//
RUDCHAA/ARCENT MAIN//G2//
RHIUFAA/USCENTAF FWD HQS ELEMENT//IN//
RHIPAAA/NAVCENT RIYADH SA//N2//
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RHIIMAA/COMUSMARCENT//G2//
RUAJMAJ/COMNAVFORJAPAN POST YOKOSUKA JA
[ (b)(2) ]
BT
[ (b)(2) ]

SECTION 01 OF 04

/*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/


BODY SUBJ: DIA MIDDLE EAST-AFRICA INTSUM 37-91/13 JAN 91. (U)
))

[ (b)(2) ]
))

IRAQ: AIR FORCE CAPABILITY TO DELIVERY CHEMICAL WEAPONS. AS OF 4 JAN 91
))

MAJOR POINTS
))

1. SHOULD SADDAM HUSAYN DECIDE TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST DESERT SHIELD FORCES, THE IRAQI AIR FORCE WOULD PLAY A CRITICAL ROLE. IT WOULD USE PRIMARILY SU-22/FITTERS AND MIG-23/FLOGGERS TO DELIVER 250- AND 500-KG BOMBS, SUPPLEMENTED BY HELICOPTER-DELIVERED ROCKETS AND AEROSOL SPRAYS.

2. PERSISTENT AND NONPERSISTENT AGENTS WOULD BE USED AGAINS KEY MILITARY TARGETS, SUCH AS AIRFIELDS, COMMAND POSTS, AND LOGISTIC/TROOP CONCENTRATIONS NEAR THE FORWARD LINE OF TROOPS. THE AIR FORCE ALSO MIGHT ATTEMPT TO STRIKE KEY MILITARY OR ECONOMIC TARGETS IN REAR AREAS WITH PERSISTENT AGENTS.
))

DISCUSSION
))

3. THE IRAQI AIR FORCE GAINED VALUABLE EXPERIENCE IN CHEMICAL WARFARE DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, WHEN IT CONDUCTED NUMEROUS CHEMICAL ATTACKS AGAINST IRANIANS AND KURDS. THE FIRST KNOWN USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS EMPLOYED BY THE AIR FORCE OCCURRED IN AUGUST 1983, WHEN SU-22/FITTERS ATTACKED IRANIAN TROOPS IN THE NORTHERN IRAN-IRAQ BORDER AREA. BETWEEN 1983 AND 1988, THE AIR FORCE CONDUCTED AT LEAST 10 MAJOR INCIDENTS OF CHEMICAL WEAPON USE, INVOLVING MORE THAN 100 AIRCRAFT SORTIES. ALTHOUGH AIRCRAFT ARE JUST ONE OF SEVERAL CHEMICAL DELIVERY OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE IRAQIS, AIRCRAFT ARE IRAQ'S ONLY MEANS OF ACCURATELY DELIVERING CHEMICAL WEAPONS BEYOND ARTILLERY RANGE.
))

4. AIR DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND MUNITIONS. IRAQI SU-22/FITTERS AND MIG-23/FLOGGERS CONDUCTED MOST OF THE AIR-LAUNCHED CHEMICAL ATTACKS DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. IRAQ ALSO USED SEVERAL OTHER AIRFRAMES, FIXED-WING AND HELICOPTER, FOR DELIVERING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. A COMPLETE LIST FOLLOWS AND SHOWS THE ORDNANCE USED TO DELIVER AGENTS.
))

AIR DELIVERY SYSTEMS
AIRCRAFT BOMBS ROCKETS SPRAY TANKS CANISTERS

--FIXED WING

SU-17/22/FITTER X
MIG-23/FLOGGER F X
SU-25/FROGFOOT X
MIRAGE F-1(PROB EQ5/16) X
PC-9(AND POSSIBLY PC-7) X
TUCANO X

--HELICOPTERS

MI-26/HALO POSSIBLY POSSIBLY
MI-8/HIP C POSSIBLY X POSSIBLY
MI-24/25/HIND(POSSIBLY) POSSIBLY POSSIBLY POSSIBLY
))

5. THE IRAQI AIR FORCE ALSO COULD EMPLOY OTHER AIRCRAFT IN ITS INVENTORY TO DELIVER CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

6. DURING THE WAR WITH IRAN, 250- AND 500-KG BOMBS WERE THE PREFERRED CHEMICAL ORDNANCE IRAQI AIRCRAFT DELIVERED. FLOGGER F'S AND FITTERS DELIVERED 250-KG BOMBS FILLED WITH MUSTARD AND TABUN. FITTERS, AND PROBABLY FLOGGERS, DELIVERED 500-KG MUSTARD-FILLED BOMBS. IRAQ MAY HAVE DEVELOPED THE CAPABILITY TO USE CLUSTER BOMBS, SOME OF WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN FILLED WITH CHEMICALS SINCE THE END OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. IRAQI HELICOPTERS DROPPED 55-GALLON DRUMS FILLED WITH UNKNOWN CHEMICAL AGENTS (PROBABLY MUSTARD) ONTO FORCES FROM ALTITUDES OF 3,000-4,000 FEET. SPRAY SYSTEMS MOUNTED ON THE MI-8/HIP HELICOPTERS ALSO WERE USED AGAINST TROOP CONCENTRATIONS. IRAQ OUTFITTED AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF HIPS WITH TWO SPRAY TANKS ON THEIR UNDER SIDE, EACH WITH A VOLUME OF 1,000 LITERS. A BO-105, REPORTED NEAR BASRAH IN APRIL 1988, CARRIED A PROBABLE CHEMICAL SPRAY TANK ATTACHED TO THE EXTERIOR NEAR THE COCKPIT; HOWEVER, BO-105 USE FOR DELIVERING CHEMICAL ORDNANCE REMAINS UNCONFIRMED. FINALLY, IRAQ USED 90-MM AIR-TO-SURFACE ROCKETS FILLED WITH CHEMICAL AGENTS, POSSIBLY FIRED BY MI-24/25/HINDS, AGAINST IRANIAN TROOPS.
))

