The question as to whether or not Iraq actually used chemical weapon-loaded Scud missiles during the 1991 Gulf War is still an open one. Further to this, there still remain outstanding questions about the claims that Iraq possessed illegally-retained Scud Missiles in the period prior to the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. There is no complete record to draw upon and no one organisation has ever been seen to have compiled an exhaustive and comprehensive analysis.

- A review by a former member of the Dhahran Scud Watchers Club

Lieutenant General Amir al-Saadi

Saddam aide: Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction

Fallen tyrant's chemical supremo surrenders ... and puts pressure on Bush and Blair

By James Cusick Westminster Editor

13 April 2003

SADDAM Hussein's senior weapons adviser last night surrendered to coalition forces in Baghdad and claimed Iraq was free of any weapons of mass destruction.

The claims of Lieutenant General Amir al-Saadi - given under no duress and with nothing to fear from Saddam's destroyed regime - throws into disarray the active US and UK intelligence operation to discover the elusive "smoking gun" that would give international legitimacy for the war, and justification for ignoring the United Nations.

The Iraqi general's statement also puts pressure on the newly formed team of US-led weapons inspectors who have been given the task the UN inspectors failed to deliver on, namely, to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inside Iraq.

With the UN secretary-general Kofi Annan only last week demanding that UN arms inspectors be allowed back into Iraq to finish their work, the existence of the US team is further proof that President Bush intends to now sideline the UN.

Al-Saadi, who is on the list of the US's 55 most wanted Iraqis, surrendered in Baghdad with the help of a German media crew, who filmed him leaving his villa with his German wife. He presented himself to a US warrant officer and was escorted into military custody.

Al-Saadi is said to have worked closely with the UN team headed by Dr Hans Blix. He spoke for the Iraqi government in news conferences between the resumption of inspections in November and their end last month when the UN removed its personnel due to the dangers of war.

He said: "Time will bear me out. I was telling the truth, never told anything but the truth. There will be no difference after this war."


© 2003 James Cusick/The Sunday Herald

Hearing Transcripts from the Hutton Inquiry

Mr Knox to Mrs Olivia Bosch


1 Thursday, 4th September 2003
2 (10.30 am)


Q. Perhaps I can just call up BBC/4/165. You will see an article appearing on the screen in front of you.

A. Okay.

Q. It is an article in the Sunday Times on 13th April.

A. I had not actually seen that article but what he did mention, and it was about that time that David -- he told me he was surprised to find that a journalist he had known quite well had quoted his name in an article. He did not tell me who that journalist was, although I know from the Inquiry who it is.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Yes. What was the name he mentioned?

A. He did not mention -- at that time he did not mention to me the name of the journalist.

LORD HUTTON: I see, yes.

A. He would be very discreet often in that manner.

MR KNOX: It may be this. This is an article written on 13th April 2003 by Mr Rufford.

A. Right.

Q. You will see, in the fourth paragraph down, there is a reference to: "Dr David Kelly, the UN's former chief weapons inspector, said al-Saadi 'knew where all the bodies were buried', adding: 'He advised Saddam on what he could get away with'."


© 2003 The Hutton Inquiry

Spy, boffin, disgruntled civil servant: this was the David Kelly I knew

The Sunday Times January 25, 2004

By Nicholas Rufford


Kelly was diligent in his pursuit of Saddam Hussein's henchmen. One of his long-standing foes was General Amer Al-Saadi, Saddam's British-educated weapons adviser. Al-Saadi was responsible for Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from 1972 onwards. Kelly had long suspected him of lying to weapons inspectors.

He described the Iraqi general as "a very sinister and very charming man. He was one of the brightest people I have ever met. But he supported the wrong cause".

Kelly interviewed Al-Saadi at least 20 times during UN inspection visits to Iraq. His questioning of the general helped to expose flaws in Iraq's supposedly "full, complete, final and comprehensive declaration of weapons of mass destruction" in December 2002.

When the Iraqi declaration was rejected by the UN, it was the beginning of the end for Saddam. Within weeks America had completed its military build-up and invaded Iraq.