POSSIBLE AIR DELIVERY SYSTEMS
AIRCRAFT BOMBS SPRAY TANKS CANISTERS

--FIXED WING SU-24/FENCER X
MIG-25/FOXBAT X
TU-22/BLINDER X X
TU-16/BADGER X X
L-29/39/ALBATROS X
IL-76/CANDID X X
AN-24/COKE X X
AN-26/CURL X X
AN-12/CUB X X
AN-2/COLT X
--HELICOPTERS

SA-342/GAZELLE X X
MI-2/HOPLITE X X
BO-105 X X

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/

7. THE IRAQI AIR FORCE'S EARLY USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROVED INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE OF POOR EMPLOYMENT TECHNIQUES AND UNFAVORABLE WEATHER. IRAQ INITIALLY EMPLOYED THE SAME TACTICS IT USES FORDELIVERING CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND DID NOT FACTOR IN TERRAIN AND METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS, SUCH AS WIND SPEED AND DIRECTION, HUMIDITY, AND TEMPERATURE. PILOTS DELIVERED CHEMICAL ORDNANCE AT ALTITUDES TOO HIGH TO BE EFFECTIVE OR TOO LOW FOR BOMB FUSES TO FUNCTION PROPERLY, PREVENTING BOMBS FROM DETONATING. THE IRAQIS LATER CORRECTED THESE PROBLEMS BY IMPROVING DELIVERY TECHNIQUES AND BY USING IMPACT FUSES.
))

IRAQI AIR-DELIVERED CHEMICAL WEAPONS
TYPE BOMB TABUN SARIN GF MUSTARD DUSTY MUSTARD
100-KG GENERAL-PURPOSE X
250-KG GENERAL-PURPOSE X X X X X
500-KG GENERAL-PURPOSE X X X X X
90-MM ROCKETS X X
SPRAY TANK POSS. POSS. POSS.
))

8. AIR FORCE CHEMICAL USE OPTIONS AGAINST DESERT SHIELD FORCES. IRAQ MIGHT USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS DEFENSIVELY IN IRAQ OR NORTHERN KUWAIT IF AN ALLIED OFFENSIVE FORCED THEM TO LOSE GROUND. DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, IRAQ INITIALLY EMPLOYED CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS, ALTHOUGH, BY LATE 1987, SADDAM HUSAYN EXTENDED THEIR USE TO OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. SADDAM HAS DEMONSTRATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO EMPLOY CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST CIVILIANS AS IRAQ CONDUCTED CHEMICAL ATTACKS AGAINST THE KURDS IN NORTHERN IRAQ IN MARCH 1987.

9. SINCE THE 2 AUGUST 1990 INVASION OF KUWAIT, POSSIBLE CHEMICAL MUNITION HANDLING HAS BEEN REPORTED AT SEVERAL IRAQI AIRFIELDS. THIS ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE POSSIBLE POSITIONING OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN AIRBASE ORDNANCE BUNKERS FOR AIRCRAFT STATIONED THERE TO USE. NO ACTIVITY HAS BEEN REPORTED SINCE OCTOBER 1990. AS MOST OF THE AGENTS HAVE A SHORT SHELF LIFE, RENEWED PRODUCTION AND SUBSEQUENT DISTRIBUTION TO MAIN OPERATING BASES SHOULD TAKE PLACE SOME TIME IN JANUARY 1991.
))

POSSIBLE CHEMICAL ACTIVITY
AIRFIELD MONTH (1990)
KIRKUK OCTOBER
QAYARRAH WEST OCTOBER
TALLIL OCTOBER
MOSEL SEPTEMBER
TAQADDUM SEPTEMBER
SHAIBAH AUGUST
UBAYDAH BIN AL JARRAH AUGUST
))

10. THE IRAQI AIR FORCE MOST LIKELY WOULD DELIVER CHEMICAL MUNITIONS AGAINST DESERT SHIELD FORCE TARGETS BEYOND ARTILLERY RANGE (24-32 KM). LIKELY TARGETS INCLUDE NORTHERN SAUDI AIRFIELDS, TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES, AND LARGE TROOP CONCENTRATIONS AND LOGISTIC AREAS WITHIN STRIKING DISTANCE OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT BASED IN SOUTHERN IRAQ. IRAQ QUITE LIKELY WOULD STRIKE SHORTLY AFTER SUNRISE, WHEN LOW TEMPERATURES AND LOW WINDS MAKE THE EFFECTS OF CHEMICALS STRONGEST. BASED ON RECENT GROUND-ATTACK TRAINING AND TACTICS EMPLOYED DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, THE IRAQIS ARE LIKELY TO ATTACK WITH ONE TO FOUR TWO-SHIP OR FOUR-SHIP FORMATIONS SPACED 1 TO 5 MINUTES APART, POSSIBLY SUPPORTED BY AIR INTERCEPTORS AND ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURE AIRCRAFT. CHEMICAL AIR STRIKES WOULD AIM TO LIMIT ALLIED OPERATIONS FROM KEY MILITARY FACILITIES, INFLICT LARGE NUMBERS OF CASUALTIES IN A SHORT TIME, AND BREAK THE WILL OF DESERT SHIELD FORCES TO FIGHT.

11. LIKELY AIRFIELD TARGETS INCLUDE DHAHRAN, KING FAHD, AND KING ABDUL AZIZ, AS EACH HAS LARGE CONCENTRATIONS OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. THESE AIRFIELDS ARE LOCATED ALONG THE PERSIAN GULF COAST WITHIN 300 NAUTICAL MILES OF IRAQI FORWARD-DEPLOYMENT BASES IN SOUTHERN IRAQ. IRAQI STRIKE AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT REQUIRE AERIAL REFUELING AND COULD INGRESS AND EGRESS OVER THE PERSIAN GULF AT LOW ALTITUDES TO AVOID DETECTION, USING THE COASTLINE FOR VISUAL NAVIGATION. STRIKE AIRCRAFT ALSO COULD ATTEMPT TO INGRESS OVER THE PERSIAN GULF, USING CIVILIAN FLIGHT CORRIDORS OVER IRANIAN AIRSPACE TO PROVIDE MASKING. A STRIKE PACKAGE AGAINST SAUDI AIRFIELDS MOST LIKELY WOULD CONSIST OF TWO TO FOUR FITTERS OR FLOGGER F'S, EACH UPLOADED WITH FOUR OR SIX 500-KG BOMBS. THE AIRCRAFT WOULD ATTEMPT TO ATTACK BELOW 1,000 FEET, IN LEVEL FLIGHT, AND AT SLOW SPEEDS TO ENSURE ACCURACY. TWO MIRAGE F-1E'S, CARRYING MAGIC 1 AND R530 AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES WOULD PROVIDE ESCORT. THE PACKAGE ALSO PROBABLY WOULD INCLUDE TWO F-1'S CARRYING CAIMAN JAMMERS, AND AS-37 MARTEL ANTIRADIATION MISSILES FOR SUPPRESSION OF AIR DEFENSES NEAR THE AIRFIELDS. PERSISTENT OR SEMIPERSISTENT AGENTS WOULD BE AIMED AT DISRUPTING ALLIED FLIGHT OPERATIONS, AS EQUIPMENT EXPOSED TO AGENTS WOULD REQUIRE DECONTAMINATION PRIOR TO USE, AND ALLIED GROUND-SUPPORT PERSONNEL WOULD HAVE TO WORK IN PROTECTIVE CLOTHING.

12. TACTICAL COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATION FACILITIES ALSO WOULD BE LIKELY TARGETS. IRAQ CONDUCTED CHEMICAL ATTACKS WITH FITTER AIRCRAFT ALONG THE CENTRAL IRAN-IRAQ BORDER AND AT AL FAW IN 1988 AGAINST IRANIAN COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENTS. IRAQ PROBABLY WOULD EMPLOY TWO TO FOUR TWO-SHIP FORMATIONS OF FITTERS AND FLOGGERS, EACH CARRYING UP TO SIX 500-KG CHEMICAL BOMBS, AGAINST SUCH TARGETS. DELIVERY WOULD BE AT ALTITUDES BELOW 1,000 FEET AT LEVEL FLIGHT AND SLOW SPEEDS. NONPERSISTENT AGENTS, WHICH ARE MORE VOLATILE THAN PERSISTENT AGENTS, WOULD INFLICT EXTENSIVE CASUALTIES IN COMMAND FACILITIES AND DEGRADE DESERT SHIELD COMMAND AND CONTROL AT LEAST TEMPORARILY.
))

PERSISTENCE OF BOMB-DELIVERED CHEMICAL AGENTS
AGENT TEMPERATURE (DEGREES C) DURATION (MINUTES)

MUSTARD 25 2,040 (1.4 DAYS)
10 8,310 (5.7 DAYS)
-5 40,800 (28.3 DAYS)

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/

SARIN 25 30
10 75
-5 270
))

13. IRAQI AIRCRAFT ARE LIKELY TO TARGET LARGE TROOP CONCENTRATIONS AND LOGISTIC AREAS. IRAQI FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS CONDUCTED SUCH ATTACKS DURING THE WAR, MOSTLY IN SMALL FORMATIONS OF TWO TO FOUR AIRCRAFT. ON AT LEAST TWO OCCASIONS, IRAQI FLOGGER AIRCRAFT, WHILE CONDUCTING CHEMICAL BOMBING MISSIONS AGAINST IRANIAN TROOP FORMATIONS, RELEASED THEIR BOMBS IN A RANDOM PATTERN AT AN ALTITUDE OF 9,000-12,000 FEET. IRAQ WOULD USE PERSISTENT AGENTS AGAINST FORCE CONCENTRATIONS AND LOGISTIC AREAS IN THE REAR, AND NONPERSISTENT AGENTS WOULD BE USED AGAINST TARGETS CLOSER TO THE FORWARD LINE OF TROOPS (FLOT). THE AIR FORCE WOULD USE HIP HELICOPTERS FOR LOW-ALTITUDE CHEMICAL ATTACKS AGAINST DESERT SHIELD FORCE CONCENTRATIONS AND LOGISTIC AREAS CLOSE TO THE FORWARD EDGE OF THE BATTLE AREA, WHILE IRAQI FLOGGERS, FITTERS, FROGFOOTS, AND F-1'S WOULD OPERATE AGAINST TARGETS BEYOND ARTILLERY RANGE.

14. ALTHOUGH LESS LIKELY, IRAQ COULD ATTACK DISTANT AIRFIELDS OR OTHER DEEP MILITARY TARGETS. TARGETING AIRFIELDS AT TAIF, TABUK, AS WELL AS KEY MILITARY FACILITIES, SUCH AS HEADQUARTERS IN RIYADH, WOULD REQUIRE SUCCESSFULLY PENETRATING SEVERAL HUNDRED MILES INTO SAUDI AIRSPACE AND COMPLETING A SOPHISTICATED CHEMICAL WEAPON STRIKE. THIS WOULD PROVE DIFFICULT FOR THE IRAQI AIR FORCE, ALTHOUGH SUCH AN ATTEMPT CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED, ESPECIALLY IF IRAQ WERE ON THE VERGE OF DEFEAT. A STRIKE PACKAGE WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THAT NOTED ABOVE FOR NORTHERN SAUDI AIRFIELDS, ALTHOUGH A FORCE OF F-1 BUDDY REFUELERS PROBABLY WOULD BE ADDED TO PROVIDE INFLIGHT REFUELING TO THE FLOGGERS AND F-1'S EQUIPPED WITH REFUELING PROBES. IRAQ HAS AT LEAST 15 GROUND-ATTACK FLOGGERS MODIFIED WITH F-1 REFUELING PROBES FOR LONG-RANGE STRIKE MISSIONS.
))