© 2004 Nicholas Rufford/The Times,,2087-976810,00.html

FOX NEWS - December 22, 2002 - Saddam Hussein's adviser Amir al-Saadi on Sunday invited the CIA to send its agents to Iraq to point out to U.N. inspectors sites the Bush administration suspects of weapons development. Al-Saadi also said during a news conference in Baghdad that Iraq was prepared to answer any questions raised by the United States and Britain. "We are ready to deal with each of those questions if you ask us," he said.

© 2002 Fox News/PA,2933,73685,00.html

Presentation of the Delegation of the Republic of Iraq before an Informal Meeting of the Members of the Security Council

June 2, 1998.

II. The Concealment Theory and Priority Issues by Dr. Amir H. Al-Saadi, Advisor at the Presidency.

Section II

The Concealment Theory and Priority Issues

By Dr. Amir H. Al-Saadi, Advisor at the Presidency

I- Concealment Theory

During the forthcoming briefing to the Security Council by the Executive Chairman Mr. Richard Butler and his team, scheduled for 3 June 1998, it is intended to inform the Council of the reasons for creating in June 1996 the new section within the UNSCOM headquarters in the United Nations called the Concealment Section.

It is ironic that when the defection of Hussein Kamel brought to the attention of the Government of Iraq the unknown part of activities of Hussien Kamel and other individuals, that of retaining documents and materials, and then Iraq took the decision to hand over all that material to the Executive Chairman in August 1995 followed by clear and unambiguous orders to the organizations and individuals involved in the past programs to cooperate fully with UNSCOM on completing the remaining issues which fall within UNSCOMs mandate for completing its tasks ... And when Iraq embarked on a new phase of cooperation in the technical areas remaining on completing the missile and chemical files as well as revealing everything unsaid about the Biological program ... after all that UNSCOM saw fit to establish the concealment section in 1996.

The new outfit began its work on the basis of theories about a concealment system and mechanism and to develop scenarios based on those theories and proceeded to work on those bases. That action brought about a new dimension to the work on all the files nuclear, missile, chemical and biological.

The result of those activities were:

- Poisoning UNSCOM and Iraq relationship on each front.

- Creating mistrust by intruding and trespassing on Iraq's security concerns and infringing on Iraq's dignity and pride.

Exploiting Iraq's sensitivity to the intrusion on its security and the injury to its dignity and pride to the maximum they moved with sickening repetition from one crisis to another undermining UNSCOM's real work on disarmament.

The incidents created through the demands to enter sensitive sites such as:

- The Ministry of Irrigation-March 1996.

- Republican Guards Units-March 1996.

- Security Services and Special Guards-July 1996.

- Special republican Guards Unit adjacent to a Presidential site - August 1996.

- And several other incidents in 1997 culminating in September 1997 with the incident outside the 3 Presidential sites.

Those incidents resulted in adverse statements and resolutions by the Security Council against Iraq on issues unrelated to the real work on disarmament. In addition to showing Iraq in a negative light and provoking public opinion against Iraq.

The cumulative effect of that campaign was an escalation of threats of military strikes against Iraq by the United Sates and the massing of military forces in the Gulf. Thus creating a seriously dangerous situation and bringing the area to the brink of disaster. Thus UNSCOM embroiled itself in politics (wittingly we believe) through the work of the Concealment Section.

- What have they proved so far?

a) Allegations of concealment of operational missile force?

The Concealment Section elaborated a paper based on its concealment theory on the "Measures taken by the Government of Iraq on the Concealment of Weapons of Mass Destruction" in which it claimed that Iraq concealed an operational missile force composed of up to 25 operational missiles and 1 to 2 launchers in addition to chemical and biological warheads and perhaps an imported nuclear bomb and having two nuclear devices minus the cores which Iraq was trying to obtain secretly.

This scenario, of course, was the cover for all the intrusive inspections carried out over the past two years. That campaign as is well known came to nothing and proved to be miserably wrong in two ways: the first was that they found nothing and the second through the establishment of material balances employing technical and scientific means in the nuclear and missiles areas, including the material balance for missiles, engines, and special warheads, launchers etc.

b) Allegations on concealment in the nuclear area.

In the Nuclear area, the Concealment Section put forward ideas on the basis of their concealment theory that nuclear material was concealed in sensitive sites, farms, a church and a monastery in the vicinity of Baghdad.