IRAQI AIRCRAFT AND CHEMICAL WEAPON LOADS
MAXIMUM BOMB LOAD NORMAL BOMB LOAD

AIRCRAFT 500-KG 250-KG
SU-17/FITTER H 8 10 4 250-KG
MIG-23/FLOGGER F 6 8 4 250-KG
SU-25/FROGFOOT 8 16 4 250-KG
SU-24/FENCER 10 28 4 500-KG
MIRAGE F-1E4 4 (400-KG) 5 4 250-KG
))

15. THE IRAQI AIR FORCE'S CAPABILITY TO EMPLOY CHEMICAL ATTACKS AGAINST AREA TARGETS, SUCH AS TROOP ASSEMBLY AREAS, CLOSE TO THE FLOT IS GOOD. ITS CAPABILITY TO ATTACK POINT TARGETS, SUCH AS COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES, IS POOR TO MODERATE BECAUSE OF THE NEED FOR ACCURATE LOW-ALTITUDE ORDNANCE DELIVERY. DEPENDING ON SADDAM'S WILLINGNESS TO LOSE AIRCRAFT, IRAQ COULD MASS A LARGE STRIKE PACKAGE OF OVER 40 GROUND-ATTACK AIRCRAFT IN AN ATTEMPT TO PENETRATE DESERT SHIELD FORCE FORWARD AIR DEFENSES, ALTHOUGH NO SUCH TRAINING HAS BEEN REPORTED AND THE IRAQIS RARELY EMPLOYED MASSIVE ATTACKS IN THE PAST. FORWARD-DEPLOYED FORCES MIGHT HAVE VERY LITTLE WARNING TIME BEFORE AN IRAQI AIRCRAFT CHEMICAL STRIKE. WHILE DESERT SHIELD AIR DEFENSES WOULD SUCCEED IN DOWNING IRAQI AIRCRAFT, SOME MIGHT PENETRATE BEYOND THE FORWARD DEFENSES. IRAN ALREADY HAS DEPLOYED AIRCRAFT CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING CHEMICAL ATTACKS TO SOUTHERN IRAQI AIRBASES. CHEMICAL ORDNANCE MAY BE STORED AT SEVERAL IRAQI AIRFIELDS SO IRAQI AIRCRAFT CAN BE UPLOADED WITH CHEMICAL BOMBS QUICKLY ONCE SADDAM HUSAYN HAS GIVEN THE AIR FORCE RELEASE AUTHORITY.

16. IRAQI CAPABILITIES TO CONDUCT DEEP-STRIKE AIR ATTACKS AGAINST DISTANT AIRFIELDS OR MILITARY HEADQUARTERS ARE LOW. AS IRAQ LACKS AIR SUPERIORITY UNDER VIRTUALLY ANY CONFLICT SCENARIO, AIRCRAFT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO A VERY HIGH RATE OF ATTRITION FROM DESERT SHIELD FORCES. SADDAM MIGHT NOT BE WILLING TO RISK LOSING SEVERAL AIRCRAFT AND PILOTS; INSTEAD, HE MAY OPT TO USE LESS ACCURATE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH CHEMICAL WARHEADS. THE AL HUSSEIN AND AL ABBAS, IRAQ'S LONG-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES BELIEVED TO BE CAPABLE OF DELIVERING CHEMICAL AGENTS, HAVE AN OPERATIONAL RANGE OF 600 KM AND CIRCULAR ERROR PROBABILITY OF 2(PLUS) AND 3(PLUS) KM, RESPECTIVELY; THIS PROBABLY WOULD NOT ENSURE ADEQUATE CHEMICAL CONCENTRATION AGAINST A POINT TARGET. NEVERTHELESS, SADDAM PROBABLY WOULD BE WILLING TO SUBJECT HIS AIRCRAFT TO THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH A DEEP STRIKE ONLY IF COALITION FORCES ARE ON THE VERGE OF VICTORY.

17. IRAQI AIRFIELDS WITH SUSPECTED CHEMICAL MUNITION BUNKERS.

THE NUMBER IN PARENTHESES WITH THE AIRFIELD NAME INDICATES THE NUMBER QF [ (b)(1) sec 1.3 (a)(4) ] BUNKERS AT THE AIRFIELD:


--MOSEL (1)
--QAYARRAH WEST AIRFIELD (1)
--KIRKUK AIRFIELD (1)
--AL TAQADDUM AIRFIELD (1)
--H-3 AIRFIELD (5)
--UBAYDAH BIN AL JARRAH AIRFIELD (2)
--TALLIL AIRFIELD (1)
))

OUTLOOK
))

18. THE IRAQI AIR FORCE'S SUCCESSFUL EXPERIENCE IN EMPLOYING CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAN MAKES IT LIKELY THAT IT WILL CONDUCT CHEMICAL WARFARE AGAINST DESERT SHIELD FORCES, AS CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF IRAQI COMBAT DOCTRINE. THE AIR FORCE MOST LIKELY WILL ATTACK TARGETS NEAR IRAQ TO MAXIMIZE THE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS AND HELP ENSURE AIRCREW AND AIRFRAME SURVIVABILITY. EVEN SO, IRAQI AIRCRAFT PROBABLY WILL BE SUBJECT TO A HIGH RATE OF ATTRITION FROM DESERT SHIELD FORCES' SOPHISTICATED AIR INTERCEPTORS AND GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS. NONETHELESS, IF SADDAM IS DETERMINED TO EMPLOY CHEMICAL WEAPONS, HE WILL RISK LOSING AIRCRAFT TO DELIVER THEM, AS AIRCRAFT PROVIDE IRAQ ITS ONLY MEANS FOR ACCURATELY DELIVERING AGENTS AGAINST TARGETS BEYOND ARTILLERY RANGE.
[ (b)(2) ]
))

© Copyright 1991 Defense Intelligence Agency



January 25th 1991 assessment...



From the DoD GulfLINK website:

(N.B. Comments thus added by SCUDWATCH)

File: 970613_dim37_91d_txt_0001.txt
Page: 0001
Total Pages: 1

[b.2]

SERIAL: DIM 37-91

/*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/

SUBJECT: IRAQ: POTENTIAL FOR CHEMICAL WEAPON USE.

DOI: 25 JAN 91
)) KEY JUDGMENTS
))

1. COALITION ATTACKS ARE STEADILY ELIMINATING IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WEAPON PRODUCTION AND FILLING CAPABILITIES. [b.1. sec 1.5(c)]

2. IRAQ IS LIKELY TO RETAIN A SIGNIFICANT CHEMICAL WEAPON STOCKPILE FOR SOME TIME, ALTHOUGH 1TS NERVE AGENT STOCKS ARE BEING REDUCED BY SPOILAGE AND PROBABLY WILL BE MILITARILY INEFFECTIVE AFTER 31 MARCH. IRAQ'S BINARY STOCKS AND BLISTER AGENTS WILL REMAIN TOXIC FOR A LONGER TIME.

3. THE PRINCIPAL THREAT OF CHEMICAL ATTACK IS FROM ARTILLERY AND MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHER FIRE AGAINST COALITION GROUND FORCES. THE LIKELIHOOD THAT CHEMICAL MUNITIONS WOULD BE AIR DELIVERED HAS BEEN REDUCED BY ALLIED AIR SUPERIORITY. IRAQ HAS TOO FEW SCUD CHEMICAL WARHEADS TO SUSTAIN THEIR USE.

4. ATTACKS ON IRAQ'S CHEMICAL AGENT PRODUCTION AND WEAPONS FILLING CAPABILITIES SHOULD BE CONTINUED. ELIMINATING FIRE SUPPORT ASSETS AND CHEMICAL STORAGE AREAS AT GROUND FORCE DEPOTS IS THE MOST EFFICIENT MEANS TO PREVENT TACTICAL USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
))

BACKGROUND
))

5. IRAQ HAS A SIGNIFICANT PRODUCTION CAPABILITY FOR BOTH NERVE AND BLISTER AGENT WEAPONS. THE IRAQI CHEM1CAL WEAPON PRODUCTION [b.1. sec 1.5(c)] THE LOSS WILL GREATLY REDUCE IRAQ'S POTENTIAL TO REPLENISH ITS CHEMICAL MUNITIQN STORES. FURTHER STRIKES AGAINST SAMARRA WILL BE REQUIRED TO ELIMINATE THIS CAPABILITY.

6. IRAQ IS NOT ABLE TO MAKE GOOD-QUALITY CHEMICAL AGENTS. TECHNICAL FAILURES HAVE REDUCED THEIR PURITY AND CAUSED PROBLEMS IN STORAGE AND HANDLING. THIS IS A PARTICULAR PROBLEM FOR THE SARIN-TYPE NERVE AGENTS (GB AND GF). THESE BOTH CONTAIN HYDROFLUORIC ACID (HF), AN IMPURITY THAT ATTACKS METAL SURFACES AND CATALYZES NERVE AGENT DECOMPOSITION. THIS LEADS TO METAL FAILURE AND LEAKS IN THE AMMUNITION, INCREASING HANDLING HAZARDS. MUSTARD IS ALSO JUDGED TO BE OF POOR QUALITY, BUT IT HAS LESS CORROSIVE IMPURITIES. LOWER PURITY SIGNIFICANTLY LIMITS SHELF LIFE AND REDUCES TOXIC EFFECTS WHEN THE MUNITION IS EMPLOYED.

7. IN WEAPONS WITH RELATIVELY SMALL FILL WEIGHTS, THE REDUCED PURITY AND LOSS OF TOXICITY THROUGH DILUTION PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE MUCH EFFECT ON THE WEAPON'S AREA OF COVERAGE. IN MUNITIONS WITH LARGER FILL WEIGHTS (AERIAL BOMBS AND MISSILE WARHEADS), THE WEAPON'S LOSS OF POTENCY COULD REDUCE CONTAMINATED AREAS CONSIDERABLY. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS INCLUDING WEATHER AND TERRAIN ALSO INFLUENCE THE EXTENT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTAMINATION.

8. [b.1. sec 1.5(c)] PERIODIC PRODUCTION RUNS ARE NEEDED TO REPLENISH DETERIORATED NERVE AGENT STOCKS. THE IRAQI STOCKPILE'S TOTAL SIZE IS NOT KNOWN, BUT IT HAS BEEN ESTIMATED AT 300 TO 2,000 TONNES. THE LARGER STOCKPILE SIZE IS BASED ON A LARGE PROPORTION OF MUSTARD IN THE INVENTORY.

9. THE NERVE AGENT [b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)] SHOULD HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO DETERIORATE, AND DECOMPOSITION SHOULD MAKE MOST OF THE NERVE AGENT WEAPONS UNSERVICEABLE BY THE END OF MARCH 1991. IRAQ'S BINARY STOCKS AND BLISTER AGENTS WILL REMAIN TOXIC FOR A LONGER TIME. [b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)]

10. PRODUCTION FACILITIES. THE SAMARRA PRODUCTION COMPLEX, CONTAINED IN AN AREA OF ABOUT 25 SQUARE KILOMETERS, IS THE WORLD'S LARGEST CHEMICAL AGENT PRODUCTION FACILITY. ALLIED BOMBING HAS DESTROYED SEVERAL OF THE FACILITIES. [b.1.sec.1.5.(c)]

11. SAMARRA IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING NERVE AND BLISTER AGENTS, BINARY COMPONENT CHEMICALS, AND RIOT CONTROL AGENTS.