Those sites had to be inspected by teams from the IAEA against their better judgement on the basis of the information supplied by the Concealment Section. Needless to say, the inspection proved that the information was wrong.

c) Allegations on concealment of munitions at various sensitive sites.

d) Concealment of documents at various sensitive sites, military and civil organizations, ministry of defense and other ministries, and even private houses on occasions.

e) Allegations of concealment of production capabilities in this or that sensitive site.

f) Allegation on concealment of CW & BW stocks of agents Vx and Anthrax and biological production facilities at Presidential sites.

UNSCOM's allegations based on the concealment theory achieved its final goal of inspecting the Presidential sites, searching for hidden stocks of Vx and Anthrax and Missile warheads filled with those agents and for their production facilities etc. and took samples from the soil, the air, the water, and swabs from various surfaces inside the buildings and underground surveys using ground penetration radar. We have yet to receive the results! Needless to say, the results will also be negative.

g) The concealment section followed every bit of information and leads supplied by foreign intelligence services. What did they find? Nothing!

How long will that activity continue?

All the problems identified as remaining priority issues stem from the new dimension added to the work of the groups in all 3 areas. They are all based on suspicions, unjustified and unwarranted. Many issues could have been resolved in a professional manner during discussion between experts unprejudiced and uninfluenced by the concealment theories.

II-The priority issues

The concealment theory as we have seen permeated into all areas of the work remaining between UNSCOM and Iraq. IN all these areas it remains for Iraq to provide documents and records UNSCOM "knows" are in Iraq's possession and therefore UNSCOM must continue to search for them.

In the Missile Area:

The priority issues identified by UNSCOM as problems to be addressed in the coming months are:

1) The material balance of the indigenous production for missiles.

a) UNSCOM's position:

UNSCOM maintains that the material balance of the destroyed items could not be reestablished by the inspection team sent recently to the destruction site and therefore UNSCOM must resort to another way for establishing the material balance and that can only be through the provision by Iraq of production, quality control and store records.

b) Iraq's Position:

Iraq has submitted a complete material balance for Gyroscopes (which represent the major part of guidance and control) and indigenous missile warheads.

Iraq also submitted in the FFCD a complete account of indigenous production of airframes.

The Special Commission verified the Iraqi declaration by hundreds of inspection visits and scores of meetings and interviews with the cadre concerned in the Military Industrialization Corporation (MIC). A large number of supporting documents were submitted to the Special Commission including the procurement documents for supply of raw material, finished and semi-finished parts.

The volume of documents presented to the Special Commission in the field of indigenous production of engines was about 300 documents and reports (more than 2000 pages.) There are no further documents available on this matter.

Iraq furnished UNSCOM with extensive data and information on the status of the indigenous production of the missiles and proved the status of the indigenously produced engine parts never attained the final specifications required for operational missiles. That being so it follows that tools made for those parts are not final and thus are worthless.

Iraq established the material balance and detailed information supported by material evidence and documents according to the inquiries of the Special Commission. Iraq also cooperated fully in providing the required clarifications and answers related to the destruction methods, quantities and types of destroyed items.

The Special Commission was shown that the indigenously produced engines were not operational. The difficulties experienced in developing Al-Sumud liquid propellant engine (less 150km range) are indicative of this fact.

And, therefore, the remaining issue of indigenous production of the engines is not relevant to the disarmament phase stipulated in chapter C of resolution 687(1991) and any further questions in that area can easily by pursued during the on-going monitoring and verification phase, particularly that all the remaining production facilities for this type of work are currently subject to strict monitoring regime. Therefore Iraq cannot see why this issue has recently qualified to be moved up as a priority issue.

2) The Material balance of the propellant

a) UNSCOM position:

UNSCOM claims that Iraq's declaration on the propellant material balance is inaccurate and has changed several times. Therefore UNSCOM demanded from Iraq to provide the destruction diary for the unilateral destruction of the propellant.

b) Iraq's position:

UNSCOM never considered the issue of the propellant an important one for the first six years of its work. Consequently, Iraq thought this matter was closed. However, UNSCOM returned to the propellant on and off since April 1996. At all times, the issue was never considered as a priority issue. The attitude of UNSCOM in bringing this issue now as a priority issue is unjustified. The claim that the propellant for the Scud missile is of a type dedicated to that missile implying that it is a special propellant. This is far from being so. The propellant is made up from two types of fuel and an oxidizer. The starting fuel designated TG-02 is a mixture of common and commercially available organic compounds. More importantly it is not a proscribed item as it is also used in the Volga anti-aircraft missile currently in service in Iraq.