12. [b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)] SOME OF THE HABBANIYAH PLANTS ALSO MAY BE ABLE TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL AGENT OR BINARY COMPONENTS.

13. OTHER FACILITIES. OTHER CHEMICAL AGENT PRODUCTION FACILITIES HAVE BEEN REPORTED [b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)]> IT IS POSSIBLE IRAQ HAS ESTABLISHED CLANDESTINE PRODUCTION SITES INSIDE LARGE PRODUCTION COMPLEXES [b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)] OR AT REMOTE OR EVEN UNDERGROUND LOCATIONS. THESE POSSIBILITIES ARE CONSIDERED UNLIKELY. HIDING A CHEMICAL AGENT PLANT IN A LARGE COMPLEX RISKS ITS DISCOVERY BY VISITORS. THERE IS ALSO A RISK OF ACCIDENTALLY EXPOSING FACTORY WORKERS TO CHEMICAL AGENTS. CLANDESTINE LOCATIONS WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ESTABLISH AND OPERATE WITHOUT DISCOVERY [b.1. sec 1.5.(c)] ADDITIONALLY THE IRAQIS DEPEND ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FOR THEIR TECHNICAL OPERATIONS, AND IT IS LIKELY THAT SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD ADD TO THE RISK OF DISCLOSORE.

14. CHEMICAL STOCKPILE. DIA ESTIMATES THAT MOST OF THE IRAQI CHEMICAL STOCKPILE IS IN MUNITIONS, WITH A MODEST AMOUNT OF CHEMICAL AGENTS STORED IN BULK. DIA ASSESSES THAT MOST OF IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE UNITARY; THEY HAVE BEEN FILLED WITH A FINISHED CHEMICAL AGENT. BINARY WEAPONS ARE BEING INTRODUCED, BUT THEY ARE BELIEVED TO BE A SMALL PART OF THE CURRENT STOCKPILE. THE STOCKPILE INCLUDES

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/

NERVE AND BLISTER AGENT WEAPONS. BLOOD AGENTS CANNOT BE RULEDOUT.

15. MISSILE WARHEADS. IRAQ IS ASSESSED TO HAVE A LIMITED NUMBER OF CHEMICAL WARHEADS FOR ITS SCUD-B MISSILES AND POSSIBLY FOR THE AL HUSAYN AND THE AL ABBAS MISSILES. A CHEMICAL WARHEAD WOULD IMPROVE THE VALUE OF THESE INACCURATE MISSILES BY GIVING THEM THE POTENTIAL TO CONTAMINATE LARGE AREAS. THE CHEMICAL FILL WEIGHT FOR THE MISSILES HAS BEEN ESTIMATED AT ABOUT 550 KG FOR THE SCUD-B, 80 TO 1U0 KG FOR THE AL HUSAYN, AND 200 TO 3U0 KG FOR THE AL ABBAS. THE EXTENDED-RANGE SCUD MISSILES GAINED RANGE IN PART BY REDUCING THE MISSILE PAYLOAD. SIGNIFICANT TECHNICAL PROBLEMS IN GUIDANCE, FUSING, AND AGENT STABILITY WILL CONTINUE TO LIMIT THEIR CIVILIANS.

16. THE MOST EFFECTIVE CHEMICAL AGENT FILL FOR A MISSILE WARHEAD IS A PERSISTENT AGENT. THE VX NERVE AGENT OR A THICKENED AGENT OF ANY TYPE COULD BE USED TO ATTACK HIGH-VALUE DEEP TARGETS. IRAQ'S BEST AGENTS FOR MISSILE WARHEADS ARE THE PERSISTENT BLISTER AGENT MUSTARD AND THE SEMIPERSISTENT NERVE AGENT GF. VX IS A POSSIBLE AGENT IN THE IRAQI INVENTORY.

17. AERIAL WEAPONS. AIRCRAFT ARE IRAQ'S ONLY MEANS TO DELIVER CHEMICAL AGENTS ACCURATELY AT DISTANCES IN EXCESS OF ARTILLERY RANGE. DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, ALL TYPES OF AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING HELICOPTERS, WERE USED TO DELIVER CHEMICALS.

18. IRAQ HAS DEVELOPED 90MM ROCKETS FOR ITS HELICOPTERS. THESE PROBABLY ARE FILLED WITH MUSTARD, BUT THEY COULD CONTAINANY AGENT.

19. AERIAL BOMBS ARE ESTIMATED TO BE THE MAJOR PART OF THE IRAQI STOCKPILE. ABOUT 65 TO 75 PERCENT OF IRAQ'S CHEMICAL AGENT STOCK IS ASSESSED TO BE IN BOMBS BECAUSE BOMBS CONTAIN LARGER AMOUNTS OF AGENT THAN DO ARTILLERY SHELLS. IRAQI AERIAL BOMBS ARE ESTIMATED TO HAVE 100 KG OF NERVE AGENT OR 120 KG OF MUSTARD IN THE 500-KG BOMBS AND 50 KG OF NERVE AGENT OR 60 KG OF MUSTARD IN THE 250-KG BOMBS. ARTILLERY SHELLS CONTAIN AN ESTIMATED 1.5 TO 3.4 KG OF AGENT.

20. GROUND DELIVERY SYSTEMS. IRAQ HAS DELIVERED CHEMICALS USING ITS 130MM, 152MM, AND 155MM TUBE ARTILLERY AND 122MM MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS. OTHER FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEMS COULD BE USED TO DELIVER CHEMICALS. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF CHEMICAL EMPLOYMENT BY ROCKET-PROPELLED GRENADES AND MINES.

21. OTHER AGENTS AND WEAPONS. IRAQ PROBABLY HAS FILLED MUNITIONS WITH PARTICULATE CARRIERS IMPREGNATED WITH MUSTARD,ALSO CALLED "DUSTY MUSTARD." [b.1. sec. 1.5.(a), (g)] OTHER POSSIBLE ITEMS IN THE IRAQI ARSENAL ARE AEROSOL GENERATORS FOR AGENT DISSEMINATION AND SPRAY TANKS THAT COULD SPREAD CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION FROM HELICOPTERS OR FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT.

22. CONSEQUENCES OF BINARY INTRODUCTION. IRAQ IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING THE COMPONENTS AND CHEMICALS FOR BINARY CHEMICAL MUNITIONS, BUT THE NUMBER OF BINARY WEAPONS IN INVENTORY IS BELIEVED TO BE LIMITED. UNITARY MUNITIONS REMAIN THE PRIMARY CHEMICAL WEAPON TYPE IN THE IRAQI INVENTORY. ONE OF IRAQ'S MOTIVATIONS FOR DEVELOPING BINARY WEAPONS WAS TO MAKE CHEMICAL AGENTS THAT ARE STABLE IN STORAGE. BINARIES COMBINE TWO OR MORE CHEMICALS IN A MUNITION TO PRODUCE A CHEMICAL AGENT. THE CHEMICALS USED IN THE BINARY WEAPON ARE NOT CHEMICAL AGENTS AND HAVE LOWER TOXICITY,SO THEY ARE EASIER TO PRODUCE WITH GOOD QUALITY THAN UNITARY CHEMICAL AGENTS AND ARE SAFER TO HANDLE.

23. THE MOST LIKELY IRAQI CHEMICAL AGENTS TO BE USED IN BINARY WEAPONS ARE THE NERVE AGENTS GB AND GF. BOTH ARE MADE BY THE REACTION OF AN ALCOHOL WITH THE CHEMICAL DIFLUOROMETHYLPHOSPHONATE (DF). GB IS PRODUCED BY THE REACTION OF ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL (ISOPROPANOL) WITH DF; GF IS PRODUCED BY THE REACTION OF CYCLOHEXYL ALCOHOL (CYCLOHEXANOL) WITH DF. GF PRODUCTION IS MORE DIFFICULT IN THE BINARY CONFIGURATION SINCE CYCLOHEXANOL IS LESS REACTIVE THAN ISOPROPANOL. THE REACTION WILL TAKE LONGER AND MAY NEED TO BE HEATED.

24. THE MOST LIKELY TYPES OF IRAQI BINARY WEAPONS ARE ARTILLERY, MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS (MRLS), AND MISSILE WARHEADS, ALTHOUGH ANY WEAPON CARRYING A CHEMICAL FILL CAN BE CONVERTED TO A BINARY. GB IS THE MOST LIKELY FILL FOR THE ARTILLERY AND MRL AMMUNITION. GF IS MORE LIKELY TO BE USED IN LARGER MUNITIONS, SUCH AS MISSILES OR AERIAL BOMBS.

25. BINARY WEAPONS HAVE DISADVANTAGES THAT WOULD REDUCE THEIR VALUE TO THE IRAQIS. A LARGE PART OF THE BINARY'S INTERIOR IS FILLED WITH NONLETHAL COMPONENTS THAT HELP MIX THE CHEMICALS WHEN THE WEAPON IS DELIVERED. THESE COMPONENTS ALSO HELP KEEP THE CHEMICALS SEPARATED PRIOR TO USE. BECAUSE THE REACTION MUST TAKE PLACE WHILE THE WEAPON IS EN ROUTE TO THE TARGET, THE REACTION DOES NOT CONVERT ALL THE DF TO A CHEMICAL AGENT WHEN THE ROUND HITS ITS TARGET. THE ROUND CONTAINS A MIXTURE OF AGENT, UNREACTED DF, UNREACTED ALCOHOL, HF, AND OTHER IMPURITIES WHEN IT REACHES THE TARGET.

26. AN ADDITIONAL PROBLEM FOR THE IRAQIS MAY BE THE POOR QUALITY OF THE DF THEY PRODUCE. THE SAME CHEMICAL ENGINEERING PROBLEMS THAT HAVE LIMITED THE PURITY OF CURRENTLY PRODUCED AGENTS ALSO COULD LIMIT THEIR DF QUALITY. DF IS MADE FROM AN ORGANOPHOSPHORUS CHEMICAL AND HF. REMOVING THE HF IS DIFFICULT: IT IS LIKELY THAT IRAQI DF CONTAINS HF, WHICH COULD CATALYZE DECOMPOSITION.

27. DISTRIBUTION OF THE STOCKPILE. THE CHEMICAL STOCKPILE'S LOCATION IS NOT KNOWN WITH CONFIDENCE. LIKELY STORAGE SITES ARE BUNKERS DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT IRAQ AND BUNKERS AT SAMARRA. [b.1. sec 1.5.(c)] CHEMICAL WEAPONS ALSO COULD BE STORED IN [b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)] BUNKERS LOCATED THROUGHOUT IRAQ. [b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)]

IF NECESSARY, CHEMICAL MUNITIONS SIMPLY COULD BE STORED IN THE OPEN.