The other fuel is the main fuel designated TM-185 which is a cocktail of petroleum products which can be produced in many crude oil refineries around the world without any difficulty. (See attachment No. I)

The Oxidizer is mainly fuming nitric acid with some additives as stabilizers (see attachment No. II) It is seen that all the compounds in the oxidizer are common commercially available chemicals. It is readily seen for formula given in attachment II that the oxidizer for Volga system (permitted) and for the Scud system (prohibited) are essentially the same with slight difference in the additives to account for the longer residence time for the oxidizer inside the Volga system than the Scud. From the practical point of view one may be used in place of the other with acceptable performance.

3) The conventional warheads material balance:

a) UNSCOM's position:

In view of the fact that indigenously produced conventional warheads were also used as special warheads then UNSCOM requires production records of the conventional warheads for the full accounting of the material balance.

b) Iraq's position:

On their own, the conventional warheads are not relevant to the disarmament phase and have no special importance. It should be noted that, paragraph (47) of the report of the Special Commission of April 1997 mentions special warheads only. The special warheads were accounted for and verified fully through material and documentary evidence. Those warheads included 18 indigenously produced warheads.

Iraq provided all the clarifications requested by the Special Commission during the TEM on the warheads. In the TEM, Mr. El-Khateeb asked for a special table concerning the indigenous warhead monthly production details. The Table included information that may be regarded as to the best recollection of the personnel involved in the production in accordance with UNSCOM's request as a substitute to the original production records which do not exist. The clarification also included the explanation for the existence of 7-8 empty warheads in project 144/2 after the war.

As to the point concerning the P3 pit, we have presented to the Special Commission in our letter of May 25, 1998 the results of the analyses done on the remnants of the warheads excavated from P1, P3 & P6. Any additional information that may be discovered during the work in progress at present in the destruction area will be forwarded to UNSCOM.

A number of chief inspectors from the Special Commission have mentioned on many occasions that a zero material balance of a major component of the missile system such as the engines and launchers would be sufficient to indicate the correctness of Iraq's declarations regarding the material balance of other components. Unfortunately the Special Commission abandoned this principle when the zero material balance of missile engines, launchers, special warheads was accomplished.

The Chairman of the Special Commission stated in the high level talks of February 1998 in Baghdad, that he would not search for 100% level of verification of the material balance of the other parts. Unfortunately that statement was not reflected in the Commission's statements and reports that followed, specially the report of April 1998.

Iraq undertook to cooperate with the Special Commission in clarifying any ambiguities concerning subjects not related to disarmament that the Special Commission believes require further clarification during the on-going monitoring and verification (OMV) after the implementation of paragraph 22 of resolution 687(1991).

In view of the establishment of the material balance for the missile, engines, launchers and special warheads, the requirements for disarmament is achieved. Other issues raised presently by UNSCOM are of secondary importance and may be pursued during the ongoing monitoring and verification phase.

In the Chemical Area

The priority issues identified by UNSCOM as problems to be addressed in the coming months are:

1) Revision of the material balance of the chemical munition

a) UNSCOM's position:

UNSCOM stated that in order to help finalize the Vx issue it is important to revise the material balance for all types of chemical munitions. Namely:

- Filled and empty 155 mm shells

- Empty R-400 bombs: 170 bombs accepted plus 191 bombs rejected. Other aerial bombs LD250 & ALD500

- 122mm filled and empty rockets.

b- Iraq's position:

155 mm munitions

- The Iraqi declaration in 1991 included the existence of 12,634 (155 mm caliber) filled with mustard at two different sites. This represents the status of intact munitions and their location.

- 12747 mustard filled shells were destroyed during 1992-1993 under UNSCOM supervision at Al-Muthana. The reason for the extra quantity compared with the Iraqi declaration in 1991 was due to the discovery of the remaining shells at different sites that have been bombarded (132 at Al-Muhammadiyat) in addition to quantity of rejected shells in the graveyard of Al-Muthana (113). Therefore, the Iraqi declaration in 1995 came with the figure 12 900.