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/

28. DIA ASSESSES THAT IN THE KUWAITI THEATER OF OPERATIONS, THE STOCKPILE PROBABLY HAS BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO THE GENERAL SUPPORT AMMUNITION DEPOTS WITH CHEMICAL STORAGE BUNKERS AND FIELD SUPPLY AREAS FOR THE DEPLOYED UNITS. [b.1. sec 1.5.(c)]

29. DOCTRINE FOR CHEMICAL USE. DURING THE WAR WITH IRAN, THE IRAQIS LEARNED TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPDNS IN WAYS THAT MAXIMIZED EFFECTIVENESS. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY DISSEMINATED CHEMICAL AGENTS IN THE MORNING RATHER THAN LATER IN THE DAY, WHEN HIGH TEMPERATURES WOULD ACCELERATE EVAPORATION. TYPICALLY, THE IRAQIS WOULD DEPOSIT PERSISTENT MUSTARD AGENT IN AN IRANIAN FORCE'S REAR AREA AND THEN BOMBARD THE FRONT WITH A NONPERSISTENT NERVE AGENT (SARIN). TROOPS FLEEING THE SARIN-CONTAMINATED AREA THEN WOULD BE EXPOSED TO MUSTARD AS WELL.

30. IRAQ MIGHT ATTEMPT TO USE AIR ASSETS TO ATTACK TARGETS BEHIND THE LINES, SUCH AS LOGISTIC STOCKPILES, PORTS, AND AIRFIELDS. AIRFIELDS, IN PARTICULAR, WOULD BE CRITICAL TARGETS BECAUSE OF COALITION AIR POWER. PERSISTENT CHEMICALS WOULD BE EMPLOYED TO SUPPRESS AIRFIELD OPERATIONS. ATTACKS AGAINST NAVAL SHIPS MIGHT BE ATTEMPTED BUT WOULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO HAVE A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EFFECT.

31. IRAQ USED CHEMICALS EFFECTIVELY IN THE 1988 OFFENSIVES AGAINST IRAN. DURING THIS TIME, IRAQ EMPHASIZED SELECTIVE SATURATION OF TARGETS WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS. BECAUSE IRAQ HAD THE OPERATIONAL INITIATIVE, ITS FORCES COULD CHOOSE THE BEST WEATHER AND TERRAIN CONDITIONS TO SELECT CHEMICAL TARGETS.

32. LATE IN THE WAR WITH IRAN, SADDAM HUSAYN DELEGATED THE RESULTS. THE DISCRETION OF THE GROUND FORCE COMMANDER MADE IT POSSIBLE TO RESPOND QUICKLY WHEN THE TACTICAL SITUATION FAVORED CHEMICAL WEAPON USE, AND COMMANDERS TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THIS AUTHORITY. [b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)] IRAQI RADIO RECENTLY ANNOUNCED ALLIED CHEMICAL ATTACKS IN THE BASRA VICINITY. IT APPEARS THAT IRAQ MAY BE LAYING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL GROUNDWORK FOR ITS USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. [b.1. sec. 1.5 (a), (c)]

Sections 33-41 ----------- (?)

42. PROSPECTS FOR CHEMICAL USE. IRAQ'S CHEMICAL CAPABILITY REMAINS SIGNIFICANT. THIS CAPABILITY WILL DETERIORATE OVER TIME, BUT IT WILL NOT BE ELIMINATED COMPLETELY. IRAQ RETAINS THE ABILITY TO LAUNCH CHEMICAL STRIKES AT ANY TIME WITH ARTILLERY AND AIRPOWER, AND IT COULD USE CHEMICALS ON SOME OF ITS REMAINING SCUD-B MISSILES.

43. IRAQ MAY BE SAVING ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO LAUNCH A STRIKE WITH ALL AVAILABLE ASSETS TO KILL AND INJURE COALITION FORCES. SUCH AN ATTACK MIGHT ATTEMPT TO DISRUPT AN ALLIED ATTACK OR MIGHT BE PROMPTED BY IRAQ'S CALCULATION THAT IT IS FACING IMMINENT DEFEAT AND HAS LITTLE TO LOSE. THESE OPTIONS COULD BE COUNTERED BY DIMINISHING IRAQ'S CAPABILITY TO DELIVER CHEMICAL WEAPONS: ELIMINATING ITS AIRFIELDS, MISSILE LAUNCHERS, AND FIRE SUPPORT ASSETS.

44. SADDAM EVIDENTLY BELIEVES THE US HAS BOTH A CHEMICAL AND A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN THE THEATER, BUT DIA ASSESSES THAT THIS WOULD NOT DETER HIM FROM EMPLOYING CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST COALITION FORCES. DIA JUDGES THAT SADDAM VALUES THE FORCE-MULTIPLICATION CAPABILITY OF CHEM1CAL WEAPONS TOO HIGHLY TO FORGO THEIR USE IN ANY IMPORTANT COMBAT SITUATION WHERE THEY WOULD PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL TACTICAL BENEFITS. CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE INTEGRAL TO IRAQ'S MILITARY DOCTRINE. CONSEQUENTLY, DIA ESTIMATES THAT:

--IRAQI FORCES WOULD BE VIRTUALLY CERTAIN TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN ANY DEFENSIVE SITUATION IN IRAQ OR KUWAIT WHERE THEY ARE BEING --(?)-- IRAQI FORCES WOULD BE VERY LIKELY TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF ANY OFFENSIVE INTO TERRITORY DEFENDED BY US OR OTHER ALLIED FORCES.

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--IRAQ MAY USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO DISRUPT AN IMMINENT ALLIED ATTACK.

--ONCE IRAQI FORCES BEGIN USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST ALLIED FORCES, DIA ANTICIPATES THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO USE THEIR ENTIRE CHEMICAL ARSENAL, INCLUDING MISSILES WITH CHEMICAL WARHEADS.


--SPECIAL FORCES OR OTHER GROUPS ALSO COULD DELIVER CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO SELECTED TARGETS.

45. (U) THIS MEMORANDUM CONTAINS INFORMATION AS OF 25 JANUARY 1991.

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© Copyright 1991 DoD/DIA