- In December 1995 Iraq found some important documents which were handed over to UNSCOM according to those documents there was prior to the war 13500 shells filled with mustard. Thus the balance was corrected to the above figure and given by the Iraqi declaration in June 1996. The discrepancy of 500-600 shells in the balance have been attributed to the aerial bombardment and lost during the Gulf War as was evident that munitions stores were bombarded from the air and remnants were found on a number of occasions.

- In February 1998, the UNSCOM team visited Al- Muhamedyat stores, they noticed the presence of some shells (155 mm) were scattered and damaged, which were the remnants of the shells that were stored before at the site. The Iraqi side presently upon UNSCOM's request endeavors to obtain more information about the remnants of this quantity of munitions.

- UNSCOM claims that the Iraqi side did not declare Al-Aukhaider depot as a chemical store. This is not accurate for in 1991 the Iraqi side informed UNSCOM that Al-Aukhaider munitions depot was used as a temporary storage site for the purpose of storing the shells. Inspection teams visited the site during 1991. They observed the destroyed dump and the presence of a big pit, close to it, a pile of shells. The transfer of the scattered shells to Al-Muthana site may not have been complete as 4 shells were discovered in 1997 amongst the shrubs and 12 more were unearthed recently.

- UNSCOM lately claims that these shells contain high quality mustard (purity 95-97 %) giving rise to speculations that they have made a new discovery. This must be corrected.

- Does this issue really qualify to be a priority issue? The shortfall in the material balance was known since 1995, why was it not raised earlier?

R-400 bomb

Regarding the 170 empty R-400 bombs and 191 rejects which were destroyed by melting. This quantity represented the total rejected quantity after delivery of 1224 R-400 bombs to MSE. Some of the rejects, as shown in the supporting documents presented by Iraq namely 170 pieces, were possible to repair and the remainder 191 pieces were impossible to repair and were melted as scrap. It is worth mentioning here that the R-400 bomb is made up from 3 parts; The bomb's body (which was made by Iraq) the tail unit, and fuse mechanism, both of which are advanced technology items which were imported. Therefore the quantity of R-400 bomb bodies referred to by UNSCOM are not significant by themselves.

Other munitions:

Concerning the material balance of the 122mm sarin rockets, they were verified as mentioned in a letter of the Chief Inspector of UNSCOM 198 in August 1997.

1) The Vx Issue:

The Commissions position on this issue outlined in the Executive Chairman's letter of 11 May 1998 is that the international experts, on the basis of indirect evidence, drew the conclusion that Iraq was indeed capable of producing Vx in quantity. Therefore Iraq must provide the necessary documents on the Vx activities during the last stage of its program in 1990. Recently during the technical meeting we had with the Commission we were informed that the quantity of Vx produced in 1987 and 1988 were accounted for. However, the quantity produced in 1990 needs to be supported by documentary evidence.

We have heard so much about Vx and the hundreds of tons Iraq may have produced and concealed that we do not exactly know what the Commission's position really means.

Iraq's declaration stated that R & D work on Vx was successful but Iraq never succeeded in production of Vx. There were a total of 5 batches produced in 1988 and 2 batches in 1990. All ended in failure and further production attempts were stopped. Evidence from a copy of a report found with one of the personnel involved in the work showed that the 5 batches of 1988 about 2,5 tons reached zero Vx purity after one month.

The two batches which were produced in 1990 (1.5 tons), were not successful and were discarded. Evidence of that is the letter of MSE activities for December 1990 in which the absence of Vx production was commented upon by Minister Hussein Kamel. The Vx was also absent from the inventory list of MSE agents and precursor material in storage at the end of 1990. In addition to that, another document about receiving munitions dated 5th January 1991. In that document there is no mention of Vx. All this is direct evidence for the absence of Vx production as distinct from failed production. IN view of that why do we consider indirect evidence? And how should we prove that success in production did not take place during the last stage of 1990?

3) The material balance of the production equipment:

We were informed during the technical meeting with the Commission on 28 May 1998 that the account of the material balance for the equipment is good and no further information are necessary. As regards the evacuation of equipment in 1990 and 1991, this was limited to the aerial bomb workshop that was transferred to the sugar factory in Mousel, and the analytical equipment were evacuated. All these events were mentioned in the two documents handed over to UNSCOM concerning the evacuation activity.

In the Biological Area

a) UNSCOM's position

UNSCOM considers the entire FFCD as inaccurate, deficient and lacks credibility and consequently unverifiable. Therefore Iraq must present all the records and documents relevant to all aspects of the program.

b) Iraq's position

Iraq maintains that the FFCD of September 1997 is true in every respect and the data given whenever documents could be found are accurate. Where supporting documents are lacking, the true data were given to the best of the recollections of the personnel involved in the program. It is stated throughout the FFCD which portion is accurate and supported by evidence and which portion although unsupported by evidence is still true and in many cases verifiable through other means. Such as indirect evidence as in cases of personnel diaries and notes found, qualitative and analytical evidence as in the unearthing of remnants of munitions unilaterally destroyed and buried.

Research and development:

Agents researched and finally selected for production and weaponization have been identified and supported by evidence.

Acquisitions of materials:

All known activities related to the past biological program are given in the FFCD including the culture media, materials, equipment and microorganisms. Whenever UNSCOM ventured to present what they considered as evidence to the contrary, they were proven wrong.

Production of BW agents:

Iraq stated repeatedly that all records and documents of the BW program were destroyed in 1991 including the production of biological agents, therefore, the information depended on recollection of technical staff, capacity of the equipment, batches and durations especially for 1988 and 1989. While the production of 1990 was documented by the annual production report of Al-Hakam factory, noting that this year is considered as the year of the most intensive production of biological agents.

The equipment used in the production were obtained locally from idle projects or plants belonging to other organizations and were adapted for use in the production with many problems due to their condition and age or the fact they were imported for other purposes and not specific for biological agent production. Moreover, the specific production equipment ordered by Iraq from Chemap had not been received and this fact is well known by UNSCOM.

The Iraqi side submitted all information about the material balance of imported and local acquisition of culture media, consumed quantities and the remaining quantity which was destroyed under the supervision of UNSCOM.

The Material balance is given of BW agents produced, filled in munitions and the remaining stockpile that was destroyed in 1991. The Iraqi side also submitted documents that clarified the potential capacity for production for 1988 and 1989.

Filling and weaponization:

The information were reconstructed mainly from recollections with some documents for weaponization have been provided to UNSCOM. The munitions used in the field trials were mentioned as far as could be recollected by the personnel involved in the trials.

The munitions produced and filled were as follows:

R400 Aerial Bombs

Total number 200 manufactured (documented)
Number used for filling 157 (indirect documents)
Number of empty munitions 37 (indirect documents)
Number of rejected munitions 6 (UNSCOM verified and destroyed them)

This matter was discussed at length over the past two years and recently by UNSCOM-238. Nothing was brought up by UNSCOM, which contradicts the account given in the FFCD. The BW special warheads account in the FFCD was contested by UNSCOM on the bases of suspicions only and no evidence was presented. Strenuous efforts by Iraq showed that Iraq's account is supported by physical evidence from the destruction site.

Other issues for which UNSCOM demanded answers such as structure and organization of the program, entities which supported the program and their role as well as the position of the BW weapons in Iraq's defense policy have all been truthfully answered. UNSCOM contests the answers without giving any reasons. In any case these issues are not relevant to the disarmament phase?

The Commission supervised the destruction of the main site of Al-Hakem totally including 926 units of equipment and instruments many of which were unrelated to the past program and were actually used in non-proscribed production activities. Also destroyed were 30500kg of growth media and chemicals.

The Commission also destroyed the other declared sites which participated in the past program, namely Al-Salman site and the FMD site. The Commission refused to give or acknowledge formally to Iraq the list of destroyed items, and refused even to say why? Consequently disputes over destroyed items cannot be settled. A case in point is now relevant to that of 3 bags of yeast extracts allegedly imported from Daniel Company in October 1990.

The Commission carried out hundreds of verification inspections and analyses for all the identified sites and many other sites designated by the Commission with full Iraqi cooperation and found nothing which contradicts Iraq's declarations.

The active and extensive ongoing monitoring system covering over 100 sites in the biological area in addition to the export-import monitoring system in place since 1994 have not registered any case of proscribed activity.

Iraq's comments on TEM in Vienna:

TEM was attended by 18 experts from 14 countries of whom only 4 or 5 were new. They have been briefly exposed in New York and Vienna to masses of documents and materials originating from Iraq's draft declarations and two formal FFCDs for which there was insufficient time to study and to formulate a conclusion about. Therefore, members of the TEM, adopted the readymade opinions and comments and the numerous questions prepared by the old group and confronted the Iraqi side with that. Thus, the Iraqi team spent considerable time responding to questions many of which were irrelevant or insignificant or already settled and verified through visits, tests, inspections and analyses, discussions and interviews over the past 30 months of work with UNSCOM. The teams evaluation report was full of generalities containing nothing specific in the way of contradictory evidence. It failed to reflect Iraq's point of view in any way and did mot include Iraq's response delivered to the TEM on the final session as was the case in the previous TEM's reports for the missile warheads and the Vx question.

The assembled experts asked the Iraqi counterparts to provide site plans and documentary evidence for events, decisions, or actions mentioned in the FFCD. Most of these were either included in the attachment to the FFCD of 1996 or handed over separately to the BW UNSCOM team over the past years, some of which were the only copy available in Iraq. That shows that not all the material provided by Iraq over the years was passed to the TEM experts.

It is curious to note that the Commission in its April 1998 report states that Iraq failed to present the technical answers required by the experts and that more than half the answers provided by Iraq were political. There were about 150 questions asked by the experts, 55 questions were technical and were mainly answered during the discussion and the remainder were answered in writing later (over 100 pages supported by some documents) 72 questions were non-technical and were answered as far as possible and 23 political questions. (quote from political)

The Commission has been challenging Iraq's FFCD on every aspect reported. So far all attempts to discredit the report were shown to have been baseless.

The Commission and to some extent the TEMs evaluation criticizes Iraq's FFCD on the bases of concepts and standards and practices prevalent in developed countries and thus rejects some aspects of the program as incredible or implausible.

The Commission presumes that all records for the past program exist in Iraq and the non-submission of those records is part of the concealment system.

The Commission in conclusion inexplicably ignores all the evidence at hand, documents (about 200 documents), physical evidence, absence of any signs of proscribed activities over the past 7 years and continue to maintain that Iraq conceals information about a parallel or dormant biological program!

The perception it created by catch phrases repeated often like "black hole" makes it all the more difficult for the Commission to come down to earth and deal with the realities evident on the ground.

© 1998 Global Security

Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Parliamentary Questions

Amir al-Saadi

Monday, 7 February 2005

Angus Robertson (Moray, Scottish National Party):

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

(1) when (a) he, (b) officials of his Department and (c) representatives of the UK Government last had discussions with members and representatives of (i) the US Administration and (ii)the Iraqi interim authority concerning the detention of Amir Al-Saadi; and if he will make a statement;

(2) what discussions (a) he, (b) officials of his Department and (c) representatives of the UK Government had with members and representatives of (i) the US Administration and (ii) the Iraqi interim authority concerning the status under which Amir Al-Saadi is being detained; when this status was last (A)reviewed and (B) changed; and if he will make a statement;

(3) what discussions (a) he, (b) officials in his Department and (c) representatives of the UK Government have had with members and representatives of (i) the US Administration and (ii) the Iraqi interim authority concerning the release of Amir Al-Saadi; and if he will make a statement.

Denis MacShane (Minister of State (Europe), Foreign & Commonwealth Office):

Our Embassy in Baghdad has raised Dr. Al-Saadi's case with the US authorities in Iraq and with senior members of the Iraqi Government. Dr. Al-Saadi was released by the US on 18 January 2005.

Wednesday, 11 October 2006

Norman Baker (Lewes, Liberal Democrat):

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what information she has received regarding the whereabouts of Dr. Amir al-Saadi; and when and where definitive sightings of him reported to her were.

Kim Howells (Minister of State (Middle East), Foreign & Commonwealth Office):

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office does not have information about Dr. Amir al-Saadi's whereabouts.

Hansard Link

Thursday, 12 October 2006

Norman Baker (Lewes, Liberal Democrat):

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what contact the UK Government has had with Dr Amir al-Saadi following his release by the US authorities on 18 January 2005.

Kim Howells (Minister of State (Middle East), Foreign & Commonwealth Office):

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has not had contact with Dr Amir al-Saadi following his release.

Hansard Link

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